Farimah Farahmandi

Farimah Farahmandi

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Farimah Farahmandi

University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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8 May 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ANAdib Nahiyan
Adib Nahiyan
FFFarimah Farahmandi
Farimah Farahmandi
PMPrabhat Mishra
Prabhat Mishra
DFDomenic Forte
Domenic Forte
MTMark Tehranipoor
Mark Tehranipoor
The security of a system-on-chip (SoC) can be compromised by exploiting the vulnerabilities of the finite state machines (FSMs) in the SoC controller modules through fault injection attacks. These vulnerabilities may be unintentionally introduced by traditional FSM design practices or by CAD tools during synthesis. In this paper, we first analyze how the vulnerabilities in an FSM can be exploited by fault injection attacks. Then, we propose a security-aware FSM design flow for ASIC designs to mitigate them and prevent fault attacks on FSM. Our proposed FSM design flow starts with a security-aware encoding scheme which makes the FSM resilient against fault attacks. However, the vulnerabilities introduced by the CAD tools cannot be addressed by encoding schemes alone. To analyze for such vulnerabilities, we develop a novel technique named Analyzing Vulnerabilities in FSM (AVFSM). If any vulnerability exists, we propose a secure FSM architecture to address the issue. In this paper, we mainly focus on setup-time violation based fault attacks which pose a serious threat on FSMs; though our proposed flow works for advanced laser-based fault attacks as well. We compare our proposed secure FSM design flow with traditional FSM design practices in terms of cost, performance, and security. We show that our FSM design flow ensures security while having a negligible impact on cost and performance.

3 September 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Computers
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
FFFarimah Farahmandi
Farimah Farahmandi
PMPrabhat Mishra
Prabhat Mishra
Optimized and custom arithmetic circuits are widely used in embedded systems such as multimedia applications, cryptography systems, signal processing and console games. Debugging of arithmetic circuits is a challenge due to increasing complexity coupled with non-standard implementations. Existing algebraic rewriting techniques produce a remainder to indicate the presence of a potential bug. However, bug localization remains a major bottleneck. In this paper, we present an automated test generation and bug localization technique for debugging arithmetic circuits. This paper makes four important contributions. We propose an automated approach for generating directed tests by suitable assignments of input variables to make the remainder non-zero. The generated tests are guaranteed to activate bugs. We also propose an automatic bug fixing technique by utilizing the patterns of the remainder terms as well as by analyzing the regions activated by the generated tests to detect and correct the error(s). We also propose an efficient debugging algorithm that can handle multiple dependent as well as independent bugs. Finally, our proposed framework, consisting of directed test generation, bug localization and bug correction, is fully automated. Our experimental results demonstrate that the proposed approach can be used for automated debugging of large and complex arithmetic circuits.

5 December 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TZTao Zhang
Tao Zhang
MTMark Tehranipoor
Mark Tehranipoor
FFFarimah Farahmandi
Farimah Farahmandi
The Internet-of-Thing (IoT) era inspires a surge of networked embedded devices in the real world. However, cyber-attacks such as malware intrusions pose severe concerns about the security of the entire IoT space by hijacking the devices, altering the application’s execution, and/or causing a denial of services. Traditional operating-system-level and built-in hardware detection solutions either induce drastic performance degradation or incur high overhead to the system, failing to provide protection in a timely and affordable fashion. On the other hand, external side-channel-based security monitoring becomes an attractive scheme for addressing the dilemma because the observable physical properties of a running electronic device, such as power consumption and electromagnetic (EM) emanations, can deliver a good amount of information for the underlying operations. In this article, we present TrustGuard, a standalone security monitoring framework integrating both power side-channel capturing and machine learning (ML)-based malware detection capabilities on the same field-programmable gate array (FPGA) fabric. We eliminate the need for dedicated sampling equipment like an oscilloscope with an ON-chip configurable sensor FPGA analog-to-digital converter (ADC) and enable agile prototyping of ML accelerator for attack detection through the high-level synthesis (HLS) technique. We deploy the outcome hardware sensor and security monitor on the Xilinx ZCU104 platform to target the prevalent BeagleBone Black (BBB) board by profiling the behaviors of uncompromised benchmark applications and discovering the anomalies introduced by the attack vectors, including malware infections, code injection, and code reuse. The experimental results demonstrate the performance and effectiveness of TrustGuard by achieving more than 90% malware detection accuracy.

15 November 2023 in ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PCPaul E. Calzada
Paul E. Calzada
SSSami Ul Islam Sami
Sami Ul Islam Sami
KAKimia Zamiri Azar
Kimia Zamiri Azar
FRFahim Rahman
Fahim Rahman
FFFarimah Farahmandi
Farimah Farahmandi
MTMark Tehranipoor
Mark Tehranipoor
Over the past few decades, electronics have become commonplace in government, commercial, and social domains. These devices have developed rapidly, as seen in the prevalent use of system-on-chips rather than separate integrated circuits on a single circuit board. As the semiconductor community begins conversations over the end of Moore’s law, an approach to further increase both functionality per area and yield using segregated functionality dies on a common interposer die, labeled a System in Package (SiP), is gaining attention. Thus, the chiplet and SiP space has grown to meet this demand, creating a new packaging paradigm, advanced packaging, and a new supply chain. This new distributed supply chain with multiple chiplet developers and foundries has augmented counterfeit vulnerabilities. Chiplets are currently available on an open market, and their origin and authenticity consequently are difficult to ascertain. With this lack of control over the stages of the supply chain, counterfeit threats manifest at the chiplet, interposer, and SiP levels. In this article, we identify counterfeit threats in the SiP domain, and we propose a mitigating framework utilizing blockchain for the effective traceability of SiPs to establish provenance. Our framework utilizes the Chiplet Hardware Security Module to authenticate a SiP throughout its life. To accomplish this, we leverage SiP information including electronic chip identification of chiplets, combating die and IC recycling sensor information, documentation, test patterns and/or electrical measurements, grade, and part number of the SiP. We detail the structure of the blockchain and establish protocols for both enrolling trusted information into the blockchain network and authenticating the SiP. Our framework mitigates SiP counterfeit threats including recycled, remarked, cloned, overproduced interposer, forged documentation, and substituted chiplet while detecting of out-of-spec and defective SiPs.

4 March 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SRSree Ranjani Rajendran
Sree Ranjani Rajendran
NDNusrat Farzana Dipu
Nusrat Farzana Dipu
STShams Tarek
Shams Tarek
HKHadi Mardani Kamali
Hadi Mardani Kamali
FFFarimah Farahmandi
Farimah Farahmandi
MTMark Tehranipoor
Mark Tehranipoor
Due to the increasing size and complexity of system-on-chips (SoCs), new threats and vulnerabilities are emerging, mainly related to flaws at the system level. Due to the lack of decisive security requirements and properties from the perspective of the SoC designer, the system-level verification process, whose violation may lead to exploiting a hardware vulnerability, is not studied comprehensively. To enable more comprehensive verification of system-level properties, this paper presents a framework known as HUnTer (Hardware Underath Trigger) for identifying sets of instructions (sequences) at the processor unit (PU) that reveal the underlying hardware vulnerabilities. HUnTer automates (i) threat modeling, (ii) threat-based formal verification, (iii) generating counterexamples, and (iv) generating snippet code to exploit the vulnerability. Furthermore, the HUnTer framework defines a unique security coverage metric ( HUnT_Coverage ) to measure the performance and effectiveness of vulnerability exploits. To demonstrate the high effectiveness of the proposed framework, we conduct a wide variety of case studies using the HUnTer framework on RISC-V-based open-source SoC architecture and attains the security coverage of 86% as an average for 11 benchmarks of the Trust-Hub database.

11 April 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RKRasheed Kibria
Rasheed Kibria
FFFarimah Farahmandi
Farimah Farahmandi
MTMark Tehranipoor
Mark Tehranipoor
Numerous security vulnerability assessment techniques urge precise and fast finite state machines (FSMs) extraction from the design under evaluation. Sequential logic locking, watermark insertion, fault-injection assessment of a System-on-a-Chip (SoC) control flow, information leakage assessment, and reverse engineering at gate-level abstraction, to name a few, require precise FSM extraction from the synthesized netlist of the design. Unfortunately, no reliable solutions are currently available for fast and accurate extraction of FSMs from the highly unstructured gate-level netlist for effective security evaluation. The major challenge in developing such a solution is precise recognition of FSM state flip-flops in a netlist having a massive collection of flip-flops. In this paper, we propose FSMx-Ultra, a framework for extracting FSMs from extremely unstructured gate-level netlists. FSMx-Ultra utilizes state-of-the-art graph theory concepts and algorithms to distinguish FSM state registers from other registers and then constructs gate-level state transition graphs (STGs) for each identified FSM state register using automatic test pattern generation (ATPG) techniques. The results of our experiments on 14 open-source benchmark designs illustrate that FSMx-Ultra can recover all FSMs quickly and precisely from synthesized gate-level netlists of diverse complexity and size utilizing various state encoding schemes.