Daniel Schlette

Daniel Schlette

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Daniel Schlette

University of Regensburg

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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4 October 2021 in IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DSDaniel Schlette
Daniel Schlette
MCMarco Caselli
Marco Caselli
GPGunther Pernul
Gunther Pernul
Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) is threat information intended for security purposes. However, use for incident response demands standardization. This study examines the broader security incident response perspective. Introducing 18 core concepts, we assist efforts to establish and assess current standardization approaches. We further provide the reader with a detailed analysis of 6 incident response formats. While we synthesize structural elements, we point to characteristics and show format deficiencies. Also, we describe how core concepts can be used to determine a suitable format for a given use case. Our surveys’ findings indicate a consistent focus on incident response actions within all formats. Besides, playbooks are used to represent procedures. Different use cases suggest that organizations can leverage and combine multiple formats. Finally, we discuss open research challenges to fully realize incident response potentials.

2 March 2020 in International Journal of Information Security
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
DSDaniel Schlette
Daniel Schlette
FBFabian Böhm
Fabian Böhm
MCMarco Caselli
Marco Caselli
Günther PernulGünther Pernul
Günther Pernul
The very raison d’être of cyber threat intelligence (CTI) is to provide meaningful knowledge about cyber security threats. The exchange and collaborative generation of CTI by the means of sharing platforms has proven to be an important aspect of practical application. It is evident to infer that inaccurate, incomplete, or outdated threat intelligence is a major problem as only high-quality CTI can be helpful to detect and defend against cyber attacks. Additionally, while the amount of available CTI is increasing it is not warranted that quality remains unaffected. In conjunction with the increasing number of available CTI, it is thus in the best interest of every stakeholder to be aware of the quality of a CTI artifact. This allows for informed decisions and permits detailed analyses. Our work makes a twofold contribution to the challenge of assessing threat intelligence quality. We first propose a series of relevant quality dimensions and configure metrics to assess the respective dimensions in the context of CTI. In a second step, we showcase the extension of an existing CTI analysis tool to make the quality assessment transparent to security analysts. Furthermore, analysts’ subjective perceptions are, where necessary, included in the quality assessment concept.

1 December 2021 in Computers & Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DSDaniel Schlette
Daniel Schlette
MVManfred Vielberth
Manfred Vielberth
GPGünther Pernul
Günther Pernul

19 May 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
DSDaniel Schlette
Daniel Schlette
PEPhilip Empl
Philip Empl
MCMarco Caselli
Marco Caselli
TSThomas Schreck
Thomas Schreck
GPGünther Pernul
Günther Pernul
Incident response "playbooks" are structured sets of operational procedures organizations use to instruct humans or machines on performing countermeasures against cybersecurity threats. These playbooks generally combine information about a given threat and organizational aspects relevant within the context of an organization. Both types of information are crucial for using, maintaining, and sharing playbooks across organizations as they ensure effectiveness and confidentiality. While practitioners show great interest in playbooks, their characteristics have not yet been thoroughly investigated from a research perspective. For this reason, we explore the topic by analyzing what is inside a playbook. Our approach consists of a comprehensive empirical assessment of available data (1217 playbooks), an online study with 147 participants, and final in-depth interviews with nine security professionals to consolidate and validate our findings. We notably find intrinsic ambiguities in the way practitioners and organizations define their playbooks. Furthermore, we notice that available playbooks cannot be used outright which might currently impair their wide use across different cybersecurity actors. As a result, we can conclude that organizations do "play it by the books" but individually define what is inside their playbooks and which areas of incident response they might address.

11 December 2023 in International Journal of Information Security
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
PEPhilip Empl
Philip Empl
DSDaniel Schlette
Daniel Schlette
LSLukas Stöger
Lukas Stöger
Günther PernulGünther Pernul
Günther Pernul
Organizations face attacks on industrial control systems (ICS) as vulnerabilities are pervasive. However, patching vulnerable systems by simply updating to the newest version is often not an option and shifts focus to workarounds. Beyond pure patching, workarounds specify other remediation measures (e.g., firewall or VPN configuration) that must be taken due to system availability requirements, complexity, or heterogeneous devices. In this paper, we introduce vulnerability playbooks based on open standards. Pushing the envelope of cybersecurity playbooks—steps organizations should follow when responding to cybersecurity incidents reactively—for ICS vulnerability management offers organizations a more transparent, repeatable process and faster, possibly automated actions. We have designed a process model to collect and transform security advisories in Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) format and generate Collaborative Automated Course of Action Operations (CACAO) playbooks based on listed remediation advice. With a proof of concept, we demonstrate that structured CSAF documents can be seamlessly transformed into CACAO playbooks. For our industrial use case, we must also use unstructured security advice highlighting quality differences (compared to CSAF). Our generated 79 standard conformant CACAO playbooks with 485 identified actions hint at imbalanced advice toward patching. Preferably, vendors should include detailed technical remediation advice, provide APIs, and go beyond patching recommendations in their security advisories. Subscribers should structure their assets and use machine learning to normalize, generate, and prioritize CACAO playbooks. With CSAF and CACAO, we see two open standards for handling vulnerabilities.

18 June 2020
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
DSDaniel Schlette
Daniel Schlette
FMFlorian Menges
Florian Menges
TBThomas Baumer
Thomas Baumer
GPGünther Pernul
Günther Pernul