Tobias Cloosters

Tobias Cloosters

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Tobias Cloosters

University of Duisburg-Essen, Essen, Germany

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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2 December 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SASébastien Andreina
Sébastien Andreina
TCTobias Cloosters
Tobias Cloosters
LDLucas Davi
Lucas Davi
JGJens-Rene Giesen
Jens-Rene Giesen
MGMarco Gutfleisch
Marco Gutfleisch
HNHouda Naji
Houda Naji
Solana gained considerable attention as one of the most popular blockchain platforms for deploying decentralized applications. Compared to Ethereum, however, we observe a lack of research on how Solana smart contract developers handle security, what challenges they encounter, and how this affects the overall security of the ecosystem. To address this, we conducted the first comprehensive study on the Solana platform consisting of a 90-minute Solana smart contract code review task with 35 participants followed by interviews with a subset of seven participants. Our study shows, quite alarmingly, that none of the participants could detect all important security vulnerabilities in a code review task and that 83% of the participants are likely to release vulnerable smart contracts. Our study also sheds light on the root causes of developers' challenges with Solana smart contract development, suggesting the need for better security guidance and resources. In spite of these challenges, our automated analysis on currently deployed Solana smart contracts surprisingly suggests that the prevalence of vulnerabilities - especially those pointed out as the most challenging in our developer study - is below 0.3%. We explore the causes of this counter-intuitive resilience and show that frameworks, such as Anchor, are aiding Solana developers in deploying secure contracts.

22 June 2025 in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ODOussama Draissi
Oussama Draissi
TCTobias Cloosters
Tobias Cloosters
DKDavid Klein
David Klein
MRMichael Rodler
Michael Rodler
MMMarius Musch
Marius Musch
LDLucas Davi
Lucas Davi
WebAssembly enables fast execution of performance-critical in web applications utilizing native code. However, recent research has demonstrated the potential for memory corruption errors within WebAssembly modules to exploit web applications. In this work, we present the first systematic analysis of memory corruption in WebAssembly, unveiling the prevalence of a novel threat model where memory corruption enables code injection on a victim’s browser. Our large-scale analysis across 37797 domains reveals that an alarming 29411 (77.81%) of those fully trust data coming from potentially attacker-controlled sources. As a result, an attacker can exploit memory errors to manipulate the WebAssembly memory, where the data is implicitly trusted and frequently passed into security-sensitive functions such as eval or directly into the DOM via innerHTML. Thus, an attacker can abuse this trust to gain JavaScript code execution, i.e., Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). To tackle this issue, we present Wemby, the first viable approach to efficiently analyze WebAssembly-powered websites holistically. We demonstrate that Wemby is proficient at detecting remotely exposed memory corruption errors in web applications through fuzzing. For this purpose, we implement binary-only WebAssembly instrumentation that provides fine-grained memory corruption oracles. We applied Wemby to different websites, uncovering several memory corruption bugs, including one on the Zoom platform. In terms of performance, our ablation study demonstrates that Wemby outperforms current WebAssembly fuzzers. Specifically, Wemby achieves an average speed improvement of 232 times and delivers 46% greater code coverage compared to the state-of-the-art.

10 April 2024 in IEEE Security & Privacy
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
TCTobias Cloosters
Tobias Cloosters
ODOussama Draissi
Oussama Draissi
JWJohannes Willbold
Johannes Willbold
THThorsten Holz
Thorsten Holz
LDLucas Davi
Lucas Davi
Trusted execution environments provide strong security guarantees, like isolation and confidentiality, but are not immune from memory-safety violations. Our investigation of public trusted execution environment code based on symbolic execution and fuzzing reveals subtle memory safety issues.