Tarun Khanna

Tarun Khanna

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Tarun Khanna

Harvard Business School

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

29Years (1998-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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27 March 1998 in The Journal of Industrial Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
PGPankaj Ghemawat
Pankaj Ghemawat
TKTarun Khanna
Tarun Khanna

22 March 2017 in Strategic Management Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
CGCheng Gao
Cheng Gao
TZTiona Zuzul
Tiona Zuzul
GJGeoffrey Jones
Geoffrey Jones
TKTarun Khanna
Tarun Khanna

1 June 1999 in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TKTarun Khanna
Tarun Khanna
KPKrishna Palepu
Krishna Palepu

15 July 2015 in Strategic Management Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JMJuan Ma
Juan Ma
TKTarun Khanna
Tarun Khanna
Research summary: Although opinion conformity is believed to be commonly used by corporate elites to invoke reciprocity, it is hard to study in the context of corporate boards since boards are typically “black boxes.” Focusing on publicly traded companies in C hina, where disclosure of dissent is mandated, we show that dissent is associated with a breakdown of the social exchange relationship within boards. Specifically, dissent is more likely to occur when the board chair who appointed the independent director has left the board, or when the board “game” is reaching its last round, defined as a 60‐day window before departure of the board chair or the director herself. Our findings lend considerable support to conceptualization of boards as a social exchange device . Managerial summary: With a novel dataset from C hina we ask the question of whether the social norm of reciprocity compromises independent directors' decisions. Our results lend considerable support to the hypothesis that independent directors would generally defer to top management as they feel indebted for being offered a director position and in exchange independent directors provide support. We identified two instances in which independent directors are more likely to dissent due to a breakdown of social exchange relationships: (1) when the board chair who appointed the independent director has left the board, and (2) when the board “game” was reaching its last round, that is, either the board chair or the director herself is leaving the board . © 2015 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

21 October 2004 in Journal of International Business Studies
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Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
TKTarun Khanna
Tarun Khanna
KPKrishna G Palepu
Krishna G Palepu

22 November 2010 in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
RNRamana Nanda
Ramana Nanda
TKTarun Khanna
Tarun Khanna