Marco Caselli

Marco Caselli

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Marco Caselli

Siemens AG

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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4 October 2021 in IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DSDaniel Schlette
Daniel Schlette
MCMarco Caselli
Marco Caselli
GPGunther Pernul
Gunther Pernul
Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) is threat information intended for security purposes. However, use for incident response demands standardization. This study examines the broader security incident response perspective. Introducing 18 core concepts, we assist efforts to establish and assess current standardization approaches. We further provide the reader with a detailed analysis of 6 incident response formats. While we synthesize structural elements, we point to characteristics and show format deficiencies. Also, we describe how core concepts can be used to determine a suitable format for a given use case. Our surveys’ findings indicate a consistent focus on incident response actions within all formats. Besides, playbooks are used to represent procedures. Different use cases suggest that organizations can leverage and combine multiple formats. Finally, we discuss open research challenges to fully realize incident response potentials.

19 May 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
DSDaniel Schlette
Daniel Schlette
PEPhilip Empl
Philip Empl
MCMarco Caselli
Marco Caselli
TSThomas Schreck
Thomas Schreck
GPGünther Pernul
Günther Pernul
Incident response "playbooks" are structured sets of operational procedures organizations use to instruct humans or machines on performing countermeasures against cybersecurity threats. These playbooks generally combine information about a given threat and organizational aspects relevant within the context of an organization. Both types of information are crucial for using, maintaining, and sharing playbooks across organizations as they ensure effectiveness and confidentiality. While practitioners show great interest in playbooks, their characteristics have not yet been thoroughly investigated from a research perspective. For this reason, we explore the topic by analyzing what is inside a playbook. Our approach consists of a comprehensive empirical assessment of available data (1217 playbooks), an online study with 147 participants, and final in-depth interviews with nine security professionals to consolidate and validate our findings. We notably find intrinsic ambiguities in the way practitioners and organizations define their playbooks. Furthermore, we notice that available playbooks cannot be used outright which might currently impair their wide use across different cybersecurity actors. As a result, we can conclude that organizations do "play it by the books" but individually define what is inside their playbooks and which areas of incident response they might address.

7 July 2020
Verified
Book Chapter
Open access
PDF file
HEHerson Esquivel-Vargas
Herson Esquivel-Vargas
MCMarco Caselli
Marco Caselli
GLGeert Jan Laanstra
Geert Jan Laanstra
APAndreas Peter
Andreas Peter
Cybersecurity research relies on the reproducibility and deep understanding of attacks to devise appropriate solutions. Different kinds of testbeds are typically used to systematically execute attacks and evaluate defenses. Testbeds are widely used to demonstrate Building Automation and Control System (BACS) attacks and defenses, considered too risky to be executed on real infrastructures. However, those testbeds implement arbitrary configurations of building services that do not resemble real-world deployments. In this work, we present the first BACS testbed specially designed to assess the impact of cyberattacks from the victim’s perspective. It features general purpose building services such as illumination, ventilation, and temperature control, whose configuration is easily adapted to emulate the requirements of real-world locations. In this way, the context added to our testbed allows us to better understand the impact of BACS attacks through concrete and realistic scenarios. Moreover, by analyzing different configurations of the BACS (i.e., contexts), we found out that identical attacks may have dramatically different impacts. Thus, reinforcing our view on the relevance of adding context to BACS testbeds.

19 April 2022 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
HEHerson Esquivel-Vargas
Herson Esquivel-Vargas
JCJohn Henry Castellanos
John Henry Castellanos
MCMarco Caselli
Marco Caselli
NTNils Ole Tippenhauer
Nils Ole Tippenhauer
APAndreas Peter
Andreas Peter
Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) rely on insecure protocols and devices to monitor and operate critical infrastructure. Prior work has demonstrated that powerful attackers with detailed system knowledge can manipulate exchanged sensor data to deteriorate performance of the process, even leading to full shutdowns of plants. Identifying those attacks requires iterating over all possible sensor values, and running detailed system simulation or analysis to identify optimal attacks. That setup allows adversaries to identify attacks that are most impactful when applied on the system for the first time, before the system operators become aware of the manipulations. In this work, we investigate if constrained attackers without detailed system knowledge and simulators can identify comparable attacks. In particular, the attacker only requires abstract knowledge on general information flow in the plant, instead of precise algorithms, operating parameters, process models, or simulators. We propose an approach that allows single-shot attacks, i.e., near-optimal attacks that are reliably shutting down a system on the first try. The approach is applied and validated on two use cases, and demonstrated to achieve comparable results to prior work, which relied on detailed system information and simulations.