Santiago Torres-Arias

Santiago Torres-Arias

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Santiago Torres-Arias

Purdue University, West Lafayette, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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2 December 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ASAyushi Sharma
Ayushi Sharma
SSShashank Sharma
Shashank Sharma
STSai Ritvik Tanksalkar
Sai Ritvik Tanksalkar
STSantiago Torres-Arias
Santiago Torres-Arias
AMAravind Machiry
Aravind Machiry
Embedded software is used in safety-critical systems such as medical devices and autonomous vehicles, where software defects, including security vulnerabilities, have severe consequences. Most embedded codebases are developed in unsafe languages, specifically C/C++, and are riddled with memory safety vulnerabilities. To prevent such vulnerabilities, Rust, a performant memory-safe systems language, provides an optimal choice for developing embedded software. Rust interoperability enables developing Rust applications on top of existing C codebases. Despite this, even the most resourceful organizations continue to develop embedded software in C/C++. This paper performs the first systematic study to holistically understand the current state and challenges of using Rust for embedded systems. Our study is organized across three research questions. We collected a dataset of 6,408 Rust embedded software spanning various categories and 6 Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tools. We performed a systematic analysis of our dataset and surveys with 225 developers to investigate our research questions. We found that existing Rust software support is inadequate, SAST tools cannot handle certain features of Rust embedded software, resulting in failures, and the prevalence of advanced types in existing Rust software makes it challenging to engineer interoperable code. In addition, we found various challenges faced by developers in using Rust for embedded systems development.

13 November 2023 in IEEE Security & Privacy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
STSantiago Torres-Arias
Santiago Torres-Arias
DGDan Geer
Dan Geer
JMJohn Speed Meyers
John Speed Meyers
Software bills of materials (SBOMs) have become a required mechanism to communicate software supply chain information. However, even though they experience wide and increasing adoption, using them to improve supply chain security remains a challenge. We posit that, in order to achieve the intended goal of SBOMs, we must first develop mechanisms to measure their quality.

15 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
KMKelsey Merrill
Kelsey Merrill
ZNZachary Newman
Zachary Newman
STSantiago Torres-Arias
Santiago Torres-Arias
KSKaren R. Sollins
Karen R. Sollins
Software repositories, used for wide-scale open software distribution, are a significant vector for security attacks. Software signing provides authenticity, mitigating many such attacks. Developer-managed signing keys pose usability challenges, but certificate-based systems introduce privacy problems. This work, Speranza, uses certificates to verify software authenticity but still provides anonymity to signers using zero-knowledge identity co-commitments. In Speranza, a signer uses an automated certificate authority (CA) to create a private identity-bound signature and proof of authorization. Verifiers check that a signer was authorized to publish a package without learning the signer's identity. The package repository privately records each package's authorized signers, but publishes only commitments to identities in a public map. Then, when issuing certificates, the CA issues the certificate to a distinct commitment to the same identity. The signer then creates a zero-knowledge proof that these are co-commitments. We implemented a proof-of-concept for Speranza. We find that costs to maintainers (signing) and end users (verifying) are small (sub-millisecond), even for a repository with millions of packages. Techniques inspired by recent key transparency systems reduce the bandwidth for serving authorization policies to 2 KiB. Server costs in this system are negligible. Our evaluation finds that Speranza is practical on the scale of the largest software repositories. We also emphasize practicality and deployability in this project. By building on existing technology and employing relatively simple and well-established cryptographic techniques, Speranza can be deployed for wide-scale use with only a few hundred lines of code and minimal changes to existing infrastructure. Speranza is a practical way to bring privacy and authenticity together for more trustworthy open-source software.

13 November 2023 in IEEE Security & Privacy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MMMarcela S. Melara
Marcela S. Melara
STSantiago Torres-Arias
Santiago Torres-Arias
Many of the adoption challenges in securing the software supply chain are largely caused by the language we use to describe risk and defenses and other sociocultural gaps. We shed light on the impacts of these gaps and opportunities to overcome them.

24 October 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
HDHongying Dong
Hongying Dong
HSHao Shu
Hao Shu
VPVijay Prakash
Vijay Prakash
YZYizhe Zhang
Yizhe Zhang
MPMuhammad Talha Paracha
Muhammad Talha Paracha
YSYixin Sun
Yixin Sun

14 February 2025 in IEEE Security & Privacy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TSTaylor R. Schorlemmer
Taylor R. Schorlemmer
EBEthan H. Burmane
Ethan H. Burmane
KKKelechi G. Kalu
Kelechi G. Kalu
STSantiago Torres-Arias
Santiago Torres-Arias
JDJames C. Davis
James C. Davis
The integration of third-party components leaves the software supply chain vulnerable. Cryptographic signatures enable verifying the origin of components (provenance) before they are added. This article describes traditional software signing, its challenges, and the changes introduced by next-generation software signing platforms.