Dana Dghaym

Dana Dghaym

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Dana Dghaym

Department of Computer Science and Engineering, American University of Sharjah, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 April 2021 in Safety Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DDDana Dghaym
Dana Dghaym
THThai Son Hoang
Thai Son Hoang
STStephen R. Turnock
Stephen R. Turnock
MBMichael Butler
Michael Butler
JDJon Downes
Jon Downes
BPBen Pritchard
Ben Pritchard

19 September 2024 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
TMTaslim Mahbub
Taslim Mahbub
DDDana Dghaym
Dana Dghaym
ASAadhith Shankarnarayanan
Aadhith Shankarnarayanan
TSTaufiq Syed
Taufiq Syed
SSSalsabeel Shapsough
Salsabeel Shapsough
IZImran Zualkernan
Imran Zualkernan
Effective software projects hinge on robust requirements, yet flawed requirements often lead to costly delays and revisions. While tools have been developed to identify defects in Software Requirements Specifications (SRS), the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) like GPT-4 presents new opportunities for enhancing requirements quality. However, the potential of LLMs in this realm remains largely unexplored, particularly in the context of large-scale industrial documents. To bridge this gap, we investigate the efficacy of zero-shot GPT-4 in various requirements analysis tasks using an industrial software specification document. Our study evaluates LLM performance in detecting defects, such as ambiguities, inconsistencies, and incompleteness, while also analyzing GPT-4’s ability to identify issues across version iterations and support technical experts in requirements analysis. Qualitatively, we identify key limitations of LLMs in defect detection, notably their inability to cross-reference throughout the document and their constrained understanding of specialized contexts. Quantitatively, we find that while LLMs excel in identifying incomplete requirements (precision 0.61), their performance is less impressive in detecting inconsistencies (precision 0.43) and ambiguities (precision 0.39). Although GPT-4 demonstrates promise in automating early defect detection across versions and providing accurate technical answers, our results underscore that they cannot entirely replace human analysts due to their lack of nuanced domain knowledge in a zero-shot setting. Nevertheless, avenues like few-shot learning and complex prompt design offer the potential to enhance LLM precision in defect detection.

12 November 2019 in International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
DDDana Dghaym
Dana Dghaym
MDMohammadsadegh Dalvandi
Mohammadsadegh Dalvandi
MPMichael Poppleton
Michael Poppleton
CSColin Snook
Colin Snook
We demonstrate refinement-based formal development of the hybrid, ‘fixed virtual block’ approach to train movement control for the emerging European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) level 3. Our approach uses iUML-B diagrams as a front end to the Event-B modelling language. We use abstraction to verify the principle of movement authority before gradually developing the details of the Virtual Block Detector component in subsequent refinements, thus verifying that it preserves the safety properties. We animate the refined models to demonstrate their validity using the scenarios from the Hybrid ERTMS Level 3 (HLIII) specification. We reflect on our team-based approach to finding useful modelling abstractions and demonstrate a systematic modelling method based on the state and class diagrams of iUML-B. The component and control flow architectures of the application, its environment and interacting systems emerge through the layered refinement process. The runtime semantics of the specification’s state-machine behaviour are modelled in the final refinements. We discuss how the model could be used to generate an implementation using code generation tools and techniques.

8 May 2018
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
DDDana Dghaym
Dana Dghaym
MPMichael Poppleton
Michael Poppleton
CSColin Snook
Colin Snook

11 October 2018
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
CSColin Snook
Colin Snook
THThai Son Hoang
Thai Son Hoang
DDDana Dghyam
Dana Dghyam
MBMichael Butler
Michael Butler
TFTomas Fischer
Tomas Fischer
KWKeMing Wang
KeMing Wang

12 March 2024 in Innovations in Systems and Software Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
AFAsieh Salehi Fathabadi
Asieh Salehi Fathabadi
CSColin Snook
Colin Snook
DDDana Dghaym
Dana Dghaym
THThai Son Hoang
Thai Son Hoang
FAFahad Abdullah Alotaibi
Fahad Abdullah Alotaibi
MBMichael Butler
Michael Butler
Safety and security are key considerations in the design of critical systems. Requirements analysis methods rely on the expertise and experience of human intervention to make critical judgements. While human judgement is essential to an analysis method, it is also important to ensure a degree of formality so that we reason about safety and security at early stages of analysis and design, rather than detect problems later. In this paper, we present a hierarchical and incremental analysis process that aims to justify the design and flow-down of derived critical requirements arising from safety hazards and security vulnerabilities identified at the system level. The safety and security analysis at each level uses STPA-style action analysis to identify hazards and vulnerabilities. At each level, we verify that the design achieves the safety or security requirements by backing the analysis with formal modelling and proof using Event-B refinement. The formal model helps to identify hazards/vulnerabilities arising from the design and how they relate to the safety accidents/security losses being considered at this level. We then re-apply the same process to each component of the design in a hierarchical manner. Thus, we use hazard and vulnerability analysis, together with refinement-based formal modelling and verification, to drive the design, replacing the system level requirements with component requirements. In doing so, we decompose critical system-level requirements down to component-level requirements, transforming them from abstract system level requirements, towards concrete solutions that we can implement correctly so that the hazards/vulnerabilities are mitigated.