Linda Bushnell

Linda Bushnell

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Linda Bushnell

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

25Years (2002-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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29 January 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XYXuhang Ying
Xuhang Ying
SSSang Uk Sagong
Sang Uk Sagong
ACAndrew Clark
Andrew Clark
LBLinda Bushnell
Linda Bushnell
RPRadha Poovendran
Radha Poovendran
This paper presents a new masquerade attack called the cloaking attack and provides formal analyses for clock skew-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) that detect masquerade attacks in the controller area network (CAN) in automobiles. In the cloaking attack, the adversary manipulates the message inter-transmission times of spoofed messages by adding delays so as to emulate a desired clock skew and avoid detection. In order to predict and characterize the impact of the cloaking attack in terms of the attack success probability on a given CAN bus and IDS, we develop formal models for two clock skew-based IDSs, i.e., the state-of-the-art (SOTA) IDS and its adaptation to the widely used network time protocol (NTP), using parameters of the attacker, the detector, and the hardware platform. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that provides formal analyses of clock skew-based IDSs in automotive CAN. We implement the cloaking attack on two hardware testbeds, a prototype and a real vehicle (the University of Washington EcoCAR), and demonstrate its effectiveness against both the SOTA and NTP-based IDSs. By comparing each predicted attack success probability curve against its experimental curve, we find that the average prediction error is within 3.0% for the SOTA IDS and 5.7% for the NTP-based IDS.

24 February 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SMShana Moothedath
Shana Moothedath
DSDinuka Sahabandu
Dinuka Sahabandu
JAJoey Allen
Joey Allen
ACAndrew Clark
Andrew Clark
LBLinda Bushnell
Linda Bushnell
RPRadha Poovendran
Radha Poovendran
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) infiltrate cyber systems and compromise specifically targeted data and/or resources through a sequence of stealthy attacks consisting of multiple stages. Dynamic information flow tracking has been proposed to detect APTs. In this paper, we develop a dynamic information flow tracking game for resource-efficient detection of APTs via multi-stage dynamic games. The game evolves on an information flow graph, whose nodes are processes and objects (e.g., file, network endpoints) in the system and the edges capture the interaction between different processes and objects. Each stage of the game has pre-specified targets that are characterized by a set of nodes of the graph. The goal of the APT is to evade detection and reach a target node of each stage. The goal of the defender is to maximize the detection probability while minimizing performance overhead on the system. The resource costs of the players are different and the information structure is asymmetric, resulting in a nonzero-sum imperfect information game. We first calculate the best responses of the players and then compute Nash equilibrium for single stage attacks. We then provide a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a correlated equilibrium for the multi-stage attack case. Finally, we simulate our model and algorithm on real-world nation state attack data obtained from the Refinable Attack INvestigation (RAIN) system.


13 November 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZLZhipeng Liu
Zhipeng Liu
ACAndrew Clark
Andrew Clark
LBLinda Bushnell
Linda Bushnell
DKDaniel S. Kirschen
Daniel S. Kirschen
RPRadha Poovendran
Radha Poovendran

5 April 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ZLZhipeng Liu
Zhipeng Liu
ACAndrew Clark
Andrew Clark
PLPhillip Lee
Phillip Lee
LBLinda Bushnell
Linda Bushnell
DKDaniel Kirschen
Daniel Kirschen
RPRadha Poovendran
Radha Poovendran
Voltage instability occurs when a power system is unable to meet the reactive power demand, and is typically corrected by switching on additional reactive power devices such as capacitor banks. Real-time monitoring and communication technologies can potentially improve voltage stability by enabling the rapid detection of low voltages and the implementation of corrective actions. These corrective actions, however, will only be effective in restoring stability if they are chosen in a timely, scalable manner. In this paper, we propose a submodular optimization approach for designing a control strategy that prevents voltage instability. Our key insight is that the voltage deviation from the desired level is a supermodular function of the set of reactive power injections that are employed, leading to computationally efficient control algorithms for stabilization with provable optimality guarantees. This submodular control framework is tested on the IEEE 300-bus transmission system.

1 December 2016 in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PLPhillip Lee
Phillip Lee
ACAndrew Clark
Andrew Clark
BABasel Alomair
Basel Alomair
LBLinda Bushnell
Linda Bushnell
RPRadha Poovendran
Radha Poovendran
Malware propagation poses a growing threat to networked systems, such as computer networks and cyberphysical systems. Current approaches to defend against malware propagation are based on patching or filtering susceptible nodes at a fixed rate. When the propagation dynamics are unknown or uncertain, however, the static rate that is chosen may be either insufficient to remove all viruses or too high, incurring additional performance cost. In this paper, we formulate adaptive strategies for mitigating multiple malware epidemics when the propagation rate is unknown, using patching and filtering-based defense mechanisms. In order to identify conditions for ensuring that all viruses are asymptotically removed, we show that the malware propagation, patching, and filtering processes can be modeled as coupled passive dynamical systems. We prove that the patching rate required to remove all viruses is bounded above by the passivity index of the coupled system, and formulate the problem of selecting the minimum-cost mitigation strategy. Our results are evaluated through a numerical study.