Johannes Benedikt Mahr

Johannes Benedikt Mahr

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Johannes Benedikt Mahr

Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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29 September 2023 in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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FBFrancesca Bonalumi
Francesca Bonalumi
JMJohannes B. Mahr
Johannes B. Mahr
PMPauline Marie
Pauline Marie
NPNausicaa Pouscoulous
Nausicaa Pouscoulous
In everyday conversation, messages are often communicated indirectly, implicitly. Why do we seem to communicate so inefficiently? How speakers choose to express a message (modulating confidence, using less explicit formulations) has been proposed to impact how committed they will appear to be to its content. This commitment can be assessed in terms of accountability – is the speaker held accountable for what they communicated? – and deniability – can the speaker plausibly deny they intended to communicate it? We investigated two factors that may influence commitment to implicitly conveyed messages. In a preregistered online study, we tested the hypothesis that the degree of meaning strength (strongly or weakly communicated) and the level of meaning used by the speaker (an enrichment or a conversational implicature) modulate accountability and plausible deniability. Our results show that both meaning strength and level of meaning influence speaker accountability and plausible deniability. Participants perceived enrichments to be harder to deny than conversational implicatures, and strongly implied content as more difficult to deny than weakly implied content. Furthermore, participants held the speaker more accountable to content conveyed via an enrichment than to content conveyed via an implicature. These results corroborate previously found differences between levels of meaning (enrichment vs. implicature). They also highlight the largely understudied role of meaning strength as a cue to speaker commitment in communication.

1 March 2020 in Cognition
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JMJohannes B. Mahr
Johannes B. Mahr

17 January 2023 in Perspectives on Psychological Science
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Journal Article
Closed access
JMJohannes B. Mahr
Johannes B. Mahr
PBPenny van Bergen
Penny van Bergen
JSJohn Sutton
John Sutton
DSDaniel L. Schacter
Daniel L. Schacter
CHCecilia Heyes
Cecilia Heyes
Episodic representations can be entertained either as “remembered” or “imagined”—as outcomes of experience or as simulations of such experience. Here, we argue that this feature is the product of a dedicated cognitive function: the metacognitive capacity to determine the mnemicity of mental event simulations. We argue that mnemicity attribution should be distinguished from other metacognitive operations (such as reality monitoring) and propose that this attribution is a “cognitive gadget”—a distinctively human ability made possible by cultural learning. Cultural learning is a type of social learning in which traits are inherited through social interaction. In the case of mnemicity, one culturally learns to discriminate metacognitive “feelings of remembering” from other perceptual, emotional, action-related, and metacognitive feelings; to interpret feelings of remembering as indicators of memory rather than imagination; and to broadcast the interpreted feelings in culture- and context-specific ways, such as “I was there” or “I witnessed it myself.” We review evidence from the literature on memory development and scaffolding, metacognitive learning and teaching, as well as cross-cultural psychology in support of this view before pointing out various open questions about the nature and development of mnemicity highlighted by our account.

21 January 2020 in Perspectives on Psychological Science
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JMJohannes B. Mahr
Johannes B. Mahr
GCGergely Csibra
Gergely Csibra
The past is undeniably special for human beings. To a large extent, both individuals and collectives define themselves through history. Moreover, humans seem to have a special way of cognitively representing the past: episodic memory. As opposed to other ways of representing knowledge, remembering the past in episodic memory brings with it the ability to become a witness. Episodic memory allows us to determine what of our knowledge about the past comes from our own experience and thereby what parts of the past we can give testimony about. In this article, we aim to give an account of the special status of the past by asking why humans have developed the ability to give testimony about it. We argue that the past is special for human beings because it is regularly, and often principally, the only thing that can determine present social realities such as commitments, entitlements, and obligations. Because the social effects of the past often do not leave physical traces behind, remembering the past and the ability to bear testimony it brings is necessary for coordinating social realities with other individuals.

15 July 2016
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Conference Paper
Open access
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JBJacques Bloch
Jacques Bloch
JMJohannes Mahr
Johannes Mahr
SSSebastian Schmalzbauer
Sebastian Schmalzbauer
We present our latest results on the application of the complex Langevin method to one-and twodimensional QCD. Although the method is stable, it unfortunately converges to an incorrect result when applied as such. After applying additional gauge cooling steps, the results agree with the known analytical results in the one-dimensional case. However, in the two-dimensional case the disagreement subsists, even with gauge cooling, when the sign problem is sufficiently large.

26 October 2021 in Consciousness and Cognition
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Journal Article
Closed access
JMJohannes B. Mahr
Johannes B. Mahr
JGJoshua D. Greene
Joshua D. Greene
DSDaniel L. Schacter
Daniel L. Schacter