18 November 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Services Computing
Proof of Stake (PoS) blockchain protocols emerged as a promising alternative to the largely energy-wasteful Proof of Work mechanisms currently in place. In contrast to computing power, however, stake is a virtual resource that can be replicated or reused, opening the door to attack vectors that have no counterpart in a PoW setting, and are much harder to defeat. We present PoTS (Proof of TEE-Stake), a novel PoS protocol that leverages properties of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) to limit the attack surface of malicious validators, and employs techniques such as forward security to guarantee protection against posterior-corruption attacks.We show that PoTS is secure against nothing at stake, grinding, and long range attacks down to realistic hardware assumptions on TEE and well-established cryptographic assumptions, and retains reasonable security even in face of compromised TEEs.We evaluate the performance of our proposal by means of implementation. Our evaluation results demonstrate that PoTS offers an excellent trade-off between security and performance.
11 April 2025 in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Although distributed machine learning (distributed ML) is gaining considerable attention in the community, prior works have independently looked at instances of distributed ML in either the training or the inference phase. No prior work has examined the combined robustness stemming from distributing both the learning and the inference process. In this work, we explore, for the first time, the robustness of distributed ML models that are fully heterogeneous in training data, architecture, scheduler, optimizer, and other model parameters. Supported by theory and extensive experimental validation using CIFAR10 and FashionMNIST, we show that such properly distributed ML instantiations achieve across-the-board improvements in accuracy-robustness tradeoffs against state-of-the-art transfer-based attacks that could otherwise not be realized by current ensemble or federated learning instantiations. For instance, our experiments on CIFAR10 show that for the Common Weakness attack, one of the most powerful state-of-the-art transfer-based attacks, our method improves robust accuracy by up to 40%, with a minimal impact on clean task accuracy.