Somya Singhvi

Somya Singhvi

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Somya Singhvi

Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2020 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RLRetsef Levi
Retsef Levi
SSSomya Singhvi
Somya Singhvi
YZYanchong Zheng
Yanchong Zheng
Economically motivated adulteration (EMA) is a serious threat to public health. In this paper, we develop a modeling framework to examine farms’ strategic adulteration behavior and the resulting EMA risk in farming supply chains. We study both “preemptive EMA,” in which farms engage in adulteration to decrease the likelihood of producing low-quality output, and “reactive EMA,” in which adulteration is done to increase the perceived quality of the output. We fully characterize the farms’ equilibrium adulteration behavior in both types of EMA and analyze how quality uncertainty, supply chain dispersion, traceability, and testing sensitivity (in detecting adulteration) jointly impact the equilibrium adulteration behavior. We determine when greater supply chain dispersion leads to a higher EMA risk and how this result depends on traceability and testing sensitivity. Furthermore, we caution that investing in quality without also enhancing testing capabilities may inadvertently increase EMA risk. Our results highlight the limitations of only relying on end-product inspection to deter EMA. We leverage our analyses to offer tangible insights that can help companies and regulators to more proactively address EMA risk in food products. This paper was accepted by Charles Corbett, operations management.

1 March 2022 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RLRetsef Levi
Retsef Levi
SSSomya Singhvi
Somya Singhvi
YZYanchong Zheng
Yanchong Zheng
Problem definition: Price surge of essential commodities despite inventory availability, due to artificial shortage, presents a serious threat to food security in many countries. To protect consumers’ welfare, governments intervene reactively with either (i) cash subsidy, to increase consumers’ purchasing power by directly transferring cash; or (ii) supply allocation, to increase product availability by importing the commodity from foreign markets and selling it at subsidized rates. Academic/practical relevance: This paper develops a new behavioral game-theoretic model to examine the supply chain and market dynamics that engender artificial shortage as well as to analyze the effectiveness of various government interventions in improving consumer welfare. Methodology: We analyze a three-stage dynamic game between the government and the trader. We fully characterize the market equilibrium and the resulting consumer welfare under the base scenario of no government intervention as well as under each of the interventions being studied. Results: The analysis demonstrates the disparate effects of different interventions on artificial shortage; whereas supply allocation schemes often mitigate shortage, cash subsidy can inadvertently aggravate shortage in the market. Furthermore, empirical analysis with actual data on onion prices in India shows that the proposed model explains the data well and provides specific estimates on the implied artificial shortage. A counterfactual analysis quantifies the potential impacts of government interventions on market outcomes. Managerial implications: The analysis shows that reactive government interventions with supply allocation schemes can have a preemptive effect to reduce the trader’s incentive to create artificial shortage. Although cash subsidy schemes have recently gained wide popularity in many countries, we caution governments to carefully consider the strategic responses of different stakeholders in the supply chain when implementing cash subsidy schemes.

1 November 2025 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RLRetsef Levi
Retsef Levi
MRManoj Rajan
Manoj Rajan
SSSomya Singhvi
Somya Singhvi
YZYanchong Zheng
Yanchong Zheng
Problem definition: To improve the welfare of smallholder farmers, multiple countries (e.g., Ethiopia and India) have launched online agri-platforms to transform traditional markets. However, there is still mixed evidence regarding the impact of these platforms and, more generally, how they can be leveraged to enable more efficient agricultural supply chains and markets. This paper describes work conducted in close collaboration with the state government of Karnataka, India, to design, implement, and assess the impact of a new two-stage auction on the state’s online agri-platform, the United Market Platform (UMP). Methodology/results: To ensure implementability and protect farmers’ revenue, the auction design is guided by practical operational considerations, as well as semistructured interviews with a majority of the traders in the field. A new behavioral auction model informed by the field insights is developed to determine when the proposed two-stage auction can generate a higher revenue for farmers than the traditional single-stage, first-price, sealed-bid auction. The new auction mechanism was implemented on the UMP for a major market of lentils in February 2019. By the end of May 2019, commodities worth more than $6 million (USD) had been traded under the new auction. A difference-in-differences analysis demonstrates that the implementation has yielded a significant 3.6% price increase (corresponding to a 55%–94% profit gain) for over 10,000 farmers who traded in the treatment market. Managerial implications: The results from this paper offer tangible lessons on how innovative price discovery mechanisms could be enabled by online agri-platforms in resource-constrained environments. Importantly, the success of these designs critically depends on careful considerations of systemic operational and behavioral factors that affect trades in the physical markets. History: This paper has been accepted as part of the 2023 Manufacturing & Service Operations Management Practice-Based Research Competition. Funding: Financial support from the Tata Center for Technology and Design at MIT and the National Science Foundation [Grant 1452875] is gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0437 .

1 November 2026 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JPJimin Park
Jimin Park
SSSomya Singhvi
Somya Singhvi
YZYanchong Zheng
Yanchong Zheng
This paper examines how the need for immediate cash by smallholder farmers may lead to undesirable selling decisions that hurt their revenue and analyzes the efficacy of government loan policies in tackling this challenge. We develop a game-theoretic model to characterize the base scenario of no loan, uncovering the impacts of cash needs on farmers’ revenue. We then examine how a government loan, under which farmers store some of their production at government warehouses in exchange for immediate cash, may counteract these negative impacts. We analyze and optimize two types of policies: one in which all farmers are eligible (a homogeneous loan) and another in which the loan is offered only to farmers whose production is below a certain threshold (a heterogeneous loan). Our results demonstrate that, when designed properly, both loans simultaneously increase aggregate farmer revenue and generate a more equitable revenue distribution among farmers. Nonetheless, overly generous loans can be counterproductive and harm farmers. We further show that heterogeneous loans achieve optimal market outcomes with lower government expenditure when cash needs are moderately high. We then contrast the two policies across key metrics related to farmers. Whereas the homogeneous loan better mitigates inequity among farmers, the heterogeneous loan helps more farmers meet cash needs. These results underscore that government loan design must carefully account for farmers’ strategic responses to the policy to generate positive societal outcomes. Finally, we use field data from India to numerically illustrate our insights and demonstrate the economic impacts of the policies studied. This paper was accepted by Jeannette Song, operations management. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06206 .

1 September 2025 in Operations Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DSDivya Singhvi
Divya Singhvi
SSSomya Singhvi
Somya Singhvi
Personalized recommendation systems often face the challenge of making optimal decisions when user preferences are unknown, and outcomes are only observed if users engage with the platform (e.g., clicking a recommendation). In their paper, “Online Learning with Sample Selection Bias,” Singhvi and Singhvi study this problem in the context of sequential decision making, where the censoring of outcomes leads to selection bias. Ignoring this bias results in suboptimal recommendations and linear regret, even for well-performing existing learning algorithms. To address this, they propose the sample selection bandit (SSB) algorithm, which combines Heckman’s two-step estimator with the “optimism under uncertainty” principle. The authors also demonstrate that SSB achieves a near-optimal regret rate. Extensive numerical experiments using synthetic and real-world donation data confirm that SSB significantly outperforms existing algorithms, effectively addressing selection bias while improving recommendations and outcomes in practical settings.

1 January 2026 in Operations Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DSDivya Singhvi
Divya Singhvi
SSSomya Singhvi
Somya Singhvi
XZXinyu Zhang
Xinyu Zhang
Smarter Supervision Lifts Rural Weavers’ Productivity Frequent, predictable supervisor visits can be a powerful lever for boosting artisan productivity in distributed supply chains, according to a study conducted with Jaipur Rugs in India. Analyzing loom-level data, the authors show that reducing the average gap between visits by just one day raises weaving rates by 8.5%—with more substantial gains on complex rugs and when visits follow consistent schedules. Building on these insights, they develop a routing and scheduling framework that targets those looms most in need of support. In a 25-week field implementation covering about 6,000 visits across 200 looms, sites assigned to optimized routes saw a 16.7% increase in weaving speed relative to controls, highlighting a practical, low-cost pathway to higher earnings for rural women weavers. The research suggests that data-driven supervision in other supply chains with a similar structure (e.g., smallholder agriculture) could boost productivity and earnings, offering an operational lever for poverty alleviation at scale.