Guangze Hong

Guangze Hong

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Guangze Hong

School of Computer Science and Technology, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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23 August 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CWCongming Wei
Congming Wei
GHGuangze Hong
Guangze Hong
AWAn Wang
An Wang
JWJing Wang
Jing Wang
SSShaofei Sun
Shaofei Sun
WMWenrui Ma
Wenrui Ma
In side-channel testing, the standard timing analysis works when the vendor can provide a measurement to indicate the execution time of cryptographic algorithms. In this paper, we find that there exists timing leakage in power/electromagnetic channels, which is often ignored in traditional timing analysis. Hence a new method of timing analysis is proposed to deal with the case where execution time is not available. Different execution time leads to different execution intervals, affecting the locations of plaintext and ciphertext transmission. Our method detects timing leakage by studying changes in plaintext-ciphertext correlation when traces are aligned forward and backward. Experiments are then carried out on different cryptographic devices. Furthermore, we propose an improved timing analysis framework which gives appropriate methods for different scenarios.

21 March 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GHGuangze Hong
Guangze Hong
AWAn Wang
An Wang
CWCongming Wei
Congming Wei
YDYaoling Ding
Yaoling Ding
SSShaofei Sun
Shaofei Sun
LZLiehuang Zhu
Liehuang Zhu
Timing analysis presents a significant threat to cryptographic modules. However, traditional timing leakage analysis has notable limitations, especially when precise execution times cannot be obtained. In this article, we propose a novel timing leakage analysis method that leverages horizontal leakage in the power/electromagnetic channel by detecting the trace length of encryption processes under varying inputs. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, we conducted systematic experimental evaluations across a range of cryptographic devices. In comparison to timing leakage analysis based on plaintext-ciphertext correlation, our method offers higher accuracy at lower testing costs and exhibits improved resistance to vertical noise.