Michael Colaresi

Michael Colaresi

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Michael Colaresi

Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

26Years (2001-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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28 December 2009 in American Journal of Political Science
Verified
Journal Article
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KQKevin M. Quinn
Kevin M. Quinn
BMBurt L. Monroe
Burt L. Monroe
MCMichael Colaresi
Michael Colaresi
MCMichael H. Crespin
Michael H. Crespin
DRDragomir R. Radev
Dragomir R. Radev

1 January 2008 in Political Analysis
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
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BMBurt L. Monroe
Burt L. Monroe
MCMichael P. Colaresi
Michael P. Colaresi
KQKevin M. Quinn
Kevin M. Quinn
Entries in the burgeoning “text-as-data” movement are often accompanied by lists or visualizations of how word (or other lexical feature) usage differs across some pair or set of documents. These are intended either to establish some target semantic concept (like the content of partisan frames) to estimate word-specific measures that feed forward into another analysis (like locating parties in ideological space) or both. We discuss a variety of techniques for selecting words that capture partisan, or other, differences in political speech and for evaluating the relative importance of those words. We introduce and emphasize several new approaches based on Bayesian shrinkage and regularization. We illustrate the relative utility of these approaches with analyses of partisan, gender, and distributive speech in the U.S. Senate.

15 February 2019 in Journal of Peace Research
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Journal Article
Open access
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HHHåvard Hegre
Håvard Hegre
MAMarie Allansson
Marie Allansson
MBMatthias Basedau
Matthias Basedau
MCMichael Colaresi
Michael Colaresi
MCMihai Croicu
Mihai Croicu
JVJonas Vestby
Jonas Vestby
This article presents ViEWS – a political violence early-warning system that seeks to be maximally transparent, publicly available, and have uniform coverage, and sketches the methodological innovations required to achieve these objectives. ViEWS produces monthly forecasts at the country and subnational level for 36 months into the future and all three UCDP types of organized violence: state-based conflict, non-state conflict, and one-sided violence in Africa. The article presents the methodology and data behind these forecasts, evaluates their predictive performance, provides selected forecasts for October 2018 through October 2021, and indicates future extensions. ViEWS is built as an ensemble of constituent models designed to optimize its predictions. Each of these represents a theme that the conflict research literature suggests is relevant, or implements a specific statistical/machine-learning approach. Current forecasts indicate a persistence of conflict in regions in Africa with a recent history of political violence but also alert to new conflicts such as in Southern Cameroon and Northern Mozambique. The subsequent evaluation additionally shows that ViEWS is able to accurately capture the long-term behavior of established political violence, as well as diffusion processes such as the spread of violence in Cameroon. The performance demonstrated here indicates that ViEWS can be a useful complement to non-public conflict-warning systems, and also serves as a reference against which future improvements can be evaluated.

7 April 2015 in Journal of Conflict Resolution
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Journal Article
Closed access
SCSabine C. Carey
Sabine C. Carey
MCMichael P. Colaresi
Michael P. Colaresi
NMNeil J. Mitchell
Neil J. Mitchell
From Syria to Sudan, governments have informal ties with militias that use violence against opposition groups and civilians. Building on research that suggests these groups offer governments logistical benefits in civil wars as well as political benefits in the form of reduced liability for violence, we provide the first systematic global analysis of the scale and patterns of these informal linkages. We find over 200 informal state–militia relationships across the globe, within but also outside of civil wars. We illustrate how informal delegation of violence to these groups can help some governments avoid accountability for violence and repression. Our empirical analysis finds that weak democracies as well as recipients of financial aid from democracies are particularly likely to form informal ties with militias. This relationship is strengthened as the monitoring costs of democratic donors increase. Out-of-sample predictions illustrate the usefulness of our approach that views informal ties to militias as deliberate government strategy to avoid accountability.

10 January 2008
Verified
Book
Closed access
MCMichael P. Colaresi
Michael P. Colaresi
KRKaren Rasler
Karen Rasler
WTWilliam R. Thompson
William R. Thompson
International conflict is neither random nor inexplicable. It is highly structured by antagonisms between a relatively small set of states that regard each other as rivals. Examining the 173 strategic rivalries in operation throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this book identifies the differences rivalries make in the probability of conflict escalation and analyzes how they interact with serial crises, arms races, alliances and capability advantages. The authors distinguish between rivalries concerning territorial disagreement (space) and rivalries concerning status and influence (position) and show how each leads to markedly different patterns of conflict escalation. They argue that rivals are more likely to engage in international conflict with their antagonists than non-rival pairs of states and conclude with an assessment of whether we can expect democratic peace, economic development and economic interdependence to constrain rivalry-induced conflict.

1 May 2002 in Journal of Peace Research
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Journal Article
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MCMichael Colaresi
Michael Colaresi
WTWilliam R. Thompson
William R. Thompson
Underlying the emerging interest in the role of rivalry processes as antecedents to interstate conflict is the simple idea that conflict within the constraints of rivalry works differently than conflict outside of rivalry. In this article, we inspect the concepts of protracted conflict, as developed within the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project, and rivalry, and discuss some of their applications to crisis escalation. The protracted conflict and rivalry concepts are not identical, but they do overlap in terms of their emphases on historical context, serious goal incompatibilities, and stakes that might be resolved coercively. Developing an argument for the concept of rivalry possessing fewer limitations than protracted conflict, we proceed to analyze and test the interaction between rivalry and other variables, again making use of an ICB escalation model, when predicting crisis escalation to war. Throughout, our basic question concerns what role interstate rivalry plays in crisis behavior. Are the crises of rivals more lethal than those of non-rivals? If so, can we pinpoint why that is the case? We find that rivalry not only makes escalation more likely, but also significantly interacts with more traditional predictors of conflict, such as capability ratios, the number of actors in a crisis, democracy, and the issues under contention.