Richard P. Larrick

Richard P. Larrick

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Richard P. Larrick

The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

37Years (1990-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 February 1999 in Cognitive Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CHChip Heath
Chip Heath
RLRichard P. Larrick
Richard P. Larrick
GWGeorge Wu
George Wu

25 May 2012 in Marketing Letters
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
EJEric J. Johnson
Eric J. Johnson
SSSuzanne B. Shu
Suzanne B. Shu
BDBenedict G. C. Dellaert
Benedict G. C. Dellaert
CFCraig Fox
Craig Fox
DGDaniel G. Goldstein
Daniel G. Goldstein
EWElke U. Weber
Elke U. Weber

29 April 2013 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
DGDena M. Gromet
Dena M. Gromet
HKHoward Kunreuther
Howard Kunreuther
RLRichard P. Larrick
Richard P. Larrick
This research demonstrates how promoting the environment can negatively affect adoption of energy efficiency in the United States because of the political polarization surrounding environmental issues. Study 1 demonstrated that more politically conservative individuals were less in favor of investment in energy-efficient technology than were those who were more politically liberal. This finding was driven primarily by the lessened psychological value that more conservative individuals placed on reducing carbon emissions. Study 2 showed that this difference has consequences: In a real-choice context, more conservative individuals were less likely to purchase a more expensive energy-efficient light bulb when it was labeled with an environmental message than when it was unlabeled. These results highlight the importance of taking into account psychological value-based considerations in the individual adoption of energy-efficient technology in the United States and beyond.

1 January 2006 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RLRichard P. Larrick
Richard P. Larrick
JSJack B. Soll
Jack B. Soll
Averaging estimates is an effective way to improve accuracy when combining expert judgments, integrating group members’ judgments, or using advice to modify personal judgments. If the estimates of two judges ever fall on different sides of the truth, which we term bracketing, averaging must outperform the average judge for convex loss functions, such as mean absolute deviation (MAD). We hypothesized that people often hold incorrect beliefs about averaging, falsely concluding that the average of two judges’ estimates would be no more accurate than the average judge. The experiments confirmed that this misconception was common across a range of tasks that involved reasoning from summary data (Experiment 1), from specific instances (Experiment 2), and conceptually (Experiment 3). However, this misconception decreased as observed or assumed bracketing rate increased (all three studies) and when bracketing was made more transparent (Experiment 2). Experiment 4 showed that flawed inferential rules and poor extensional reasoning abilities contributed to the misconception. We conclude by describing how people may face few opportunities to learn the benefits of averaging and how misappreciating averaging contributes to poor intuitive strategies for combining estimates.

1 January 2009 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JSJack B. Soll
Jack B. Soll
RLRichard P. Larrick
Richard P. Larrick
A basic issue in social influence is how best to change one's judgment in response to learning the opinions of others. This article examines the strategies that people use to revise their quantitative estimates on the basis of the estimates of another person. The authors note that people tend to use 2 basic strategies when revising estimates: choosing between the 2 estimates and averaging them. The authors developed the probability, accuracy, redundancy (PAR) model to examine the relative effectiveness of these two strategies across judgment environments. A surprising result was that averaging was the more effective strategy across a wide range of commonly encountered environments. The authors observed that despite this finding, people tend to favor the choosing strategy. Most participants in these studies would have achieved greater accuracy had they always averaged. The identification of intuitive strategies, along with a formal analysis of when they are accurate, provides a basis for examining how effectively people use the judgments of others. Although a portfolio of strategies that includes averaging and choosing can be highly effective, the authors argue that people are not generally well adapted to the environment in terms of strategy selection.

1 December 1998 in Journal of International Business Studies
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MMMichael W. Morris
Michael W. Morris
KWKatherine Y. Williams
Katherine Y. Williams
KLKwok Leung
Kwok Leung
RLRichard Larrick
Richard Larrick
MMM. Teresa Mendoza
M. Teresa Mendoza
JHJun-Chen Hu
Jun-Chen Hu