Zelin Wan

Zelin Wan

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Zelin Wan

Department of Computer Science, Virginia Tech, Falls Church, VA, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
2 July 2021 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ZWZelin Wan
Zelin Wan
YMYash Mahajan
Yash Mahajan
BKBeom Woo Kang
Beom Woo Kang
TMTerrence J Moore
Terrence J Moore
JCJin-Hee Cho
Jin-Hee Cho
Centrality metrics have been studied in the network science research. They have been used in various networks, such as communication, social, biological, geographic, or contact networks under different disciplines. In particular, centrality metrics have been used in order to study and analyze targeted attack behaviors and investigated their effect on network resilience. Although a rich volume of centrality metrics has been developed from 1940s, only some centrality metrics (e.g., degree, betweenness, or cluster coefficient) have been commonly in use. This paper aims to introduce various existing centrality metrics and discusses their applicabilities in various networks. In addition, we conducted extensive simulation study in order to demonstrate and analyze the network resilience of targeted attacks using the surveyed centrality metrics under four real network topologies. We also discussed algorithmic complexity of centrality metrics surveyed in this work. Through the extensive experiments and discussions of the surveyed centrality metrics, we encourage their use in solving various computing and engineering problems in networks.

6 August 2021 in IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MZMu Zhu
Mu Zhu
AHAhmed Hemida
Ahmed Hemida
ZWZelin Wan
Zelin Wan
JCJin-Hee Cho
Jin-Hee Cho
CKCharles A. Kamhoua
Charles A. Kamhoua
MSMunindar P. Singh
Munindar P. Singh
Defensive deception is a promising approach for cyber defense. Via defensive deception, a defender can anticipate and prevent attacks by misleading or luring an attacker, or hiding some of its resources. Although defensive deception is garnering increasing research attention, there has not been a systematic investigation of its key components, the underlying principles, and its tradeoffs in various problem settings. This survey focuses on defensive deception research centered on game theory and machine learning, since these are prominent families of artificial intelligence approaches that are widely employed in defensive deception. This paper brings forth insights, lessons, and limitations from prior work. It closes with an outline of some research directions to tackle major gaps in current defensive deception research.

5 October 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZWZelin Wan
Zelin Wan
JCJin-Hee Cho
Jin-Hee Cho
MZMu Zhu
Mu Zhu
AHAhmed Hemida
Ahmed Hemida
CKCharles A. Kamhoua
Charles A. Kamhoua
MSMaheshwari Singh
Maheshwari Singh
Defensive deception techniques have emerged as a promising proactive defense mechanism to mislead an attacker and thereby achieve attack failure. However, most game-theoretic defensive deception approaches have assumed that players maintain consistent views under uncertainty. They do not consider players’ possible, subjective beliefs formed due to asymmetric information given to them. In this work, we formulate a hypergame between an attacker and a defender where they can interpret the same game differently and accordingly choose their best strategy based on their respective beliefs. This gives a chance for defensive deception strategies to manipulate an attacker’s belief, which is the key to the attacker’s decision-making. We consider advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks, which perform multiple attacks in the stages of the cyber kill chain (CKC) where both the attacker and the defender aim to select optimal strategies based on their beliefs. Through extensive simulation experiments, we demonstrated how effectively the defender can leverage defensive deception techniques while dealing with multi-staged APT attacks in a hypergame in which the imperfect information is reflected based on perceived uncertainty, cost, and expected utilities of both the attacker and defender, the system lifetime (i.e., mean time to security failure), and improved false-positive rates of intrusion detection.

7 February 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ZWZelin Wan
Zelin Wan
JCJin-Hee Cho
Jin-Hee Cho
MZMu Zhu
Mu Zhu
AHAhmed Hemida
Ahmed Hemida
CKCharles A. Kamhoua
Charles A. Kamhoua
MSMaheshwari Singh
Maheshwari Singh
Defensive deception techniques have emerged as a promising proactive defense mechanism to mislead an attacker and thereby achieve attack failure. However, most game-theoretic defensive deception approaches have assumed that players maintain consistent views under uncertainty. They do not consider players’ possible, subjective beliefs formed due to asymmetric information given to them. In this work, we formulate a hypergame between an attacker and a defender where they can interpret the same game differently and accordingly choose their best strategy based on their respective beliefs. This gives a chance for defensive deception strategies to manipulate an attacker’s belief, which is the key to the attacker’s decision-making. We consider advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks, which perform multiple attacks in the stages of the cyber kill chain (CKC) where both the attacker and the defender aim to select optimal strategies based on their beliefs. Through extensive simulation experiments, we demonstrated how effectively the defender can leverage defensive deception techniques while dealing with multi-staged APT attacks in a hypergame in which the imperfect information is reflected based on perceived uncertainty, cost, and expected utilities of both the attacker and defender, the system lifetime (i.e., mean time to security failure), and improved false-positive rates of intrusion detection.

22 June 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
QZQisheng Zhang
Qisheng Zhang
AMAbdullah Zubair Mohammed
Abdullah Zubair Mohammed
ZWZelin Wan
Zelin Wan
JCJin-Hee Cho
Jin-Hee Cho
TMTerrence J Moore
Terrence J Moore
Diversity-based security approaches have been studied for several decades since the 1970s. The concept of diversity-by-design emerged in the 1980s. Since then, diversity-based system design research has been explored to provide more secure and dependable services in cyber-physical systems (CPSs). In this work, we are particularly interested in providing an in-depth, comprehensive survey of existing diversity-based approaches, their insights, and associated future work directions for building secure and dependable CPSs. This will allow us to provide promising ways of providing quality network and services based on key diversity-by-design principles for those who want to conduct research on developing secure and dependable CPSs using diversity as a system design feature. This survey paper mainly provides: (i) The common concept of diversity based on its multidisciplinary nature along with the historical evolution of the concept of diversity-by-design for providing secure and dependable services; (ii) the key diversity-by-design principles; (iii) the key benefits and caveats of using the diversity-by-design; (iv) the main concerns of CPS environments utilizing the diversity-by-design; (v) an extensive survey and discussions of existing diversity-based approaches based on five different classifications; (vi) the types of attacks considered by diversity-based approaches; (vii) the overall trends of evaluation methodologies used for diversity-based approaches, in terms of metrics, datasets, and testbeds; and (viii) the insights, lessons, and gaps identified from this extensive survey and future work directions.

18 November 2024 in ACM Transactions on Internet Technology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ZWZelin Wan
Zelin Wan
JCJin-Hee Cho
Jin-Hee Cho
MZMu Zhu
Mu Zhu
AAAhmed Anwar
Ahmed Anwar
CKCharles Kamhoua
Charles Kamhoua
MSMunindar Singh
Munindar Singh
This work aims to develop a surveillance mission system using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones when Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks are present to disrupt normal operations for mission systems. In particular, we introduce the concept of cyber deception using honey drones (HDs) to protect the mission system from DoS attacks. HDs exhibit fake vulnerabilities and employ stronger signal strengths to lure DoS attacks, unlike the legitimate drones called mission drones (MDs) deployed for mission execution. This research formulates an optimization problem to identify an optimal set of signal strengths of HDs and MDs to best prevent the system from DoS attacks while maximizing mission performance under the resource constraints of UAVs. To solve this optimization problem, we leverage deep reinforcement learning (DRL) to achieve these multiple objectives of the mission system concerning system security and performance. Particularly, for efficient and effective parallel processing in DRL, we utilize a DRL algorithm called the Asynchronous Advantage Actor-Critic (A3C) algorithm to model attack-defense interactions. We employ a physical engine-based simulation testbed to consider realistic scenarios and demonstrate valid findings from the realistic testbed. The extensive experiments proved that our HD-based approach could achieve up to a 32% increase in mission completion, a 20% reduction in energy consumption, and a 62% decrease in attack success rates compared to existing defense strategies.