In side-channel testing, the standard timing analysis works when the vendor can provide a measurement to indicate the execution time of cryptographic algorithms. In this paper, we find that there exists timing leakage in power/electromagnetic channels, which is often ignored in traditional timing analysis. Hence a new method of timing analysis is proposed to deal with the case where execution time is not available. Different execution time leads to different execution intervals, affecting the locations of plaintext and ciphertext transmission. Our method detects timing leakage by studying changes in plaintext-ciphertext correlation when traces are aligned forward and backward. Experiments are then carried out on different cryptographic devices. Furthermore, we propose an improved timing analysis framework which gives appropriate methods for different scenarios.
21 March 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Timing analysis presents a significant threat to cryptographic modules. However, traditional timing leakage analysis has notable limitations, especially when precise execution times cannot be obtained. In this article, we propose a novel timing leakage analysis method that leverages horizontal leakage in the power/electromagnetic channel by detecting the trace length of encryption processes under varying inputs. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, we conducted systematic experimental evaluations across a range of cryptographic devices. In comparison to timing leakage analysis based on plaintext-ciphertext correlation, our method offers higher accuracy at lower testing costs and exhibits improved resistance to vertical noise.