Ioannis Semertzis

Ioannis Semertzis

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Ioannis Semertzis

Department of Electrical Sustainable Energy, Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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4 October 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Alfan PresekalAlfan Presekal
Alfan Presekal
AŞAlexandru Ştefanov
Alexandru Ştefanov
ISIoannis Semertzis
Ioannis Semertzis
Peter PalenskyPeter Palensky
Peter Palensky
Electrical power grids are vulnerable to cyber attacks, as seen in Ukraine in 2015, 2016, and 2022. These cyber attacks are classified as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) with potential disastrous consequences such as a total blackout. However, state-of-the-art intrusion detection systems are inadequate for APT detection owing to their stealthy nature and long-lasting persistence. Furthermore, they are ineffective as they focus on individual anomaly instances and overlook the correlation between attack instances. Therefore, this research proposes a novel method for spatio-temporal APT detection and correlation for cyber-physical power systems. It provides online situational awareness for power system operators to pinpoint system-wide anomaly locations in near real-time and preemptively mitigate APTs at an early stage before causing adverse impacts. We propose an Enhanced Graph Convolutional Long Short-Term Memory (EGC-LSTM) by using sequential and neural network filters to improve APT detection, correlation, and prediction. Control center and substation communication traffic is used to determine cyber anomalies using semi-supervised deep packet inspection and software-defined networking. Power grid circuit breaker status is used to determine physical anomalies. Cyber-physical anomalies are correlated in cyber-physical system integration matrix and EGC-LSTM. The EGC-LSTM outperforms existing state-of-the-art spatio-temporal deep learning models, achieving the lowest mean square error.

13 August 2024 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ISIoannis Semertzis
Ioannis Semertzis
AŞAlexandru Ştefanov
Alexandru Ştefanov
Alfan PresekalAlfan Presekal
Alfan Presekal
BKBas Kruimer
Bas Kruimer
Jose Luis Rueda TorresJose Luis Rueda Torres
Jose Luis Rueda Torres
Peter PalenskyPeter Palensky
Peter Palensky
Power grid digitalization introduces new vulnerabilities and cyber security threats. The impact of cyber attacks on power system stability is a topic of growing concern, which is yet to be comprehensively analyzed. Traditional power system stability analysis is based on the impact of non-malicious small, and large physical disturbances. However, cyber attacks introduce a new dimension to power system stability, in which malicious cyber actors can selectively target critical systems and applications and cause severe stability issues. Hence, in this work, the traditional disturbances considered in power system stability classification are expanded from physical to cyber-physical disturbances caused by cyber attacks. Based on a thorough state-of-the-art, an analysis of how cyber attacks can translate into physical disturbances affecting the traditional power system stability categories is performed. The system stability analysis is expanded by mapping the power system stability categories with the defined cyber-physical attack types. The findings of this work showcase the importance of cyber security for power system stability.

27 November 2024 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Alfan PresekalAlfan Presekal
Alfan Presekal
AŞAlexandru Ştefanov
Alexandru Ştefanov
VRVetrivel Subramaniam Rajkumar
Vetrivel Subramaniam Rajkumar
ISIoannis Semertzis
Ioannis Semertzis
Peter PalenskyPeter Palensky
Peter Palensky
Power systems are undergoing rapid digitalization. This introduces new vulnerabilities and cyber threats in future Cyber-Physical Power Systems (CPPS). Some of the most notable incidents include the cyber attacks on the power grid in Ukraine in 2015, 2016, and 2022, which employed Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) strategies that took several months to reach their objectives and caused power outages. This highlights the urgent need for an in-depth analysis of APTs on CPPS. However, existing frameworks for analyzing cyber attacks, i.e., MITRE ATT&CK ICS and Cyber Kill Chain, have limitations in comprehensively analyzing APTs in CPPS environments. To address this gap, we propose a novel Advanced Cyber-Physical Power System (ACPPS) kill chain framework. In this paper, we define the characteristics of APTs on power systems. Subsequently, ACPPS kill chain defines and examines the cyber-physical APT stages on power grids from the early attack stages towards cascading failures and a blackout. The proposed ACPPS kill chain is validated by real-world cyber attack case studies using cyber-physical simulations.

4 November 2024 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Alfan PresekalAlfan Presekal
Alfan Presekal
MJMohsen Jorjani
Mohsen Jorjani
VRVetrivel Subramaniam Rajkumar
Vetrivel Subramaniam Rajkumar
HGHimanshu Goyel
Himanshu Goyel
NCNicola Cibin
Nicola Cibin
Peter PalenskyPeter Palensky
Peter Palensky
High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) technology is one of the key enablers of the energy transition, especially for offshore wind energy systems. While extensive research on cyber security of High Voltage Alternating Current (HVAC) systems has been conducted, limited research exists on cyber security aspects of HVDC systems. These systems exhibit unique attributes, in comparison to HVAC systems, such as longer transmission line distances and increased volume of data samples for wide-area monitoring, control, and protection applications. These factors lead to a higher vulnerability of HVDC systems to cyber attacks. Existing state-of-the-art HVDC surveys, however, are primarily focused on HVDC physical components and exclude cyber security elements. Therefore, this paper presents the first detailed survey on the cyber security of HVDC Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). We present a comprehensive review of the state-of-the-art HVDC systems, with a special focus on cyber threats and vulnerabilities, defense and mitigation strategies, and testbeds. Based on the review and analysis, insights and recommendations on future research directions to address the research gaps in this field of study are provided. Future research on cyber security for HVDC systems should prioritize the integration of cyber and physical system data and focus on early-stage detection to mitigate the potentially severe impacts of cyber attacks on HVDC grids.

1 June 2026 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
NCNicola Cibin
Nicola Cibin
NKNadine Kabbara
Nadine Kabbara
APAlfan Presekal
Alfan Presekal
ISIoannis Semertzis
Ioannis Semertzis
VRVetrivel Subramaniam Rajkumar
Vetrivel Subramaniam Rajkumar
AŞAlexandru Ştefanov
Alexandru Ştefanov
Cyber attacks targeting Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) in digital substations can disrupt power system operation, causing equipment damage, instability, cascading failures, and even a blackout. Cyber-Physical Power System (CPPS) datasets are critically needed to develop novel methods for the detection and prevention of cyber attacks on digital substations. In this paper, a novel CPPS dataset is proposed for cyber security of digital substations, including real-time power system measurements, i.e., electromagnetic transient three-phase voltages and currents, communication network traffic, and virtual IED resource metrics. Various scenarios are simulated on an IEC 61850-compliant testbed consisting of Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) and physical and virtual IEDs in hardware-in-the-loop configuration. The dataset contains different operating conditions and cyber attack scenarios, i.e., normal operation, single-phase-to-ground fault, network reconnaissance, resource exhaustion, and IEC 61850 Generic Object-Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) and Sampled Values (SV) injection attacks. This work aims to provide the research community with a comprehensive and high-fidelity dataset to be used for the design and testing of novel methodologies to increase the cyber security of power grids.

17 September 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Alfan PresekalAlfan Presekal
Alfan Presekal
ISIoannis Semertzis
Ioannis Semertzis
HGHimanshu Goyel
Himanshu Goyel
Peter PalenskyPeter Palensky
Peter Palensky
AŞAlexandru Ştefanov
Alexandru Ştefanov
Cyber attacks on power grids are imminent and potentially have a severe impact, as evidenced by the cyber attacks in Ukraine in 2015, 2016, and 2022. In response to this challenge, machine learning-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have become more prevalent as a potential mitigation owing to their alignment with the latest advances in artificial intelligence. However, existing anomaly detection methods for power grid Operational Technology (OT) are often inadequate, as they primarily focus on detecting power grid physical anomalies at the later attack stages and suffer from the scarcity of available data for supervised machine learning. To address these limitations, we propose a novel semi-supervised IDS specifically for digital substations of the power system. The proposed detection method identifies the distinctive distance similarity of digital substation OT communication traffic using a Convolutional Neural Network and Chebyshev distance of packet payloads, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov of packets’ interarrival time using Fast Fourier Transform amplitude. Subsequently, these traffic features are combined into a vector and classified using a novel hybrid semi-supervised Self-Organizing Map (SOM) and Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN). Results indicate that the proposed method can identify zero-day attacks and achieve accuracy and F1 above 95%.