We study the Nash equilibrium seeking problem for noncooperative agents whose decision making process can be modeled as a generalized aggregative game. Specifically, we consider players with convex local cost functions, convex local constraints, and convex separable coupling constraints, and we extend the literature on generalized aggregative games by handling possibly non-differentiable cost functions. We recast the Nash equilibrium seeking problem as the problem to find a zero of a set-valued monotone operator and show that the variational Nash equilibria correspond to KKT solutions of the original game where the shared constraints have the same Lagrange multipliers for all the players. Finally, we design a semi-decentralized algorithm with global convergence guarantee for generalized Nash equilibrium seeking.
In future distribution grids, prosumers (i.e., energy consumers with storage and/or production capabilities) will trade energy with each other and with the main grid. To ensure an efficient and safe operation of energy trading, in this paper, we formulate a peer-to-peer energy market of prosumers as a generalized aggregative game, in which a network operator is responsible to enforce the operational constraints of the system. We design a distributed market-clearing mechanism with convergence guarantee to an economically-efficient, strategically-stable, and operationally-safe configuration (i.e., a variational generalized Nash equilibrium). Numerical studies on the IEEE 37-bus testcase show the scalability of the proposed approach and suggest that active participation in the market is beneficial for both prosumers and the network operator.
14 December 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem for a population of agents playing aggregative games with affine coupling constraints. We focus on semi-decentralized communication architectures, where there is a central coordinator able to gather and broadcast signals of aggregative nature to the agents. By exploiting the framework of monotone operator theory and operator splitting, we first critically review the most relevant available algorithms and then design two novel schemes: (i) a single-layer, fixed-step algorithm with convergence guarantee for general (non-cocoercive, non-strictly) monotone aggregative games and (ii) a single-layer proximal-type algorithm for a class of monotone aggregative games with linearly coupled cost functions. We also design novel accelerated variants of the algorithms via (alternating) inertial and over-relaxation steps. Finally, we show via numerical simulations that the proposed algorithms outperform those in the literature in terms of convergence speed.
5 July 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
This paper proposes a unifying design framework for dynamic feedback controllers that track solution trajectories of time-varying generalized equations, such as local minimizers of nonlinear programs or competitive equilibria (e.g., Nash) of non-cooperative games. Inspired by the feedback optimization paradigm, the core idea of the proposed approach is to re-purpose classic iterative algorithms for solving generalized equations (e.g., Josephy–Newton, forward-backward splitting) as dynamic feedback controllers by integrating online measurements of the continuous-time nonlinear plant. Sufficient conditions for closed-loop stability and robustness of the algorithm-plant cyber-physical interconnection are derived in a sampled-data setting by combining and tailoring results from (monotone) operator, fixed-point, and nonlinear systems theory. Numerical simulations on smart building automation and competitive supply-chain management are presented to support the theoretical findings.
27 July 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
In this paper, we study proximal type dynamics in the context of multi-agent network games. We analyze several conjugations of this class of games, providing convergence results. Specifically, we look into synchronous/asynchronous dynamics with time-invariant communication network and synchronous dynamics with time-varying communication networks. Finally, we validate the theoretical results via numerical simulations on opinion dynamics.