This paper provides empirical evidence supporting the view that constitutions are the primary and fundamental institutional determinant of entrepreneurship. It shows that some of the provisions contained in national constitutions are positively and significantly associated with a standard measure of entrepreneurial dynamics, namely the rate of new business density. Using for 115 countries a novel dataset containing the characteristics of the constitutions enacted in the world, applying an IV-GMM treatment to deal with the endogeneity of constitutional rules, and controlling for de facto variables, the paper finds that provisions about the right to conduct/establish a business, the right to strike, consumer protection, anti-corruption, and compulsory education promote higher rates of new firm formation. Contrasting results are instead obtained for provisions concerning protection of intellectual property rights.
In this paper we consider the role of lawmakers as norm entrepreneurs. Drawing from expressive law theories and social response theories, we shed light on the role of law in shaping social values and norms, and on the ability of the law to produce social norms where they did not exist before. Furthermore, we unveil a possible undesirable effect of legal intervention, where a legal innovation can cause social divide and possible conflicts.
Economic models of tort law evaluate the efficiency of liability rules in terms of care and activity levels. A liability regime is optimal when it creates incentives to maximize the value of risky activities net of accident and precaution costs. The allocation of primary and residual liability allows policy makers to induce parties to undertake socially desirable care and activity levels. Traditionally, tort law systems have assigned residual liability either entirely on the tortfeasor or entirely on the victim. In this paper, we unpack the cheapest-cost-avoider principle to consider the virtues and limits of loss-sharing rules in generating optimal (second-best) incentives and allocations of risk. We find that loss sharing may be optimal in the presence of countervailing policy objectives, homogeneous risk avoiders, and subadditive risk, which potentially offers a valuable tool for policy makers and courts in awarding damages in a large number of real-world accident cases.
5 December 2017 in Industrial and Corporate Change
Substantial and systematic cross-country variation in entrepreneurship rates has been found in various studies. We attempt to explain such differences focusing on the interaction between institutional factors and population psychological characteristics. Constitutional provisions supporting economic freedom are our measure of the institutional context, whereas we proxy psychological characteristics with a country’s endowment of agency culture. We apply an IV-GMM treatment to deal with endogeneity to a data set comprising 86 countries over the period 2004–2013, and we control for de facto variables and other factors that are likely to influence entrepreneurship. Our results demonstrate that agency culture is indeed an important predictor of entrepreneurship and that this effect is moderated by constitutional provisions supporting economic freedom. In particular, the impact of agency culture on entrepreneurship becomes stronger as a country expands the constitutional protection of economic rights.