Yifan Xu

Yifan Xu

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Yifan Xu

School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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19 December 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YZYuehao Zhu
Yuehao Zhu
JTJun Tao
Jun Tao
HWHaotian Wang
Haotian Wang
LYLinxiao Yu
Linxiao Yu
YLYuantu Luo
Yuantu Luo
YXYifan Xu
Yifan Xu
Encrypted communications, implemented for the confidential information exchange, facilitate the preservation of individual privacy. Unfortunately, some criminals abuse encrypted communications to conduct illegal activities, leading to the proliferation of the Darknet. To curb malicious darknet activities, the accurate and effective classification of darknet traffic is imperative. Considerable endeavors have been devoted to identifying the darknet traffic. However, the classification of darknet applications has not yielded a satisfactory result. This deficiency arises from the limitations of current approaches, e.g., some traditional methods rely on hand-crafted features that consume labor, and other neural network-based methods disregard the graph structure of the traffic. To tackle these challenges, we propose the Darknet Traffic Graph (DTG), a graph structure that captures the interactions between local clients and remote servers in darknet traffic. Furthermore, based on DTG, we combine the GNN model and attention mechanism to create the Darknet Graph Neural Networks, i.e., DGNN, a powerful model that sufficiently exploits the benign and darknet traffic features. As a result, on the CIC-Darknet2020 dataset, the accuracy of DGNN in traffic classification and application classification is 98.52% and 99.06%, respectively, which outperforms other classifiers.

22 September 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HWHaotian Wang
Haotian Wang
JTJun Tao
Jun Tao
DCDingwen Chi
Dingwen Chi
YGYu Gao
Yu Gao
ZWZuyan Wang
Zuyan Wang
YXYifan Xu
Yifan Xu
Exploiting mobile crowdsensing to conduct data collection and analysis has become an emerging trend in IoT computing models. However, in practice, mobile users in crowdsensing networks are unwilling to participate in perceptual tasks without effective stimulation due to limited resources and strategic selfishness. To tackle the problem, a new incentive mechanism is proposed by adopting game theory in this paper. Specifically, the mobile users' preference is considered comprehensively and their energy is changed dynamically through the scheme. Furthermore, the users' preference and energy changes are exploited as equation factors between subsequent users and the platform. To motivate users, we introduce the concept of virtual currency and set a price function that rewards users for participating in sensing tasks in the form of virtual currency. To fit into practical scenarios, we map task interactions to a Rubinstein-Starr bargaining game between a user and sensing platforms based on a fully informative turn-based bargaining model. Through multiple rounds of games between users and crowdsensing platforms, we prove that there is a unique Nash Equilibrium point in the sub-game process of both parties. The analysis based on these models lays a theoretical foundation on the incentive process of mobile crowdsensing. The soundness of modeling and the accuracy of analysis are verified through extensive simulation, which also guides the design of more sophisticated incentive schemes.

22 February 2022 in Computer Networks
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZWZuyan Wang
Zuyan Wang
JTJun Tao
Jun Tao
YGYang Gao
Yang Gao
YXYifan Xu
Yifan Xu
WSWeice Sun
Weice Sun
WLWenqiang Li
Wenqiang Li

8 May 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Services Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YGYang Gao
Yang Gao
JTJun Tao
Jun Tao
YXYifan Xu
Yifan Xu
ZWZuyan Wang
Zuyan Wang
YGYu Gao
Yu Gao
MWMeiling Wang
Meiling Wang
As a promising network architecture, Mobile Edge Computing (MEC), has been proven that can effectively reduce the end-to-end latency and the energy consumption. The Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) assisted MEC network, where the UAV can provide the computation offloading services for the mobile users, can further alleviate the huge deployment cost of static edge servers. However, it remains unsolved how multiple cooperative flying UAVs serve the ground users, especially considering that these UAVs may share the same wireless channel and can communicate with the users while flying. In this paper, we first propose the Age of Task (AoT) metric to measure the quality of experience, and then formulate the joint optimization problem to minimize the worst AoT among all the users. Based on the block coordinate descent (BCD) method, this problem is transformed into three non-convex programming sub-problems (i.e., the UAV-user association sub-problem, the UAV trajectory planning sub-problem and the transmit power optimization sub-problem). Specifically, the successive convex approximation (SCA) technique is exploited iteratively to deal with the non-convexity in the UAV trajectory and transmit power optimization. Numerical results show that the proposed scheme outperforms the benchmark offloading schemes in terms of AoT.

1 October 2015
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
JTJun Tao
Jun Tao
ZZZiyi Zhang
Ziyi Zhang
FFFuqin Feng
Fuqin Feng
JHJian He
Jian He
YXYifan Xu
Yifan Xu
Data dissemination, especially large amount of data transmission, has become one of the main tasks for the selfish vehicle nodes in Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs). Exploiting the Road Side Unites (RSUs), which construct the Cloud Computing environment, provides more data access opportunities and stable communication time for the vehicles. However, due to the high mobility of the vehicles and the frequent changes in the network topology, the flow rate of the vehicles for multimedia data access may fluctuate, leading to the high transmission latency. In this paper, the cloud resource allocation for data access is investigated with the non-cooperative cloud resource allocation game based on Gauss-Seidel iteration method. Specifically, an on-demand precision control strategy is proposed to achieve the iteration precision of the flow control. The analysis based on these models lays a theoretical method foundation on the noncooperative game computing process. Furthermore, two common methods for calculating the Nash Equilibrium Point (NEP) of the cloud resource allocation game are compared based on the analytical results. The validity of the modeling and the accuracy of the analysis are verified through the extensive simulations, which also guide the design of more sophisticated cloud resource allocation schemes.

10 January 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HWHaotian Wang
Haotian Wang
JTJun Tao
Jun Tao
DCDingwen Chi
Dingwen Chi
YGYu Gao
Yu Gao
ZWZuyan Wang
Zuyan Wang
YXYifan Xu
Yifan Xu
Exploiting mobile crowdsensing to conduct data collection and analysis brings unprecedented opportunities to promote the development of the Internet of Things(IoT). However, malicious platforms may provide untrusted data or illegally leak users’ information, which leads users in crowdsensing networks to be reluctant to participate in sensing activities. Besides, users are unwilling to report malicious platforms without sufficient incentives. To tackle the problem, a new incentive mechanism is proposed by modeling users’ preferences in this paper. Specifically, two scenarios are considered to detect malicious platforms when users join sensing activities according to the system grasps user’s information, i.e., complete information scenario and partial information scenario. Different incentive algorithms are designed for each scenario to optimize the systems incentive cost. In the complete information scenario, we minimize the total incentive cost by ranking users’ preferences. In the partial information scenario, uniform Distribution and Laplace Distribution are employed to model the distribution of users’ preferences to find the optimal cost. Specifically, we incorporate the concept of non-convexity into design the incentive mechanism, when user preferences obey the Laplace Distribution. By conducting an in-depth exploration the properties of Laplace Distribution, we can transform it into a convex problem to solve it efficiently. The analysis based on these mechanisms lays a theoretical foundation on the detection of malicious platforms. Furthermore, the soundness of modeling and the accuracy of analysis are verified through extensive simulation, which also guides the design of more sophisticated incentive schemes for the detection of malicious platforms.