11 April 2025 in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
An image encoder pre-trained by self-supervised learning can be used as a general-purpose feature extractor to build downstream classifiers for various downstream tasks. However, many studies showed that an attacker can embed a trojan into an encoder such that multiple downstream classifiers built based on the trojaned encoder simultaneously inherit the trojan behavior. In this work, we propose TrojanDec, the first data-free method to identify and recover a test input embedded with a trigger. Given a (trojaned or clean) encoder and a test input, TrojanDec first predicts whether the test input is trojaned. If not, the test input is processed in a normal way to maintain the utility. Otherwise, the test input will be further restored to remove the trigger. Our extensive evaluation shows that TrojanDec can effectively identify the trojan (if any) from a given test input and recover it under state-of-the-art trojan attacks. We further demonstrate by experiments that our TrojanDec outperforms the state-of-the-art defenses.
29 November 2023 in arXiv
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the service backend for LLM-integrated applications such as code completion and AI-powered search. LLM-integrated applications serve as middleware to refine users' queries with domain-specific knowledge to better inform LLMs and enhance the responses. Despite numerous opportunities and benefits, LLM-integrated applications also introduce new attack surfaces. Understanding, minimizing, and eliminating these emerging attack surfaces is a new area of research. In this work, we consider a setup where the user and LLM interact via an LLM-integrated application in the middle. We focus on the communication rounds that begin with user's queries and end with LLM-integrated application returning responses to the queries, powered by LLMs at the service backend. For this query-response protocol, we identify potential vulnerabilities that can originate from the malicious application developer or from an outsider threat initiator that is able to control the database access, manipulate and poison data that are high-risk for the user. Successful exploits of the identified vulnerabilities result in the users receiving responses tailored to the intent of a threat initiator. We assess such threats against LLM-integrated applications empowered by OpenAI GPT-3.5 and GPT-4. Our empirical results show that the threats can effectively bypass the restrictions and moderation policies of OpenAI, resulting in users receiving responses that contain bias, toxic content, privacy risk, and disinformation. To mitigate those threats, we identify and define four key properties, namely integrity, source identification, attack detectability, and utility preservation, that need to be satisfied by a safe LLM-integrated application. Based on these properties, we develop a lightweight, threat-agnostic defense that mitigates both insider and outsider threats.