Ruize Gao

Ruize Gao

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Ruize Gao

Beijing Institute of Mathematical Sciences and Applications

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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21 February 2022 in Knowledge-Based Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XZXin Zhang
Xin Zhang
HXHongshan Xiao
Hongshan Xiao
RGRuize Gao
Ruize Gao
HZHongwu Zhang
Hongwu Zhang
YWYu Wang
Yu Wang

19 January 2022 in Expert Systems with Applications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RGRuize Gao
Ruize Gao
XZXin Zhang
Xin Zhang
HZHongwu Zhang
Hongwu Zhang
QZQuanwu Zhao
Quanwu Zhao
YWYu Wang
Yu Wang

30 August 2022 in Journal of Cleaner Production
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
NHNing Han
Ning Han
RGRuize Gao
Ruize Gao
HPHaisen Peng
Haisen Peng
QHQiongqiong He
Qiongqiong He
ZMZhenyong Miao
Zhenyong Miao
Keji WanKeji Wan
Keji Wan

24 January 2024 in Journal of Environmental Chemical Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RGRuize Gao
Ruize Gao
HPHaisen Peng
Haisen Peng
QHQiongqiong He
Qiongqiong He
ZMZhen Meng
Zhen Meng
PXPengxu Xiang
Pengxu Xiang
ZMZhenyong Miao
Zhenyong Miao

12 June 2024 in International Journal of Accounting Information Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YZYing Zhou
Ying Zhou
ZXZhi Xiao
Zhi Xiao
RGRuize Gao
Ruize Gao
CWChang Wang
Chang Wang

13 November 2025 in Industrial Management & Data Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RSRonghua Sui
Ronghua Sui
RGRuize Gao
Ruize Gao
JLJinpu Li
Jinpu Li
Purpose: In the digital economy, two-sided platforms increasingly operate as data intermediaries, establishing vital revenue streams and competitive differentiation. This study aims to explore how competing two-sided platforms, acting as data intermediaries, strategically optimize their collection and pricing of user-generated data under cost heterogeneity and varying affiliation behaviors. Design/methodology/approach: This study uses the Hotelling model to construct a multi-stage game framework, analyzing data collection and the related pricing decisions for competitive platforms. Through equilibrium analysis and practical validation, we reveal how duopolistic platforms strategically select full/partial data collection regimes while optimizing pricing, explicitly incorporating per-unit collection costs and cross-sided network effects. Findings: A significant cost advantage prompts differentiated collection strategies, whereas smaller cost gaps favor consistent partial collection by both. Under partial collection, the cost-disadvantaged platform gains disproportionately from increased data intake, driving more aggressive price adjustments. Rising marginal value of data usage can lead platforms to lower price to expand their user base and leverage higher per-unit data utility for greater profitability. Consumer affiliation predominantly shifts optimal pricing, while provider affiliation significantly alters collection decision. Originality/value: This study innovatively analyzes platform pricing from the perspective of data intermediation. Departing from the most existing literature focused on product/service intermediation, this research advances the understanding of platform pricing by examining data's unique role as a strategic asset. Formalizing non-rivalrous traits and near-zero re-production costs, this study reveals platforms' strategic trade-offs between differentiated/consistent data strategies, offering insights for leveraging data assets to enhance competitiveness and support sustainable platform growth.