Juan Albarracín

Juan Albarracín

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Juan Albarracín

University of Illinois Chicago (UIC)

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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30 November 2017 in Crime, Law and Social Change
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JAJuan Albarracín
Juan Albarracín

2 February 2018
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JAJuan Albarracín
Juan Albarracín
LGLaura Gamboa
Laura Gamboa
SMScott Mainwaring
Scott Mainwaring
Party Systems in Latin America - edited by Scott Mainwaring February 2018

11 September 2018 in Journal of Peace Research
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GTGuillermo Trejo
Guillermo Trejo
JAJuan Albarracín
Juan Albarracín
LTLucía Tiscornia
Lucía Tiscornia
This article claims that cross-national variation in criminal violence in new democracies is highly dependent on whether elites adopt transitional justice processes to address a repressive past. State specialists in violence who repress political dissidents under authoritarian rule often play a crucial role in the operation of criminal markets and in the production of criminal violence in democracy. Some of them defect from the state to become the armed branch of criminal organizations in their deadly fights against the state and rival groups; others remain but protect criminal organizations from positions of state power; and still others use state power to fight criminals through iron-fist policies. When post-authoritarian elites adopt transitional justice processes to expose, prosecute, and punish state specialists in violence for gross human rights violations committed during the authoritarian era, they redefine the rules of state coercion and deter members of the armed forces and the police from becoming leading actors in the production of criminal violence. Using a dataset of 76 countries that transitioned from authoritarian rule to democracy between 1974 and 2005, we show that the adoption of strong truth commissions is strongly associated with lower murder rates; we also find that the implementation of trials that result in guilty verdicts is associated with lower homicide rates only when the trials are jointly implemented with a strong truth commission. In contrast, amnesty laws appear to stimulate criminal violence. Our findings are particularly robust for Latin America and remain unchanged even after addressing selection effects via matching techniques.

23 November 2022 in International Interactions
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Journal Article
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JAJuan Albarracín
Juan Albarracín
JMJuan Pablo Milanese
Juan Pablo Milanese
IVInge H. Valencia
Inge H. Valencia
JWJonas Wolff
Jonas Wolff
The threat of continued violence is a primary concern in post-conflict societies. This article contributes to the literature on post-conflict violence by analyzing a specific phenomenon that has characterized Colombia since the signing of the 2016 peace agreement: the assassination of social leaders. Building on explanations that emphasize state weakness, illicit economies, and the role of illegal armed actors, we argue that the assassination of social leaders also responds to efforts by local elites to sustain local competitive authoritarian orders in the face of bottom-up threats to their power by sociopolitical actors mobilized around the local implementation of the peace agreement. Using a cross-sectional dataset of Colombian municipalities, we find that assassinations of social leaders are more likely and more frequent in municipalities with intermediate levels of party fragmentation and low levels of voter turnout—that is, in municipalities with restricted electoral competition. Furthermore, a higher share of votes for leftist parties, which signals the presence of challengers to local elites, correlates with a higher probability and a higher number of assassinations. Overall, this article suggests that the nature of local political orders constitutes a key dimension shaping the micro-dynamics of violence and repression in post-conflict contexts. La amenaza de la continuación de la violencia es una de las principales preocupaciones en las sociedades en posconflicto. Este artículo contribuye a la literatura sobre la violencia en el posconflicto analizando un fenómeno específico que ha caracterizado a Colombia desde la firma del acuerdo de paz de 2016: el asesinato de líderes sociales. Partiendo de las explicaciones que enfatizan la debilidad del Estado, las economías ilícitas y el papel de los actores armados ilegales, argumentamos que el asesinato de líderes sociales también responde a los esfuerzos de las élites locales para sostener los órdenes autoritarios competitivos locales frente a las amenazas a su poder por parte de los actores sociopolíticos movilizados en torno a la implementación local del acuerdo de paz. Utilizando un conjunto de datos de municipios colombianos, observamos que los asesinatos de líderes sociales son más probables y más frecuentes en municipios con niveles intermedios de fragmentación partidista y bajos niveles de participación electoral, es decir, en municipios con competencia electoral restringida. Además, se correlaciona una mayor proporción de votos a los partidos de izquierda, un indicador de la presencia de contendientes a las élites locales, con una mayor probabilidad de que ocurran asesinatos, así como un mayor número de casos. Como conclusión, este artículo sugiere que la naturaleza de los órdenes políticos locales constituye una dimensión clave que determina las microdinámicas de la violencia y la represión en contextos de posconflicto. Le risque de la poursuite des violences est une préoccupation majeure dans les sociétés post-conflit. Cet article contribue à la littérature sur la violence post-conflit en analysant un phénoméne spécifique qui caractérise la Colombie depuis la signature de l'accord de paix de 2016 : l'assassinat de leaders sociaux. En s'appuyant sur des explications qui mettent l'accent sur la faiblesse de l'État, les économies illicites et le rôle des acteurs armés illégaux, nous soutenons que l'assassinat des leaders sociaux répond également aux efforts des élites locales pour maintenir des ordres autoritaires compétitifs locaux face aux menaces à leur pouvoir de la part des acteurs sociopolitiques mobilisés autour de la mise en œuvre locale de l'accord de paix. En utilisant des données provenant de municipalités colombiennes, nous constatons que les assassinats de leaders sociaux sont plus probables et plus fréquents dans les municipalités où la concurrence électorale est limitée. En outre, une part plus importante de votes pour les partis de gauche, un indicateur de la présence de concurrents (challengers) aux élites locales, est corrélée à une plus grande probabilité d'assassinats, ainsi qu'à un nombre plus élevé de cas. En conclusion, cet article suggére que la nature des ordres politiques locaux constitue une dimension clé déterminant la micro-dynamique de la violence et de la répression dans les contextes post-conflit.

5 September 2022 in Small Wars & Insurgencies
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JAJuan Albarracín
Juan Albarracín
JCJuan Corredor-Garcia
Juan Corredor-Garcia
JMJuan Pablo Milanese
Juan Pablo Milanese
IVInge H. Valencia
Inge H. Valencia
JWJonas Wolff
Jonas Wolff
Violence in post-conflict settings is often attributed to a post-war boom in organized crime, facilitated by the demobilization of armed groups and the persisting weakness of the state. The article argues that this is only one pathway of post-conflict violence. A second causal pathway emerges from the challenges that peace processes can constitute for entrenched local political orders. By fostering political inclusion, the implementation of peace agreements may threaten subnational political elites that have used the context of armed conflict to ally with armed non-state actors. Violence is then used as a means to preserve such de facto authoritarian local orders. We start from the assumption that these two explanations are not exclusive or competing, but grasp different causal processes that may well both be at work behind the assassination of social leaders (líderes sociales) in Colombia since the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC guerrilla. We argue that this specific type of targeted violence can, in fact, be attributed to different, locally specific configurations that resemble the two pathways. The article combines fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis with the case studies of the municipalities of Sardinata and Suárez to empirically establish and illustrate the two pathways.

20 August 2025 in Journal of Peace Research
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Journal Article
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JAJuan Albarracín
Juan Albarracín
RKRodrigo Moura Karolczak
Rodrigo Moura Karolczak
JWJonas Wolff
Jonas Wolff
International NGOs and cross-national scholarship have drawn attention to a type of political violence particularly prevalent in democracies of the Global South: the assassination of social activists. We argue that the decentralized yet systematic nature of this targeted, lethal violence requires a theoretical framework and empirical approach addressing subnational dynamics. Specifically, we suggest that a significant share of these assassinations stems from the presence of highly territorialized illicit activities, particularly those based on dispossession. These criminal economies are sustained by networks of local elites and criminal actors – criminal-political networks – that develop forms of extra-legal governance and redefine land ownership and resource use, provoking resistance from local communities. When confronted by activist-led challenges, these criminal-political networks respond with lethal violence. We assess this theory through an empirical study of the Brazilian Amazon. Our statistical analysis indicates that the frequency of assassinations is significantly associated with industrial deforestation, a highly territorialized illicit practice involving dispossession. A qualitative case study of the municipality of Altamira further confirms that lethal violence against social activists can be attributed to criminal-political networks responding to local resistance against industrial deforestation, rather than to less territorialized drug trafficking. By bridging debates on criminal governance and socio-environmental conflict, the article contributes theoretically to the growing research on repressive violence against civil society actors in democratic regimes. Empirically, the study demonstrates how the micropolitics of this violence necessitate a focus on subnational variation, akin to micro-level approaches in civil war studies.