The financial reporting and disclosure problems at Enron, as well as the high market valuations for its stock raise troubling questions about the functioning of capital market intermediaries, regulators and governance experts whose are supposed to ensure the effective functioning of the stock market. This paper examines the functions of key capital market intermediaries and analyzes how their own governance and incentive problems may have contributed to Enron's rise and fall. We conclude by proposing system modifications to resolve the observed problems.
1 June 1999 in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
We demonstrate variation in the extent to which firms benefited from their affiliation with Chilean business groups in the 1988−96 period. The net benefits of unrelated diversification were positive if group diversification exceeded a threshold level, though this threshold increased with time. Sizable group benefits unrelated to diversification also existed, but they atrophied over time. We conjecture that the evolution of institutional context alters the value-creating potential of business groups, albeit slowly.
1 June 1999 in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy