Jimin Park

Jimin Park

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Jimin Park

Operations Research Center, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 October 2024 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JPJimin Park
Jimin Park
MLMichael K. Lim
Michael K. Lim
KMKarthik Murali
Karthik Murali
Informal cross-border trade (ICBT) refers to the illegal activities of cross-border commerce conducted by unregistered small-scale traders. We seek to develop insights to understand the ICBT value chain and offer policy recommendations to successfully integrate it into the formal economy. Using a game-theoretic model, we analyze the operations and key market dynamics of ICBT. We analyze the policy implications of three representative UN directives: enhancing marginalized traders’ access to formal channels, reducing export tax rates for formal traders, and introducing an alternative simplified trade regime (STR) for informal traders. All three policies result in an increase in government proceeds when the inherent profitability of the formal or STR channels is sufficiently high. Furthermore, social welfare increases when the policies effectively balance wholesale price competition within the formal and informal channels. We apply our model to a case study based on Uganda’s agricultural exports over an 11-year horizon. The access enhancement policy is most effective in increasing government proceeds but least effective in improving the welfare of other participants. The tax reduction policy enhances traders’ profitability but sacrifices the welfare of farmers and government proceeds substantially. Finally, the STR acknowledgement policy results in the largest increase in profitability of marginalized traders and farmers but comes at the cost of government proceeds. This paper was accepted by Jay Swaminathan, operations management. Funding: This work was supported by the Institute of Management Research, College of Business Administration, Seoul National University. Supplemental Material: The data and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02479 .

1 November 2026 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JPJimin Park
Jimin Park
SSSomya Singhvi
Somya Singhvi
YZYanchong Zheng
Yanchong Zheng
This paper examines how the need for immediate cash by smallholder farmers may lead to undesirable selling decisions that hurt their revenue and analyzes the efficacy of government loan policies in tackling this challenge. We develop a game-theoretic model to characterize the base scenario of no loan, uncovering the impacts of cash needs on farmers’ revenue. We then examine how a government loan, under which farmers store some of their production at government warehouses in exchange for immediate cash, may counteract these negative impacts. We analyze and optimize two types of policies: one in which all farmers are eligible (a homogeneous loan) and another in which the loan is offered only to farmers whose production is below a certain threshold (a heterogeneous loan). Our results demonstrate that, when designed properly, both loans simultaneously increase aggregate farmer revenue and generate a more equitable revenue distribution among farmers. Nonetheless, overly generous loans can be counterproductive and harm farmers. We further show that heterogeneous loans achieve optimal market outcomes with lower government expenditure when cash needs are moderately high. We then contrast the two policies across key metrics related to farmers. Whereas the homogeneous loan better mitigates inequity among farmers, the heterogeneous loan helps more farmers meet cash needs. These results underscore that government loan design must carefully account for farmers’ strategic responses to the policy to generate positive societal outcomes. Finally, we use field data from India to numerically illustrate our insights and demonstrate the economic impacts of the policies studied. This paper was accepted by Jeannette Song, operations management. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06206 .