Juan Pablo Milanese

Juan Pablo Milanese

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Juan Pablo Milanese

Political Studies Department, Universidad Icesi

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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23 November 2022 in International Interactions
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JAJuan Albarracín
Juan Albarracín
JMJuan Pablo Milanese
Juan Pablo Milanese
IVInge H. Valencia
Inge H. Valencia
JWJonas Wolff
Jonas Wolff
The threat of continued violence is a primary concern in post-conflict societies. This article contributes to the literature on post-conflict violence by analyzing a specific phenomenon that has characterized Colombia since the signing of the 2016 peace agreement: the assassination of social leaders. Building on explanations that emphasize state weakness, illicit economies, and the role of illegal armed actors, we argue that the assassination of social leaders also responds to efforts by local elites to sustain local competitive authoritarian orders in the face of bottom-up threats to their power by sociopolitical actors mobilized around the local implementation of the peace agreement. Using a cross-sectional dataset of Colombian municipalities, we find that assassinations of social leaders are more likely and more frequent in municipalities with intermediate levels of party fragmentation and low levels of voter turnout—that is, in municipalities with restricted electoral competition. Furthermore, a higher share of votes for leftist parties, which signals the presence of challengers to local elites, correlates with a higher probability and a higher number of assassinations. Overall, this article suggests that the nature of local political orders constitutes a key dimension shaping the micro-dynamics of violence and repression in post-conflict contexts. La amenaza de la continuación de la violencia es una de las principales preocupaciones en las sociedades en posconflicto. Este artículo contribuye a la literatura sobre la violencia en el posconflicto analizando un fenómeno específico que ha caracterizado a Colombia desde la firma del acuerdo de paz de 2016: el asesinato de líderes sociales. Partiendo de las explicaciones que enfatizan la debilidad del Estado, las economías ilícitas y el papel de los actores armados ilegales, argumentamos que el asesinato de líderes sociales también responde a los esfuerzos de las élites locales para sostener los órdenes autoritarios competitivos locales frente a las amenazas a su poder por parte de los actores sociopolíticos movilizados en torno a la implementación local del acuerdo de paz. Utilizando un conjunto de datos de municipios colombianos, observamos que los asesinatos de líderes sociales son más probables y más frecuentes en municipios con niveles intermedios de fragmentación partidista y bajos niveles de participación electoral, es decir, en municipios con competencia electoral restringida. Además, se correlaciona una mayor proporción de votos a los partidos de izquierda, un indicador de la presencia de contendientes a las élites locales, con una mayor probabilidad de que ocurran asesinatos, así como un mayor número de casos. Como conclusión, este artículo sugiere que la naturaleza de los órdenes políticos locales constituye una dimensión clave que determina las microdinámicas de la violencia y la represión en contextos de posconflicto. Le risque de la poursuite des violences est une préoccupation majeure dans les sociétés post-conflit. Cet article contribue à la littérature sur la violence post-conflit en analysant un phénoméne spécifique qui caractérise la Colombie depuis la signature de l'accord de paix de 2016 : l'assassinat de leaders sociaux. En s'appuyant sur des explications qui mettent l'accent sur la faiblesse de l'État, les économies illicites et le rôle des acteurs armés illégaux, nous soutenons que l'assassinat des leaders sociaux répond également aux efforts des élites locales pour maintenir des ordres autoritaires compétitifs locaux face aux menaces à leur pouvoir de la part des acteurs sociopolitiques mobilisés autour de la mise en œuvre locale de l'accord de paix. En utilisant des données provenant de municipalités colombiennes, nous constatons que les assassinats de leaders sociaux sont plus probables et plus fréquents dans les municipalités où la concurrence électorale est limitée. En outre, une part plus importante de votes pour les partis de gauche, un indicateur de la présence de concurrents (challengers) aux élites locales, est corrélée à une plus grande probabilité d'assassinats, ainsi qu'à un nombre plus élevé de cas. En conclusion, cet article suggére que la nature des ordres politiques locaux constitue une dimension clé déterminant la micro-dynamique de la violence et de la répression dans les contextes post-conflit.

5 September 2022 in Small Wars & Insurgencies
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JAJuan Albarracín
Juan Albarracín
JCJuan Corredor-Garcia
Juan Corredor-Garcia
JMJuan Pablo Milanese
Juan Pablo Milanese
IVInge H. Valencia
Inge H. Valencia
JWJonas Wolff
Jonas Wolff
Violence in post-conflict settings is often attributed to a post-war boom in organized crime, facilitated by the demobilization of armed groups and the persisting weakness of the state. The article argues that this is only one pathway of post-conflict violence. A second causal pathway emerges from the challenges that peace processes can constitute for entrenched local political orders. By fostering political inclusion, the implementation of peace agreements may threaten subnational political elites that have used the context of armed conflict to ally with armed non-state actors. Violence is then used as a means to preserve such de facto authoritarian local orders. We start from the assumption that these two explanations are not exclusive or competing, but grasp different causal processes that may well both be at work behind the assassination of social leaders (líderes sociales) in Colombia since the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC guerrilla. We argue that this specific type of targeted violence can, in fact, be attributed to different, locally specific configurations that resemble the two pathways. The article combines fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis with the case studies of the municipalities of Sardinata and Suárez to empirically establish and illustrate the two pathways.

12 January 2018 in Democratization
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Yanina WelpYanina Welp
Yanina Welp
JMJuan Pablo Milanese
Juan Pablo Milanese
As a bottom-up mechanism of direct democracy, recall can be triggered by citizens to remove elected officials through a vote, which is expected to increase accountability. Contradicting this hope, previous research has suggested that intensive use of recall referendums became an instrument of party competition. However, empirical evidence is scant. Thus, focusing on the 107 attempts of activating recall in Colombia during the first half of 2017 this article seeks to understand if recall activations are more likely to reinforce democratic governance (by giving an institutional solution to exceptional problems of legitimacy) or are more likely to erode it (by becoming a weapon to escalate the partisan competition beyond regular elections). We created a dataset to identify who started the recall – partisan, mixed or civil society actors – and for what reasons. Then, we examined to what extent the effective number of parties in the council, the majority reached in the previous election, or the size of the municipality have an effect on the likelihood of recall attempts. The study finds that in Colombia, political leaders (and not specific parties) are the main actors promoting recall.

1 May 2015 in Colombia Internacional
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JMJuan Pablo Milanese
Juan Pablo Milanese
LJLuis Eduardo Jaramillo
Luis Eduardo Jaramillo
This paper analyzes, in aggregate form, the levels of fragmentation which existed in local council elections in the 42 districts of Valle del Cauca between 1997 and 2011; specifically, how a range of institutional variables contributed to this fragmentation, such as the size of the district and the reform of the electoral system in 2003. In the case of the latter, there is a particular focus on the limited impact that it had, generating significantly different results from those observed in other districts, such as the Senate (National), or the House of Representatives (Departments). This shows that many of the hasty generalizations – be these implied or explicit - that stem from the above analyses do not necessarily apply on a sub-national level, which should not be understood as being directly linked to what takes place at the national level.

21 January 2022 in Regional & Federal Studies
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JMJuan Pablo Milanese
Juan Pablo Milanese
JAJuan Albarracín
Juan Albarracín
In this report, we analyse subnational electoral dynamics, reviewing some temporal patterns of both municipal and departmental elections in Colombia; however, we focus particularly on the most recent elections in 2019. Local and regional electoral dynamics are significantly decoupled from national politics and, despite the existence of the same party labels across all levels of government, we show that political parties are secondary actors in subnational elections whose central purpose is to satisfy legal requirements for candidate nomination. Leaders of political machines and other regional or local political organizations are the centre of subnational electoral politics. Therefore, parties are not the appropriate units of analysis to understand electoral (or post-electoral) subnational politics. In contrast, coalitions of variable composition that transcend parties shape processes of political cooperation and competition in local and regional electoral politics.

1 January 2021 in Revista de ciencia política (Santiago)
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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JAJuan Albarracín
Juan Albarracín
JMJuan Pablo Milanese
Juan Pablo Milanese
Utilizando una estrategia multi método, el artículo muestra que los cambios en las reglas electorales implementados en Colombia en 2003 tuvieron un efecto contrario al esperado en las elecciones para los concejos municipales: aumentó la fragmentación del sistema de partidos y la intensidad de la competencia personalista. Adicionalmente, pese a que en el caso de la competencia personalista se produjo un efecto homogeneizador de municipios de diferentes tamaños, se volvieron más heterogéneos en cuanto a la fragmentación partidaria. Sin embargo, la mayor fragmentación promedio no necesariamente refleja una más alta competencia entre partidos en todos los municipios. El uso de múltiples etiquetas partidarias, y el consiguiente aumento en la fragmentación, también puede ser una estrategia por parte de máquinas políticas hegemónicas para controlar más escaños en el nuevo contexto institucional. Finalmente, el artículo no solo nos permite apreciar los límites de la ingeniería institucional pensada “desde el centro” hacia unidades subnacionales, ya que revela, además, cómo el empleo de múltiples métodos con un diseño de investigación subnacional (SNR) posibilita el desarrollo descripciones más robustas de procesos políticos locales, evitando así potenciales interpretaciones parciales derivadas del empleo de un solo método.