30 May 2024 in Nature Machine Intelligence
18 March 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Physical design watermarking (WM) on contemporary integrated circuit (IC) layout encodes signatures without considering the dense connections and design constraints, which could lead to performance degradation on the watermarked products. This article presents ICMarks, a quality-preserving and robust WM framework for modern IC physical design. ICMarks embeds unique watermark signatures during the physical design’s placement stage, thereby authenticating the IC layout ownership. ICMarks’s novelty lies in 1) strategically identifying a region of cells to watermark with minimal impact on the layout performance and 2) a two-level WM framework for augmented robustness toward potential removal and forging attacks. Extensive evaluations on benchmarks of different design objectives and sizes validate that ICMarks incurs no wirelength and timing metrics degradation, while successfully proving ownership. Furthermore, we demonstrate ICMarks is robust against two major WM attack categories, namely, watermark removal and forging attacks; even if the adversaries have prior knowledge of the WM schemes, the signatures cannot be removed without significantly undermining the layout quality.
16 October 2023 in ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems
Deep learning (DL) models are enabling a significant paradigm shift in a diverse range of fields, including natural language processing and computer vision, as well as the design and automation of complex integrated circuits. While the deep models – and optimizations based on them, e.g., Deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) – demonstrate a superior performance and a great capability for automated representation learning, earlier works have revealed the vulnerability of DL to various attacks. The vulnerabilities include adversarial samples, model poisoning, and fault injection attacks. On the one hand, these security threats could divert the behavior of the DL model and lead to incorrect decisions in critical tasks. On the other hand, the susceptibility of DL to potential attacks might thwart trustworthy technology transfer as well as reliable DL deployment. In this work, we investigate the existing defense techniques to protect DL against the above-mentioned security threats. Particularly, we review end-to-end defense schemes for robust deep learning in both centralized and federated learning settings. Our comprehensive taxonomy and horizontal comparisons reveal an important fact that defense strategies developed using DL/software/hardware co-design outperform the DL/software-only counterparts and show how they can achieve very efficient and latency-optimized defenses for real-world applications. We believe our systemization of knowledge sheds light on the promising performance of hardware-software co-design of DL security methodologies and can guide the development of future defenses.