3 April 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility
Electromagnetic (EM) information leakage encourages attacks, wherein the attackers passively capture and analyze EM waves that are unintentionally generated by devices. Generally, devices with weak EM emission intensities are not targeted. However, even these devices would be subject to attacks if it becomes possible to actively sense the electrical changes that occur within them when information is processed. This article demonstrates the feasibility of the information leakage threat induced by the active sensing of input impedance changes in the input/output (I/O) circuit of an integrated circuit (IC). Specifically, the changes in the input impedance when information was transmitted from the IC, were measured by irradiating the EM waves from outside the target device. This article labels the threat as Echo TEMPEST. The experiment validated Echo TEMPEST with an evaluation board that simulated the I/O circuit of the IC, UART modules, and USB keyboards. It was also demonstrated that attackers could control the distance (obtained information from the target device), depending on the intensity of the irradiated EM waves. Furthermore, we discussed countermeasure methods focusing on the conditions for executing Echo TEMPEST.
18 July 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility
Intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) of information and communication devices is based on high-power electromagnetic environments far exceeding the device immunity to electromagnetic interference. IEMI dramatically alters the electromagnetic environment throughout the device by interfering with the electromagnetic waves inside the device and destroying low-tolerance integrated circuits (ICs) and other elements, thereby reducing the availability of the device. In contrast, in this study, by using a hardware Trojan (HT) that is quickly mountable by physically accessing the devices, to locally weaken the immunity of devices, and then irradiating electromagnetic waves of a specific frequency, only the attack targets are intentionally altered electromagnetically. Therefore, we propose a method that uses these electromagnetic changes to rewrite or generate data and commands handled within devices. Specifically, targeting serial communication systems used inside and outside the devices, the installation of an HT on the communication channel weakens local immunity. This shows that it is possible to generate an electrical signal representing arbitrary data on the communication channel by applying electromagnetic waves of sufficiently small output compared with the conventional IEMI and letting the IC process the data. In addition, we explore methods for countering such attacks.
1 January 2020 in Nonlinear Theory and Its Applications, IEICE
In this paper, for the first time, an accurate glass package power distribution network (PDN) model is proposed for the PDN impedance estimation based on a segmentation method. To verify the proposed modeling method, glass package test vehicles including the PDN are fabricated. Estimated impedance of the glass package PDN based on proposed model is validated by comparing measured and simulated glass package PDN in the frequency domain up to 20 GHz. Estimated impedance based on proposed modeling method showed good correlation with measurement and 3-Dimensional electromagnetic (3D-EM) simulation. Compared to 3D-EM simulation, the proposed method is fast but accurate. Due to low loss of the glass package substrate, sharp PDN impedance peaks at mode resonance frequencies are generated. Signal and power integrity degradation at these frequencies are analyzed. Using the proposed modeling method, locations and frequencies where signal TGVs are less affected by the PDN mode resonances can be efficiently estimated for early stage package PDN design and signal TGV floor plan.
1 January 2026 in IEEE Access
8 September 2025 in IEEE Access
The proliferation of counterfeit and refurbished semiconductor devices has become a critical concern. Device identification techniques based on Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have therefore attracted significant attention. Conventional PUFs exploit only die-internal process variations and thus cannot achieve board-level identification. In this work, we propose a novel method that also harnesses external process variations on the printed circuit board (PCB)—including trace geometry variations—to realize robust board-level device identification. Our method employs an on-chip capacitance sensor to measure the capacitance between signal traces and ground. A histogram of the sensor output values is generated, from which distinctive feature points in the distribution are extracted. By selecting bits that exhibit both high reproducibility and uniqueness, we construct a 30-bit device identifier. This approach eliminates the need for the large-scale measurement systems required by traditional techniques, enabling a more convenient yet high-precision identification process. Evaluation on 20 microcontroller boards demonstrates that the proposed method achieves 97.14% identification accuracy with the 30-bit identifier. The average normalized intra-device Hamming distance (Intra-HD) is 3.7 %, and the average normalized inter-device Hamming distance (Inter-HD) is 46.7 %, closely approximating ideal values. These results indicate that our technique offers a promising approach for ensuring board-level authenticity.