Mu Zhu

Mu Zhu

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Mu Zhu

Department of Computer Science, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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6 August 2021 in IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MZMu Zhu
Mu Zhu
AHAhmed Hemida
Ahmed Hemida
ZWZelin Wan
Zelin Wan
JCJin-Hee Cho
Jin-Hee Cho
CKCharles A. Kamhoua
Charles A. Kamhoua
MSMunindar P. Singh
Munindar P. Singh
Defensive deception is a promising approach for cyber defense. Via defensive deception, a defender can anticipate and prevent attacks by misleading or luring an attacker, or hiding some of its resources. Although defensive deception is garnering increasing research attention, there has not been a systematic investigation of its key components, the underlying principles, and its tradeoffs in various problem settings. This survey focuses on defensive deception research centered on game theory and machine learning, since these are prominent families of artificial intelligence approaches that are widely employed in defensive deception. This paper brings forth insights, lessons, and limitations from prior work. It closes with an outline of some research directions to tackle major gaps in current defensive deception research.

5 October 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZWZelin Wan
Zelin Wan
JCJin-Hee Cho
Jin-Hee Cho
MZMu Zhu
Mu Zhu
AHAhmed Hemida
Ahmed Hemida
CKCharles A. Kamhoua
Charles A. Kamhoua
MSMaheshwari Singh
Maheshwari Singh
Defensive deception techniques have emerged as a promising proactive defense mechanism to mislead an attacker and thereby achieve attack failure. However, most game-theoretic defensive deception approaches have assumed that players maintain consistent views under uncertainty. They do not consider players’ possible, subjective beliefs formed due to asymmetric information given to them. In this work, we formulate a hypergame between an attacker and a defender where they can interpret the same game differently and accordingly choose their best strategy based on their respective beliefs. This gives a chance for defensive deception strategies to manipulate an attacker’s belief, which is the key to the attacker’s decision-making. We consider advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks, which perform multiple attacks in the stages of the cyber kill chain (CKC) where both the attacker and the defender aim to select optimal strategies based on their beliefs. Through extensive simulation experiments, we demonstrated how effectively the defender can leverage defensive deception techniques while dealing with multi-staged APT attacks in a hypergame in which the imperfect information is reflected based on perceived uncertainty, cost, and expected utilities of both the attacker and defender, the system lifetime (i.e., mean time to security failure), and improved false-positive rates of intrusion detection.

7 February 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ZWZelin Wan
Zelin Wan
JCJin-Hee Cho
Jin-Hee Cho
MZMu Zhu
Mu Zhu
AHAhmed Hemida
Ahmed Hemida
CKCharles A. Kamhoua
Charles A. Kamhoua
MSMaheshwari Singh
Maheshwari Singh
Defensive deception techniques have emerged as a promising proactive defense mechanism to mislead an attacker and thereby achieve attack failure. However, most game-theoretic defensive deception approaches have assumed that players maintain consistent views under uncertainty. They do not consider players’ possible, subjective beliefs formed due to asymmetric information given to them. In this work, we formulate a hypergame between an attacker and a defender where they can interpret the same game differently and accordingly choose their best strategy based on their respective beliefs. This gives a chance for defensive deception strategies to manipulate an attacker’s belief, which is the key to the attacker’s decision-making. We consider advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks, which perform multiple attacks in the stages of the cyber kill chain (CKC) where both the attacker and the defender aim to select optimal strategies based on their beliefs. Through extensive simulation experiments, we demonstrated how effectively the defender can leverage defensive deception techniques while dealing with multi-staged APT attacks in a hypergame in which the imperfect information is reflected based on perceived uncertainty, cost, and expected utilities of both the attacker and defender, the system lifetime (i.e., mean time to security failure), and improved false-positive rates of intrusion detection.

18 November 2024 in ACM Transactions on Internet Technology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ZWZelin Wan
Zelin Wan
JCJin-Hee Cho
Jin-Hee Cho
MZMu Zhu
Mu Zhu
AAAhmed Anwar
Ahmed Anwar
CKCharles Kamhoua
Charles Kamhoua
MSMunindar Singh
Munindar Singh
This work aims to develop a surveillance mission system using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones when Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks are present to disrupt normal operations for mission systems. In particular, we introduce the concept of cyber deception using honey drones (HDs) to protect the mission system from DoS attacks. HDs exhibit fake vulnerabilities and employ stronger signal strengths to lure DoS attacks, unlike the legitimate drones called mission drones (MDs) deployed for mission execution. This research formulates an optimization problem to identify an optimal set of signal strengths of HDs and MDs to best prevent the system from DoS attacks while maximizing mission performance under the resource constraints of UAVs. To solve this optimization problem, we leverage deep reinforcement learning (DRL) to achieve these multiple objectives of the mission system concerning system security and performance. Particularly, for efficient and effective parallel processing in DRL, we utilize a DRL algorithm called the Asynchronous Advantage Actor-Critic (A3C) algorithm to model attack-defense interactions. We employ a physical engine-based simulation testbed to consider realistic scenarios and demonstrate valid findings from the realistic testbed. The extensive experiments proved that our HD-based approach could achieve up to a 32% increase in mission completion, a 20% reduction in energy consumption, and a 62% decrease in attack success rates compared to existing defense strategies.

7 October 2022
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
MMMohammad Sujan Miah
Mohammad Sujan Miah
MZMu Zhu
Mu Zhu
AGAlonso Granados
Alonso Granados
NSNazia Sharmin
Nazia Sharmin
IAIffat Anjum
Iffat Anjum
MSMunindar P. Singh
Munindar P. Singh

16 October 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ZWZelin Wan
Zelin Wan
JCJin-Hee Cho
Jin-Hee Cho
MZMu Zhu
Mu Zhu
AHAhmed Hemida
Ahmed Hemida
CKCharles Kamhoua
Charles Kamhoua
MSMunindar Singh
Munindar Singh