Alice Guerra

Dr. Alice Guerra

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 December 2018 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AGAlice Guerra
Alice Guerra
BHBrooke Harrington
Brooke Harrington

1 January 2016 in The Journal of Legal Studies
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ECEmanuela Carbonara
Emanuela Carbonara
AGAlice Guerra
Alice Guerra
FPFrancesco Parisi
Francesco Parisi
Economic models of tort law evaluate the efficiency of liability rules in terms of care and activity levels. A liability regime is optimal when it creates incentives to maximize the value of risky activities net of accident and precaution costs. The allocation of primary and residual liability allows policy makers to induce parties to undertake socially desirable care and activity levels. Traditionally, tort law systems have assigned residual liability either entirely on the tortfeasor or entirely on the victim. In this paper, we unpack the cheapest-cost-avoider principle to consider the virtues and limits of loss-sharing rules in generating optimal (second-best) incentives and allocations of risk. We find that loss sharing may be optimal in the presence of countervailing policy objectives, homogeneous risk avoiders, and subadditive risk, which potentially offers a valuable tool for policy makers and courts in awarding damages in a large number of real-world accident cases.

24 February 2022 in Public Choice
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
AGAlice Guerra
Alice Guerra
TZTatyana Zhuravleva
Tatyana Zhuravleva
We use experimental data to explore the conditions under which males and females may differ in their tendency to act corruptly and their tolerance of corruption. We ask if males and females respond differently to the tradeoff between the benefits accrued by corrupt actorsversusthe negative externality imposed on other people by corruption. Our findings reveal that neither males nor females uniformly are more likely to engage in, or be more tolerant of corruption: it depends on the exact bribery conditions—which can reduce or enhance welfare overall—and the part played in the bribery act. Females are less likely to tolerate and engage in corruption when doing so reduces overall welfare. On the other hand, males are less tolerant of bribery when it enhances welfare but confers payoff disadvantages on them relative to corrupt actors. Females’ behavior is consistent across roles when bribery reduces welfare, but apart from that, gender behavior is strongly role-dependent.

25 November 2021 in Journal of Institutional Economics
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Journal Article
Open access
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AGAlice Guerra
Alice Guerra
FPFrancesco Parisi
Francesco Parisi
DPDaniel Pi
Daniel Pi
In robot torts, robots carry out activities that are partially controlled by a human operator. Several legal and economic scholars across the world have argued for the need to rethink legal remedies as we apply them to robot torts. Yet, to date, there exists no general formulation of liability in case of robot accidents, and the proposed solutions differ across jurisdictions. We proceed in our research with a set of two companion papers. In this paper, we present the novel problems posed by robot accidents, and assess the legal challenges and institutional prospects that policymakers face in the regulation of robot torts. In the companion paper, we build on the present analysis and use an economic model to propose a new liability regime which blends negligence-based rules and strict manufacturer liability rules to create optimal incentives for robot torts.

13 March 2022 in Journal of Business Ethics
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Journal Article
Open access
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MAMario Daniele Amore
Mario Daniele Amore
OGOrsola Garofalo
Orsola Garofalo
AGAlice Guerra
Alice Guerra
We use a lab experiment to examine whether and how leaders influence workers’ (un)ethical behavior through financial reporting choices. We randomly assign the role of leaders or workers to subjects, who can choose to report an outcome via automatic or self-reporting. Self-reporting allows for profitable and undetectable earnings manipulation. We vary the leaders’ ability to choose the reporting method and to punish workers. We show that workers are more likely to choose automatic reporting when their leader voluntarily does so and can assign punishment. Even workers who choose self-reporting tend to cheat less when their leader chooses automatic reporting. Nonetheless, most leaders do not opt for automatic reporting in the first place: they often choose self-reporting and punish workers who rather choose automatic reporting. Collectively, our results reveal a dual effect of leadership on ethical behaviors in organizations: workers behave more ethically if their leader makes ethical choices, but often leaders do not make ethical choices in the first place. Hence, leading by example can backfire.

3 September 2016 in Justice System Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AGAlice Guerra
Alice Guerra
Claudio TagliapietraClaudio Tagliapietra
Claudio Tagliapietra
Italy is among the countries with the highest litigation rate and those with the highest duration of trials. This article shows that judge turnover contributes negatively to delays in Italian courts and outlines possible policies for improvement. In Italy, judges can voluntarily move from one office to another after three years of mandate, and the law prescribes their transfer after ten years to guarantee their independence. Flaws in the process managing the backlog of outbound judges and the existence of asynchrony between outbound and inbound transfers produce a chain of delays to the disposition of court cases. Using a novel dataset on Court of Appeal Districts in Italy (2008–2012), we provide evidence of a strong negative relation between high turnover rates and judicial performance. We find that marginal increases in judge turnover rates lead to a statistically significant decrease in judicial performance over two years of time.