25 October 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Tor, an onion-routing anonymity network, can be attacked by Website Fingerprinting (WF), which de-anonymizes encrypted web browsing traffic by analyzing its unique sequence characteristics. Although many defenses have been proposed, few have been implemented and tested in the real world; most state-of-the-art defenses were only simulated. Simulations fail to capture the real performance of these defenses as they make simplifying assumptions about the protocol stack and network conditions. To allow WF defenses to be analyzed as real implementations, we create WFDefProxy, the first general platform for WF defense implementation on Tor as pluggable transports. We implement three state-of-the-art WF defenses: FRONT, Tamaraw, and RegulaTor. We evaluate each defense extensively by directly collecting defended datasets under WFDefProxy. Our results show that simulation can be inaccurate in many cases. Specifically, Tamaraw’s time overhead was underestimated by 22% in one setting and overestimated by 24% in another. RegulaTor’s time overhead was underestimated by 30–40%. We find that a major source of simulation inaccuracy is that they cannot incorporate how packets depend on each other. We also find that adverse network conditions (which are ignored in simulation), especially congestion, can affect the evaluated overhead of defenses. These results show that it is important to evaluate defenses as implementations instead of only simulations to avoid errors in evaluation.
1 August 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Although Tor is designed to provide anonymity, website fingerprinting (WF) attacks have posed significant threats to user privacy. In response, various defense approaches have been developed. Randomization and regularization-based defenses are criticized to be inefficient due to their bandwidth-consuming nature. Some adversarial learning-based defenses are impractical because the generation of perturbation depends on the complete traffic traces. Other adversarial learning-based defenses have weaknesses of lacking adaptability because their perturbations are input-agnostic. To overcome these shortcomings, we propose RUDOLF, an efficient and adaptive WF defense based on the soft actor-critic (SAC) algorithm of reinforcement learning (RL). We train the agent that can incrementally output perturbations synchronously following each burst of real-time traffic. Different from previous defenses, RUDOLF’s perturbation does not depend on the integrity of the traffic and concerns the actual real-time traffic, which ensures the practicality of implementation and adaptability. Besides, we take advantage of the exploratory characteristics of the SAC algorithm to obtain the optimal policy of adding perturbations that can efficiently balance defense effects and bandwidth consumption. Experiments on synthetic datasets show that with less than 30% bandwidth overhead (BWO), RUDOLF can reduce the average attack accuracy to around 15%-20%, which is superior to previous works. We also have implemented RUDOLF as a Tor pluggable transport. The performance in the real Tor network shows that RUDOLF can reduce the average accuracy of WF classifier to around 24% with about 25% BWO and almost no time delay.
30 January 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
The onion router (Tor) is a network system for anonymous communication. However, website fingerprinting (WF) attacks have threatened the anonymity of Tor. WF attackers can passively monitor and collect traffic, classify the victims’ traffic based on machine learning or deep learning, and identify the websites the victims visit. In recent years, there has been some research on WF defense, but most of the works have high bandwidth and latency overhead. Besides, some defenses are criticized as being unrealistic to implement in real-time due to the need for prior knowledge of the traffic’s exact packet sequences, and the lengths of sequences. In this paper, we propose KimeraPAD, a defense against WF attacks based on deep reinforcement learning. Specifically, our method first trains an agent to generate perturbations confusing the attacker’s classifier. To overcome the weak point of WF defense based on adversarial learning, we then design the implementation method and incur randomness so that it can inject dummy packets in real time and resist adversarial training. Experimental results demonstrate that our method can greatly reduce attack accuracy with a low bandwidth overhead. Besides, KimeraPAD can also be implemented on the client side, which simplifies the implementation a lot while achieving excellent performance.
2 September 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Website Fingerprinting (WF) aims to deanonymize users on the Tor network by analyzing encrypted network traffic. Recent deep-learning-based attacks show high accuracy on undefended traces. However, they struggle against modern defenses that use tactics like injecting dummy packets and delaying real packets, which significantly degrade classification performance. Our analysis reveals that current attacks inadequately leverage the timing information inherent in traffic traces, which persists as a source of leakage even under robust defenses. Addressing this shortfall, we introduce a novel feature representation named the Inter-Arrival Time (IAT) histogram, which quantifies the frequencies of packet inter-arrival times across predetermined time slots. Complementing this feature, we propose a new CNN-based attack, WFCAT, enhanced with two architectural blocks designed to effectively extract and utilize timing information. The model employs convolutional kernels of varying sizes to capture multi-scale temporal features, which are then integrated through a weighted combination across feature channels. This channel-wise attention mechanism enables the model to adaptively emphasize informative patterns while suppressing noise, thereby improving its robustness against timing obfuscation. Our experiments validate that WFCAT substantially outperforms existing methods on defended traces in both closed- and open-world scenarios. Notably, WFCAT achieves over 59% accuracy against Surakav, a recently developed robust defense, marking an improvement of over 28% and 48% against the state-of-the-art attacks RF and Tik-Tok, respectively, in the closed-world scenario.
12 February 2026 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Website fingerprinting (WF) attacks, which covertly monitor user communications to identify the web pages they visit, pose a serious threat to user privacy. Existing WF defenses attempt to reduce attack accuracy by disrupting traffic patterns, but attackers can retrain their models to adapt, making these defenses ineffective. Meanwhile, their high overhead limits deployability. To overcome these limitations, we introduce a novel controllable website fingerprinting defense called TrapFlow based on backdoor learning. TrapFlow exploits the tendency of neural networks to memorize subtle patterns by injecting crafted trigger sequences into targeted website traffic, causing the attacker’s model to build incorrect associations during training. If the attacker attempts to adapt by training on such noisy data, TrapFlow ensures that the model internalizes the trigger as a dominant feature, leading to widespread misclassification across unrelated websites. Conversely, if the attacker ignores these patterns and trains only on clean data, the trigger behaves as an adversarial patch at inference time, causing model misclassification. To achieve this dual effect, we optimize the trigger using the Fast Levenshtein-like distance to maximize both its learnability and distinctiveness from normal traffic. Experiments show that TrapFlow significantly reduces the accuracy of the RF attack from 99% to 6% with 74% data overhead. This compares favorably against two SOTA defenses: FRONT reduces accuracy by only 2% at a similar overhead, while Palette achieves 32% accuracy, but with 48% more overhead. We further validate the practicality of our method in a real Tor network environment.
16 December 2024 in arXiv
Website Fingerprinting (WF) aims to deanonymize users on the Tor network by analyzing encrypted network traffic. Recent deep-learning-based attacks show high accuracy on undefended traces. However, they struggle against modern defenses that use tactics like injecting dummy packets and delaying real packets, which significantly degrade classification performance. Our analysis reveals that current attacks inadequately leverage the timing information inherent in traffic traces, which persists as a source of leakage even under robust defenses. Addressing this shortfall, we introduce a novel feature representation named the Inter-Arrival Time (IAT) histogram, which quantifies the frequencies of packet inter-arrival times across predetermined time slots. Complementing this feature, we propose a new CNN-based attack, WFCAT, enhanced with two innovative architectural blocks designed to optimally extract and utilize timing information. Our approach uses kernels of varying sizes to capture multi-scale features, which are then integrated using a weighted sum across all feature channels to enhance the model's efficacy in identifying temporal patterns. Our experiments validate that WFCAT substantially outperforms existing methods on defended traces in both closed- and open-world scenarios. Notably, WFCAT achieves over 59% accuracy against Surakav, a recently developed robust defense, marking an improvement of over 28% and 48% against the state-of-the-art attacks RF and Tik-Tok, respectively, in the closed-world scenario.