Marten van Dijk

Marten van Dijk

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Marten van Dijk

Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica, Amsterdam, Netherlands and Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, Netherlands

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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24 December 2021 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
KMKaleel Mahmood
Kaleel Mahmood
RMRigel Mahmood
Rigel Mahmood
EREthan Rathbun
Ethan Rathbun
MDMarten van Dijk
Marten van Dijk
The field of adversarial machine learning has experienced a near exponential growth in the amount of papers being produced since 2018. This massive information output has yet to be properly processed and categorized. In this paper, we seek to help alleviate this problem by systematizing the recent advances in adversarial machine learning black-box attacks since 2019. Our survey summarizes and categorizes 20 recent black-box attacks. We also present a new analysis for understanding the attack success rate with respect to the adversarial model used in each paper. Overall, our paper surveys a wide body of literature to highlight recent attack developments and organizes them into four attack categories: score based attacks, decision based attacks, transfer attacks and non-traditional attacks. Further, we provide a new mathematical framework to show exactly how attack results can fairly be compared.

18 October 2021 in Entropy
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
KMKaleel Mahmood
Kaleel Mahmood
DGDeniz Gurevin
Deniz Gurevin
MDMarten van Dijk
Marten van Dijk
PNPhuoung Ha Nguyen
Phuoung Ha Nguyen
Many defenses have recently been proposed at venues like NIPS, ICML, ICLR and CVPR. These defenses are mainly focused on mitigating white-box attacks. They do not properly examine black-box attacks. In this paper, we expand upon the analyses of these defenses to include adaptive black-box adversaries. Our evaluation is done on nine defenses including Barrage of Random Transforms, ComDefend, Ensemble Diversity, Feature Distillation, The Odds are Odd, Error Correcting Codes, Distribution Classifier Defense, K-Winner Take All and Buffer Zones. Our investigation is done using two black-box adversarial models and six widely studied adversarial attacks for CIFAR-10 and Fashion-MNIST datasets. Our analyses show most recent defenses (7 out of 9) provide only marginal improvements in security (<25%), as compared to undefended networks. For every defense, we also show the relationship between the amount of data the adversary has at their disposal, and the effectiveness of adaptive black-box attacks. Overall, our results paint a clear picture: defenses need both thorough white-box and black-box analyses to be considered secure. We provide this large scale study and analyses to motivate the field to move towards the development of more robust black-box defenses.

27 December 2021 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
KMKaleel Mahmood
Kaleel Mahmood
PNPhuong Ha Nguyen
Phuong Ha Nguyen
LNLam M. Nguyen
Lam M. Nguyen
TNTu Thanh Nguyen
Tu Thanh Nguyen
MDMarten Van Dijk
Marten Van Dijk
Adversarial machine learning defenses have primarily been focused on mitigating static, white-box attacks. However, it remains an open question whether such defenses are robust under an adaptive black-box adversary. In this paper, we specifically focus on the black-box threat model and make the following contributions: First we develop an enhanced adaptive black-box attack which is experimentally shown to be ≥ 30% more effective than the original adaptive black-box attack proposed by Papernot et al. For our second contribution, we test 10 recent defenses using our new attack and propose our own black-box defense (barrier zones). We show that our defense based on barrier zones offers significant improvements in security over state-of-the-art defenses. This improvement includes greater than 85% robust accuracy against black-box boundary attacks, transfer attacks and our new adaptive black-box attack, for the datasets we study. For completeness, we verify our claims through extensive experimentation with 10 other defenses using three adversarial models (14 different black-box attacks) on two datasets (CIFAR-10 and Fashion-MNIST).

21 March 2022 in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
CJChenglu Jin
Chenglu Jin
WBWayne Burleson
Wayne Burleson
MDMarten van Dijk
Marten van Dijk
URUlrich Rührmair
Ulrich Rührmair

2 May 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
NSNiloufar Sayadi
Niloufar Sayadi
PNPhuong Ha Nguyen
Phuong Ha Nguyen
MDMarten van Dijk
Marten van Dijk
CJChenglu Jin
Chenglu Jin
The XOR Arbiter PUF was introduced as a strong PUF in 2007 and was broken in 2015 by a Machine Learning (ML) attack, which allows the underlying Arbiter PUFs to be modeled individually by exploiting reliability information of the measured responses. To mitigate the reliability-based attacks, state-of-the-art understanding shows that the reliability of individual Arbiter PUFs and the overall XOR Arbiter PUF can be boosted to an arbitrarily high level, thus rendering all known reliability-based ML attacks infeasible; alternatively, an access control interface around the XOR Arbiter PUF can prevent the same challenge-response pairs from being accessed repeatedly, thus eliminating the leakage of reliability information. We show that, for the first time, a perfectly reliable XOR Arbiter PUF can be successfully attacked in a divide-and-conquer manner, meaning each underlying Arbiter PUF in an XOR Arbiter PUF can be attacked individually. This allows us to attack large XOR Arbiter PUFs efficiently, even without reliability information or any side-channel information. Our key insight is that, instead of reliability information, the responses of highly correlated challenges also reveal how close the responses are to the response decision boundary. This leads to a chosen challenge attack on XOR Arbiter PUFs by carefully choosing correlated challenges to measure and aggregate the collected information. We validate our attack by using PUF simulation, as well as an XOR Arbiter PUF implemented on FPGA. We also demonstrate that our chosen challenge methodology is compatible with the state-of-the-art combined gradient-based multi-objective optimization attack. Finally, we discuss an effective countermeasure that can prevent our attack but with a relatively large area overhead compared to the PUF itself.

29 June 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Computers
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DGDeniz Gurevin
Deniz Gurevin
CJChenglu Jin
Chenglu Jin
PNPhuong Ha Nguyen
Phuong Ha Nguyen
OKOmer Khan
Omer Khan
MDMarten van Dijk
Marten van Dijk
Secure processors with hardware-enforced isolation are crucial for secure cloud computation. However, commercial secure processors have underestimated the capabilities of attackers and failed to provide secure execution environments capable of protecting sensitive information against side-channel attacks. Remote Attestation protocols based on traditional signature schemes are not secure under side-channel attacks anymore since their secret keys can be leaked. Previously, Key-Insulated Schemes (KIS) have been introduced to mitigate the damage caused by secret key exposure in cryptosystems by breaking the lifetime of secret keys into independent sessions. KIS protect the security of all other sessions if any session keys are compromised, however, provide no security guarantees for a compromised session. We introduce a new cryptographic primitive called One-Time Signature with Secret Key Exposure (OTS-SKE), which ensures no one can forge a valid signature of a new message or nonce even if all secret session keys are leaked. OTS-SKE enables us to sign attestation reports securely under a powerful adversary who can observe all digital states in secure enclaves through side-channel attacks. We also minimize the trusted computing base by introducing a secure co-processor that is only responsible for key generation into the system. Our experiments show that the signing of OTS-SKE is faster than KIS as well as Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) used in Intel SGX.