Jinpu Li

Jinpu Li

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Jinpu Li

Tsinghua University - Institute of Economics

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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13 November 2025 in Industrial Management & Data Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RSRonghua Sui
Ronghua Sui
RGRuize Gao
Ruize Gao
JLJinpu Li
Jinpu Li
Purpose: In the digital economy, two-sided platforms increasingly operate as data intermediaries, establishing vital revenue streams and competitive differentiation. This study aims to explore how competing two-sided platforms, acting as data intermediaries, strategically optimize their collection and pricing of user-generated data under cost heterogeneity and varying affiliation behaviors. Design/methodology/approach: This study uses the Hotelling model to construct a multi-stage game framework, analyzing data collection and the related pricing decisions for competitive platforms. Through equilibrium analysis and practical validation, we reveal how duopolistic platforms strategically select full/partial data collection regimes while optimizing pricing, explicitly incorporating per-unit collection costs and cross-sided network effects. Findings: A significant cost advantage prompts differentiated collection strategies, whereas smaller cost gaps favor consistent partial collection by both. Under partial collection, the cost-disadvantaged platform gains disproportionately from increased data intake, driving more aggressive price adjustments. Rising marginal value of data usage can lead platforms to lower price to expand their user base and leverage higher per-unit data utility for greater profitability. Consumer affiliation predominantly shifts optimal pricing, while provider affiliation significantly alters collection decision. Originality/value: This study innovatively analyzes platform pricing from the perspective of data intermediation. Departing from the most existing literature focused on product/service intermediation, this research advances the understanding of platform pricing by examining data's unique role as a strategic asset. Formalizing non-rivalrous traits and near-zero re-production costs, this study reveals platforms' strategic trade-offs between differentiated/consistent data strategies, offering insights for leveraging data assets to enhance competitiveness and support sustainable platform growth.

1 January 2024 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
FDFeng Dong
Feng Dong
JLJinpu Li
Jinpu Li
Data are emerging as an important asset with which firms can apply for credit. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with a vertical production chain to characterize the role of rational bubbles in the data economy. On the investment side, we characterize nonrivalry in the process of data capital accumulation; on the financing side, we highlight the contextual or strong asset-specific nature of data capital. Moreover, large variance in depreciation rates for different data assets is also considered. Our analysis shows that both the labor reallocation effect and the investment efficiency effect that occur in the bubbly equilibrium affect data capital accumulation. Bubbles that emerge in the data product sector can provide additional liquidity to loosen firms' financing constraints, but in an environment where data investment is highly nonrivalrous, bubbles can be welfare-reducing. Bubbles are more likely to emerge when data depreciation rates or asset specificity are high. Furthermore, our dynamic analysis implies that there could be a data-driven cycle along the transitional path when a nonrivalry in data investment exists.

13 October 2026 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
YDYi Dong
Yi Dong
JLJinpu Li
Jinpu Li
DMDongzhou Mei
Dongzhou Mei
ZXZhenyang Xu
Zhenyang Xu
Population growth is slowing, reducing the young cohorts that purchase long-lived claims from older owners. We show that this demographic shift can substantially reduce the capacity of an economy to sustain rational bubbles when household patience responds endogenously to asset returns. Slower cohort growth lowers the return anticipated by young households, shifts consumption toward youth, and reduces saving. As a result, bubble capacity falls relative to output whenever saving rises with the anticipated return, in contrast to the fixeddiscount benchmark where this ratio is unchanged. When the saving response is sufficiently strong, bubble capacity also falls per young household. The same endogenous-patience mechanism weakens the crowding-out of capital by bubbles and makes current bubble prices respond to demographic news. It also tightens the rollover capacity of public debt and raises the confidence required to sustain a risky bubble, linking demographic change to both fiscal space and bubble survival.

27 August 2026 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
FDFeng Dong
Feng Dong
JLJinpu Li
Jinpu Li
HSHaoning Sun
Haoning Sun
Economic activity generates data, those data improve forecasts, and better forecasts raise activity. Individual firms' data-processing decisions can also respond to economic activity and the behavior of other firms. This paper studies when these feedbacks become a macroeconomic data flywheel. Firms learn about persistent demand from raw data generated by economy-wide activity or by their own operations, and they choose how effectively to convert those data into usable signals. We show that multiple steady states can exist and that the economy can become stuck in a low-production, low-data trap. A Big Push policy supplies public signals at a labor cost and has state-dependent crowd-in and crowd-out effects. Provision crowds in private activity when endogenous information is scarce but crowds it out once information is abundant. A permanent push can eliminate the low-data state while drawing productive labor away from the surviving high-data state. A temporary push of sufficient strength and duration can lead the economy out of the low-data trap.

27 August 2026 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
FDFeng Dong
Feng Dong
JLJinpu Li
Jinpu Li
ZXZhenyang Xu
Zhenyang Xu
Dollar stablecoins combine a dollar claim with liquidity supplied by a payment network. User adoption and merchant acceptance reinforce each other, creating an adoption threshold that switches an offshore dollar balance sheet on and off. Crossing the threshold reallocates developing-country saving from domestic capital and local money toward Treasury-backed dollar claims, shrinking the local monetary-revenue base and expanding dollar-side rents under the maintained intact-peg pass-through rule. Greater peg risk can eliminate the high-adoption equilibrium, while local inflation lowers the network strength needed to sustain it. Better domestic payment infrastructure raises the coordination hurdle for widespread stablecoin use.

1 January 2023 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
RSRonghua Sui
Ronghua Sui
RGRuize Gao
Ruize Gao
JLJinpu Li
Jinpu Li
In addition to intermediating transactions of goods or services, two-sided platforms also play the role of data intermediaries in the era of the digital economy. This new role brings additional profit to the platforms, and in reality platforms are incentivized to collect and sell consumer data. The main distinction between the sale of data and the sale of services is that data are by-products of consumer behavior and are replicable, implying a difference in the platform's profit model. In a duopoly bilateral market, data collection and sales behaviors of platforms have yet to be characterized. In this paper, we build a two-period model to study data collection and sales of competitive platforms considering multihoming users and service providers. Our main findings are as follows. First, due to differences in costs, platforms may adopt differentiated or consistent data collection strategies in the following three ways: one platform fully collects while the other partially collects; both platforms fully collect; both platforms partially collect. In particular, when both platforms partially collect data, the cost-disadvantaged platform may invest more than its cost-advantaged counterpart. Second, when both platforms partially collect data, they should set different prices for the data, closely linked to their respective costs. In such scenarios, as data usage revenue increases, it may be more beneficial for both platforms to lower their data pricing. When both platforms fully collect, their data pricing is identical, irrelevant to investment costs. Third, when one platform fully collects data while the other opts for partial collection, the data pricing of the platform with full collection is mainly influenced by its competitor's cost and strategies, irrespective of its own investment cost. For the platform with partial collection, its data pricing is primarily affected by its own costs.