Maria Carmela Ceparano

Maria Carmela Ceparano

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Maria Carmela Ceparano

Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Naples Federico II, Naples, Italy

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
28 July 2018 in Dynamic Games and Applications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
FCFrancesco Caruso
Francesco Caruso
MCMaria Carmela Ceparano
Maria Carmela Ceparano
JMJacqueline Morgan
Jacqueline Morgan

14 June 2023 in Annals of Operations Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
FCFrancesco Caruso
Francesco Caruso
MCMaria Carmela Ceparano
Maria Carmela Ceparano
JMJacqueline Morgan
Jacqueline Morgan

28 March 2024 in International Game Theory Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
FCFrancesco Caruso
Francesco Caruso
MCMaria Carmela Ceparano
Maria Carmela Ceparano
JMJacqueline Morgan
Jacqueline Morgan

25 February 2023 in Dynamic Games and Applications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
FCFrancesco Caruso
Francesco Caruso
MCMaria Carmela Ceparano
Maria Carmela Ceparano
JMJacqueline Morgan
Jacqueline Morgan

1 March 2019 in Journal of Mathematical Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MCMaria Carmela Ceparano
Maria Carmela Ceparano
FQFederico Quartieri
Federico Quartieri

24 April 2026 in Annals of Operations Research
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
FCFrancesco Caruso
Francesco Caruso
MCMaria Carmela Ceparano
Maria Carmela Ceparano
FQFederico Quartieri
Federico Quartieri
We examine a game-theoretic model of vessel sharing agreements in industries endowed with a general class of price functions and classes of convex cost functions. We study the equilibrium structure thereof—in particular, the existence of a unique equilibrium global aggregate as well as the existence of a unique equilibrium—and we provide a comparative statics analysis of consumer welfare with respect to an ordinal measure of concentration of the industry. We show that the a “high degree" of convexity of the cost functions can generate anti-competitive effects. In the presence of linear costs, the model satisfies a weak aggregative form in the sense of aggregative games. By allowing for the nonlinearity of variable cost functions, we further weaken the aggregative nature of the games considered. We provide a refined technique for treating these games in which both the equilibrium structure and the comparative statics analysis are based on the comparison of the equilibrium conditions of the players who strictly decrease their equilibrium strategies within the groups that strictly decrease the group’s equilibrium aggregate from an equilibrium with a smaller global aggregate associated with a less concentrated industry to an equilibrium with a (weakly) larger global aggregate associated with a more concentrated (but possibly identical) industry.