1 September 1999 in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
CGClaudia González-Vallejo
1 June 1996 in Journal of Consumer Research
1 January 2006 in Management Science
Averaging estimates is an effective way to improve accuracy when combining expert judgments, integrating group members’ judgments, or using advice to modify personal judgments. If the estimates of two judges ever fall on different sides of the truth, which we term bracketing, averaging must outperform the average judge for convex loss functions, such as mean absolute deviation (MAD). We hypothesized that people often hold incorrect beliefs about averaging, falsely concluding that the average of two judges’ estimates would be no more accurate than the average judge. The experiments confirmed that this misconception was common across a range of tasks that involved reasoning from summary data (Experiment 1), from specific instances (Experiment 2), and conceptually (Experiment 3). However, this misconception decreased as observed or assumed bracketing rate increased (all three studies) and when bracketing was made more transparent (Experiment 2). Experiment 4 showed that flawed inferential rules and poor extensional reasoning abilities contributed to the misconception. We conclude by describing how people may face few opportunities to learn the benefits of averaging and how misappreciating averaging contributes to poor intuitive strategies for combining estimates.
1 January 2009 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
A basic issue in social influence is how best to change one's judgment in response to learning the opinions of others. This article examines the strategies that people use to revise their quantitative estimates on the basis of the estimates of another person. The authors note that people tend to use 2 basic strategies when revising estimates: choosing between the 2 estimates and averaging them. The authors developed the probability, accuracy, redundancy (PAR) model to examine the relative effectiveness of these two strategies across judgment environments. A surprising result was that averaging was the more effective strategy across a wide range of commonly encountered environments. The authors observed that despite this finding, people tend to favor the choosing strategy. Most participants in these studies would have achieved greater accuracy had they always averaged. The identification of intuitive strategies, along with a formal analysis of when they are accurate, provides a basis for examining how effectively people use the judgments of others. Although a portfolio of strategies that includes averaging and choosing can be highly effective, the authors argue that people are not generally well adapted to the environment in terms of strategy selection.
1 November 2011 in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
1 January 2004 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
Judges were asked to make numerical estimates (e.g., "In what year was the first flight of a hot air balloon?"). Judges provided high and low estimates such that they were X% sure that the correct answer lay between them. They exhibited substantial overconfidence: The correct answer fell inside their intervals much less than X% of the time. This contrasts with choices between 2 possible answers to a question, which showed much less overconfidence. The authors show that overconfidence in interval estimates can result from variability in setting interval widths. However, the main cause is that subjective intervals are systematically too narrow given the accuracy of one's information-sometimes only 40% as large as necessary to be well calibrated. The degree of overconfidence varies greatly depending on how intervals are elicited. There are also substantial differences among domains and between male and female judges. The authors discuss the possible psychological mechanisms underlying this pattern of findings.