29 January 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
This paper presents a new masquerade attack called the cloaking attack and provides formal analyses for clock skew-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) that detect masquerade attacks in the controller area network (CAN) in automobiles. In the cloaking attack, the adversary manipulates the message inter-transmission times of spoofed messages by adding delays so as to emulate a desired clock skew and avoid detection. In order to predict and characterize the impact of the cloaking attack in terms of the attack success probability on a given CAN bus and IDS, we develop formal models for two clock skew-based IDSs, i.e., the state-of-the-art (SOTA) IDS and its adaptation to the widely used network time protocol (NTP), using parameters of the attacker, the detector, and the hardware platform. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that provides formal analyses of clock skew-based IDSs in automotive CAN. We implement the cloaking attack on two hardware testbeds, a prototype and a real vehicle (the University of Washington EcoCAR), and demonstrate its effectiveness against both the SOTA and NTP-based IDSs. By comparing each predicted attack success probability curve against its experimental curve, we find that the average prediction error is within 3.0% for the SOTA IDS and 5.7% for the NTP-based IDS.
1 February 2021 in Computer Networks
24 February 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) infiltrate cyber systems and compromise specifically targeted data and/or resources through a sequence of stealthy attacks consisting of multiple stages. Dynamic information flow tracking has been proposed to detect APTs. In this paper, we develop a dynamic information flow tracking game for resource-efficient detection of APTs via multi-stage dynamic games. The game evolves on an information flow graph, whose nodes are processes and objects (e.g., file, network endpoints) in the system and the edges capture the interaction between different processes and objects. Each stage of the game has pre-specified targets that are characterized by a set of nodes of the graph. The goal of the APT is to evade detection and reach a target node of each stage. The goal of the defender is to maximize the detection probability while minimizing performance overhead on the system. The resource costs of the players are different and the information structure is asymmetric, resulting in a nonzero-sum imperfect information game. We first calculate the best responses of the players and then compute Nash equilibrium for single stage attacks. We then provide a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a correlated equilibrium for the multi-stage attack case. Finally, we simulate our model and algorithm on real-world nation state attack data obtained from the Refinable Attack INvestigation (RAIN) system.