Radha Poovendran

Radha Poovendran

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Radha Poovendran

University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

21Years (2006-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 July 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
FJFengqing Jiang
Fengqing Jiang
ZXZhangchen Xu
Zhangchen Xu
LNLuyao Niu
Luyao Niu
BWBoxin Wang
Boxin Wang
JJJinyuan Jia
Jinyuan Jia
RPRadha Poovendran
Radha Poovendran
Compared with the traditional usage of large language models (LLMs) where users directly send queries to an LLM, LLM-integrated applications serve as middleware to refine users' queries with domain-specific knowledge to better inform LLMs and enhance the responses. However, LLM-integrated applications also introduce new attack surfaces. This work considers a setup where the user and LLM interact via an application in the middle. We focus on the interactions that begin with user's queries and end with LLM-integrated application returning responses to the queries, powered by LLMs at the service backend. We identify potential high-risk vulnerabilities in this setting that can originate from the malicious application developer or from an outsider threat initiator that can control the database access, manipulate and poison high-risk data for the user. Successful exploits of the identified vulnerabilities result in the users receiving responses tailored to the intent of a threat initiator. We assess such threats against LLM-integrated applications empowered by GPT-3.5 and GPT-4. Our experiments show that the threats can effectively bypass the restrictions and moderation policies of OpenAI, resulting in users exposing to the risk of bias, toxic content, privacy, and disinformation. We develop a lightweight, threat-agnostic defense to mitigate insider and outsider threats. Our evaluations demonstrate the efficacy of our defense.

29 January 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XYXuhang Ying
Xuhang Ying
SSSang Uk Sagong
Sang Uk Sagong
ACAndrew Clark
Andrew Clark
LBLinda Bushnell
Linda Bushnell
RPRadha Poovendran
Radha Poovendran
This paper presents a new masquerade attack called the cloaking attack and provides formal analyses for clock skew-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) that detect masquerade attacks in the controller area network (CAN) in automobiles. In the cloaking attack, the adversary manipulates the message inter-transmission times of spoofed messages by adding delays so as to emulate a desired clock skew and avoid detection. In order to predict and characterize the impact of the cloaking attack in terms of the attack success probability on a given CAN bus and IDS, we develop formal models for two clock skew-based IDSs, i.e., the state-of-the-art (SOTA) IDS and its adaptation to the widely used network time protocol (NTP), using parameters of the attacker, the detector, and the hardware platform. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that provides formal analyses of clock skew-based IDSs in automotive CAN. We implement the cloaking attack on two hardware testbeds, a prototype and a real vehicle (the University of Washington EcoCAR), and demonstrate its effectiveness against both the SOTA and NTP-based IDSs. By comparing each predicted attack success probability curve against its experimental curve, we find that the average prediction error is within 3.0% for the SOTA IDS and 5.7% for the NTP-based IDS.

1 February 2021 in Computer Networks
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AGAmrita Ghosal
Amrita Ghosal
SSSang Uk Sagong
Sang Uk Sagong
SHSubir Halder
Subir Halder
KSKalana Sahabandu
Kalana Sahabandu
MCMauro Conti
Mauro Conti
LBLinda Bushnell
Linda Bushnell

25 September 2022
Verified
Book Chapter
Open access
PDF file
MCMauro Conti
Mauro Conti
DDDenis Donadel
Denis Donadel
RPRadha Poovendran
Radha Poovendran
FTFederico Turrin
Federico Turrin
To support the increasing spread of Electric Vehicles (EVs), Charging Stations (CSs) are being installed worldwide. The new generation of CSs employs the Vehicle-To-Grid (V2G) paradigm by implementing novel standards such as the ISO 15118. This standard enables high-level communication between the vehicle and the charging column, helps manage the charge smartly, and simplifies the payment phase. This novel charging paradigm, which connects the Smart Grid to external networks (e.g., EVs and CSs), has not been thoroughly examined yet. Therefore, it may lead to dangerous vulnerability surfaces and new research challenges.In this paper, we presentEVExchange, the first attack to steal energy during a charging session in a V2G communication: i.e., charging the attacker’s car while letting the victim pay for it. Furthermore, if reverse charging flow is enabled, the attacker can even sell the energy available on the victim’s car! Thus, getting the economic profit of this selling, and leaving the victim with a completely discharged battery. We developed a virtual and a physical testbed in which we validate the attack and prove its effectiveness in stealing the energy. To prevent the attack, we propose a lightweight modification of the ISO 15118 protocol to include a distance bounding algorithm. Finally, we validated the countermeasure on our testbeds. Our results show that the proposed countermeasure can identify all the relay attack attempts while being transparent to the user.

24 February 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SMShana Moothedath
Shana Moothedath
DSDinuka Sahabandu
Dinuka Sahabandu
JAJoey Allen
Joey Allen
ACAndrew Clark
Andrew Clark
LBLinda Bushnell
Linda Bushnell
RPRadha Poovendran
Radha Poovendran
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) infiltrate cyber systems and compromise specifically targeted data and/or resources through a sequence of stealthy attacks consisting of multiple stages. Dynamic information flow tracking has been proposed to detect APTs. In this paper, we develop a dynamic information flow tracking game for resource-efficient detection of APTs via multi-stage dynamic games. The game evolves on an information flow graph, whose nodes are processes and objects (e.g., file, network endpoints) in the system and the edges capture the interaction between different processes and objects. Each stage of the game has pre-specified targets that are characterized by a set of nodes of the graph. The goal of the APT is to evade detection and reach a target node of each stage. The goal of the defender is to maximize the detection probability while minimizing performance overhead on the system. The resource costs of the players are different and the information structure is asymmetric, resulting in a nonzero-sum imperfect information game. We first calculate the best responses of the players and then compute Nash equilibrium for single stage attacks. We then provide a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a correlated equilibrium for the multi-stage attack case. Finally, we simulate our model and algorithm on real-world nation state attack data obtained from the Refinable Attack INvestigation (RAIN) system.