Jonas Ludwig

Jonas Ludwig

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Jonas Ludwig

Https://dx.doi.org/https://ror.org/00w7whj55Technische Universität Berlin, Germany

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 April 2026 in Nature
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Journal Article
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BABalazs Aczel
Balazs Aczel
BSBarnabas Szaszi
Barnabas Szaszi
HCHarry T. Clelland
Harry T. Clelland
MKMarton Kovacs
Marton Kovacs
FHFelix Holzmeister
Felix Holzmeister
BNBrian A. Nosek
Brian A. Nosek

8 April 2024 in Motivation and Emotion
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JLJonas Ludwig
Jonas Ludwig
JSJoseph Sommer
Joseph Sommer
False information may be published with the intention of misleading the public, and such fake news is often difficult to detect. Ideological fake news may pose a particular challenge, as people may be less able to detect false information that supports their prior beliefs. The difficulty of detecting fake news with an ideological slant may be compounded if people are motivated to defend their beliefs. Building on the mindset theory of action phases, we investigated motivational states as moderators of people’s ability to detect fake news. We tested two competing predictions to study the cognitive and motivational processes implicated in fake news detection. Both predictions concern an ideological belief bias, where people tend to accept information that agrees with their partisan identities and to reject information that disagrees with them. First, motivated reasoning accounts posit that deliberation should reinforce the ideological belief bias because reasoning primarily serves to defend and rationalize one’s own position. An opposing view, based on dual-process theory, assumes that deliberation attenuates the ideological belief bias by facilitating an unbiased assessment of new information. An online experiment (N = 497) tested these competing accounts. Participants were induced with deliberative/implemental/control mindsets prior to rating the veracity of (true/fake) news headlines. Some headlines favored a Republican view; others leaned toward a Democrat perspective. Based on self-reported political preference (Democrat vs. Republican), headlines were categorized as congruent or incongruent with participants’ political views. Consistent with an ideological belief bias, participants accepted more congruent than incongruent news, and they were more likely to fail to detect favorable fake news. In the main analysis, mindsets did not moderate the ideological belief bias, but showed interesting relationships with cognitive reflection and dishonest behavior. Further exploration using signal-detection theory suggested that the deliberative mindset might be associated with increased skepticism, thereby promoting fake news detection.

6 August 2019 in Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
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JLJonas Ludwig
Jonas Ludwig
AJAlexander Jaudas
Alexander Jaudas
AAAnja Achtziger
Anja Achtziger

22 October 2022 in Current Psychology
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Robin RinnRobin Rinn
Robin Rinn
JLJonas Ludwig
Jonas Ludwig
PFPauline Fassler
Pauline Fassler
RDRoland Deutsch
Roland Deutsch
These pre-registered studies shed light on the cues that individuals use to identify rich people. In two studies (N = 598), we first developed a factor-analytical model that describes the content and the mental structure of 24 wealth cues. A third within-subject study (N = 89) then assessed the perception of rich subgroups based on this model of wealth cues. Participants evaluated the extent to which the wealth cues applied to two distinct subgroups of rich people. The results show: German and US-American participants think that one can identify rich people based on the same set of cues which can be grouped along the following dimensions: luxury consumption, expensive hobbies, spontaneous spending, greedy behavior, charismatic behavior, self-presentation, and specific possessions. However, Germans and US-Americans relied on these cues to different degrees to diagnose wealth in others. Moreover, we found evidence for subgroup-specific wealth cue profiles insofar as target individuals who acquired their wealth via internal (e.g., hard work) compared to external means (e.g., lottery winners) were evaluated differently on these wealth cues, presumably because of their perceived differences in valence and competence. Together, this research provides new insights in the cognitive representation of the latent construct of wealth. Practical implications for research on the perception of affluence, and implications for political decision makers, are discussed in the last section.

19 June 2020 in Frontiers in Psychology
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JLJonas Ludwig
Jonas Ludwig
RRRainer Reisenzein
Rainer Reisenzein
AHAnette Hiemisch
Anette Hiemisch
Moral dilemmas often concern actions that involve causing harm to others in the attempt to prevent greater harm. But not all actions of this kind are equal in terms of their moral evaluation. In particular, a harm-causing preventive action is typically regarded as less acceptable if the harm is a means to achieve the goal of preventing greater harm than if it is a foreseen but unintended side-effect of the action. Likewise, a harm-causing preventive action is typically deemed less acceptable if it directly produces the harm than if it merely initiates a process that brings about the harmful consequence by its own dynamics. We report three experiments that investigated to which degree these two variables, the instrumentality of the harm (harm as means vs. side-effect; Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and personal force (personal vs. impersonal dilemmas; Experiments 2 and 3) influence deontological (harm-rejection) and utilitarian (outcome-maximization) inclinations that have been hypothesized to underly moral judgments in harm-related moral dilemmas. To measure these moral inclinations, the process dissociation procedure was used. The results suggest that the instrumentality of the harm and personal force affect both inclinations, but in opposite ways. Personal dilemmas and dilemmas characterized by harm as a means evoked higher deontological tendencies and lower utilitarian tendencies, than impersonal dilemmas and dilemmas where the harm was a side-effect. These distinct influences of the two dilemma conceptualization variables went undetected if the conventional measure of moral inclinations, the proportion of harm-accepting judgments, was analyzed. Furthermore, although deontological and utilitarian inclinations were found to be largely independent overall, there was some evidence that their correlation depended on the experimental conditions.

19 June 2020 in Thinking & Reasoning
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JLJonas Ludwig
Jonas Ludwig
FAFabian K. Ahrens
Fabian K. Ahrens
AAAnja Achtziger
Anja Achtziger