Fahim Rahman

Fahim Rahman

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Fahim Rahman

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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4 March 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HWHuanyu Wang
Huanyu Wang
HLHenian Li
Henian Li
FRFahim Rahman
Fahim Rahman
MTMark M. Tehranipoor
Mark M. Tehranipoor
FFFarimah Farahmandi
Farimah Farahmandi
Fault-injection attacks have become a major concern for hardware designs, primarily due to their powerful capability in tampering with critical locations in a device to cause violation of its integrity, confidentiality, and availability. Researchers have proposed a number of physical and architectural countermeasures against fault-injection attacks; however, these techniques usually come with large overhead and design efforts making them difficult to use in practice. In addition, the current electronic design automation (EDA) tools are not fully equipped to support vulnerability assessment against fault-injection attacks at the design-time for secure hardware development. To perform a design-time (i.e., pre-silicon) evaluation of such attacks, a designer should be aware of various security vulnerabilities and must perform a tedious manual design review, which is timeconsuming and hard to ensure effectiveness. Therefore, it is very important to develop an automatic assessment framework to identify the most security-critical locations in a design to fault-injection attacks and place emphasis on protecting those locations. In this paper, we propose an automated framework for fault-injection vulnerability assessment of designs at gate-level, while considering the design-specific security properties using novel models and metrics. The proposed framework identifies the faults that can violate the security properties of the design. As a result, applying local countermeasures will be more effective and the protection overhead will be reduced significantly. Our experimental results on the security properties of AES, RSA, and SHA implementations show that the security threat from fault-injection attacks can be significantly mitigated by protecting the identified critical locations, which are less than 0.6% of the design.

12 November 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ASAndrew Stern
Andrew Stern
UBUlbert Botero
Ulbert Botero
FRFahim Rahman
Fahim Rahman
DFDomenic Forte
Domenic Forte
MTMark Tehranipoor
Mark Tehranipoor

28 September 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
FRFahim Rahman
Fahim Rahman
BSBicky Shakya
Bicky Shakya
XXXiaolin Xu
Xiaolin Xu
DFDomenic Forte
Domenic Forte
MTMark Tehranipoor
Mark Tehranipoor
Hardware-oriented security and trust has traditionally relied on the dominant CMOS technology to develop security primitives and provide protection against different attacks and vulnerabilities. With CMOS nearly reaching its fundamental scaling limit and the shortcomings of current solutions, researchers are now looking to exploit emerging nanoelectronic devices for various security applications. In this paper, we discuss the unique features of three emerging nanoelectronic technologies, namely, phase-change memory, grapheme, and carbon nanotubes, and analyze how these features can aid in hardware security and trust. In addition, we present challenges and future research directions about how to effectively integrate emerging nanoscale devices into hardware security. We emphasize that an interdisciplinary initiative is needed for emerging technologies to reach their full potential in security and trust applications.

30 October 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LYLiting Yu
Liting Yu
XWXiaoxiao Wang
Xiaoxiao Wang
FRFahim Rahman
Fahim Rahman
MTMark Tehranipoor
Mark Tehranipoor
Physical unclonable function (PUF) is an important security primitive, which generates unique signatures as fingerprints for each chip. This article first presents a novel interconnect-based PUF (iPUF). The proposed iPUF utilizes the manufacturing process variability of interconnect lines to introduce crosstalk variations for generating PUF signatures. By leveraging the variations of passive interconnects, iPUF minimizes the usage of active CMOS components, providing an increased resiliency against environmental variations and aging. Initiated by a linear feedback shift register (LFSR), iPUF sequentially generates 1-bit signature at each clock cycle, making it more efficient compared with ring-oscillator PUF. Second, two schemes for signature uniqueness enhancement of sequential PUFs are proposed. The self-masking scheme windows the sequential signature with an m-bit mask trained by the PUF's own initial sequential signature. Meanwhile, the bit-filtering scheme screens the randomness of each bit within the sequential signature by exploiting several sub-iPUFs and selects the bits with high randomness. To verify the performance of iPUF, Monte Carlo simulations of 500 samples, with variations following industrial data, are conducted in different operating corners. The uniqueness of the given sample set approaches 48.63% with a 10-bit mask. With ±10% supply voltage, 0 °C-100 °C temperature variations, as well as one year of unaccelerated aging, iPUF's reliability values, are as high as 96.09%, 99.06%, and 99.63%, respectively. For verification, 50 dies of iPUF chips are manufactured with a 55-nm technology node. Silicon results demonstrate that iPUF generates 1024-bit signatures with satisfied uniqueness (48.03%) while exhibiting good reliability (90.07%) under 120-mV voltage variations. Finally, iPUF's robustness against various attacks is also proven.

25 April 2023 in IEEE Design & Test
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SSSami Ul Islam Sami
Sami Ul Islam Sami
HKHadi Mardani Kamali
Hadi Mardani Kamali
FFFarimah Farahmandi
Farimah Farahmandi
FRFahim Rahman
Fahim Rahman
MTMark Tehranipoor
Mark Tehranipoor
Due to slowdown of Moore’s law and Dennard scaling, modern hardware design has shifted to heterogenous integration (HI) instead of traditional monolithic ICs. However, HI incurs its own security vulnerabilities. In this article, the authors analyze the security issues pertaining to HI and provide defense strategies for the same.

15 November 2023 in ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PCPaul E. Calzada
Paul E. Calzada
SSSami Ul Islam Sami
Sami Ul Islam Sami
KAKimia Zamiri Azar
Kimia Zamiri Azar
FRFahim Rahman
Fahim Rahman
FFFarimah Farahmandi
Farimah Farahmandi
MTMark Tehranipoor
Mark Tehranipoor
Over the past few decades, electronics have become commonplace in government, commercial, and social domains. These devices have developed rapidly, as seen in the prevalent use of system-on-chips rather than separate integrated circuits on a single circuit board. As the semiconductor community begins conversations over the end of Moore’s law, an approach to further increase both functionality per area and yield using segregated functionality dies on a common interposer die, labeled a System in Package (SiP), is gaining attention. Thus, the chiplet and SiP space has grown to meet this demand, creating a new packaging paradigm, advanced packaging, and a new supply chain. This new distributed supply chain with multiple chiplet developers and foundries has augmented counterfeit vulnerabilities. Chiplets are currently available on an open market, and their origin and authenticity consequently are difficult to ascertain. With this lack of control over the stages of the supply chain, counterfeit threats manifest at the chiplet, interposer, and SiP levels. In this article, we identify counterfeit threats in the SiP domain, and we propose a mitigating framework utilizing blockchain for the effective traceability of SiPs to establish provenance. Our framework utilizes the Chiplet Hardware Security Module to authenticate a SiP throughout its life. To accomplish this, we leverage SiP information including electronic chip identification of chiplets, combating die and IC recycling sensor information, documentation, test patterns and/or electrical measurements, grade, and part number of the SiP. We detail the structure of the blockchain and establish protocols for both enrolling trusted information into the blockchain network and authenticating the SiP. Our framework mitigates SiP counterfeit threats including recycled, remarked, cloned, overproduced interposer, forged documentation, and substituted chiplet while detecting of out-of-spec and defective SiPs.