Mingyu Yang

Mingyu Yang

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Mingyu Yang

Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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18 January 2024 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MYMingyu Yang
Mingyu Yang
TATanvir Ahmed
Tanvir Ahmed
SISaya Inagaki
Saya Inagaki
KSKazuo Sakiyama
Kazuo Sakiyama
YLYang Li
Yang Li
YHYuko Hara-Azumi
Yuko Hara-Azumi
With the growth of Internet of Things (IoT) era, the protection of secret information on IoT devices is becoming increasingly important. For IoT devices, attacks that target information leakage through physical side-channels (e.g., a power side-channel) are a major threat in many use cases because IoT devices can be accessed easily by a hostile third party. However, securing resource-constrained IoT devices against side-channel attacks is a challenging issue. Generally, it is difficult to satisfy the requirements on side-channel protection while maintaining the low-power and real-time constrains of IoT devices. In this paper, we propose a hardware/software cooperative design for cryptosystems that is suitable for resource-constrained IoT devices. Combining a security-oriented processor design (i.e., an instruction set architecture definition and its architectural structure) and careful implementations of masked software implementation for cipher algorithms can effectively improve the power-performance-area (PPA) while suppressing power side-channel leakage. In our evaluation, for three ciphers (Chaskey, Simon, and AES), we demonstrate that our work is superior to state-of-the-art works (two RISC-V processors and a small-scale low-power processor) in terms of both PPA and power side-channel protection.

3 July 2020 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MYMingyu Yang
Mingyu Yang
YHYuko Hara-Azumi
Yuko Hara-Azumi
The rapid development of Internet of Things (IoT) has opened new opportunities for healthcare systems through so-called eHealth systems. With the help of monitoring using portable IoT devices with biomedical sensors, disease diagnoses can be conducted in real time. However, there is a challenge in that monitoring is an always-on activity that requires constant power supply and IoT devices are battery-powered and face heavy resource constraints. This work addresses a realistic implementation of a low-power eHealth device using both hardware and software approaches. We realize various lightweight eHealth applications (particularly monitoring applications) using a memory-conscious dynamic time warping (DTW) algorithm to be deployed on a small and low-power embedded processor. Actual prototypes of the processor are currently being fabricated. Our evaluation showcases the effectiveness of our work compared with other state-of-the-art embedded processors in terms of circuit area (fabrication cost) and power efficiency. We also demonstrated the scalability of the software implementation by varying the amount of data used in DTW for various eHealth monitoring applications.

26 September 2023 in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SISaya Inagaki
Saya Inagaki
MYMingyu Yang
Mingyu Yang
YLYang Li
Yang Li
KSKazuo Sakiyama
Kazuo Sakiyama
YHYuko Hara-Azumi
Yuko Hara-Azumi
In the Internet of Things (IoT) era, edge devices have been considerably diversified and are often designed using high-level synthesis (HLS) for improved design productivity. However, HLS tools were originally developed in a security-unaware manner, resulting in vulnerabilities to power side-channel attacks (PSCAs), which are a serious threat to IoT systems. Currently, the impact and applicability of existing methods to PSCA-resistant designs using HLS are limited. In this article, we propose an effective HLS-based design method for PSCA-resistant ciphers implemented in hardware. In particular, we focus on lightweight block ciphers composed of addition/rotation/XOR (ARX)-based permutations to study the effects of the threshold implementation (which is one of the provably secure countermeasures against PSCAs) to the behavioral descriptions of ciphers along with the changes in HLS scheduling. The results obtained using Welch’s t-test demonstrate that our proposed method can successfully improve the resistance against PSCAs for all ARX-based ciphers used as benchmarks.

19 June 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
GHGento Hiruma
Gento Hiruma
MYMingyu Yang
Mingyu Yang
YLYang Li
Yang Li
KSKazuo Sakiyama
Kazuo Sakiyama
YHYuko Hara-Azumi
Yuko Hara-Azumi
In recent years, there has been widespread adoption of the Internet of Things (IoT) devices, some of which involve the processing of sensitive information. In such devices, cipher-dedicated circuits are often used to encrypt sensitive information. However, the cipher circuits may be still vulnerable to side-channel attacks (SCA), such as differential power analysis (DPA) which exploits information by analyzing power consumption. To cope with DPA, threshold implementation (TI), a masking method which provides provable security, can be adopted in cipher circuits implementation. From the design-productivity perspective, integrating TI into the state-of-the-art high-level synthesis (HLS)-based design flow for cipher circuits implementation is ideal. In this approach, however, mitigating the hardware resource overhead is challenging as have been observed in previous work. In this paper, we propose a novel HLS-based countermeasure that mixes different numbers of shares to reduce the hardware overhead. Our countermeasure demonstrates secure against SCA while simultaneously reducing resource utilization along with a small latency overhead.


12 February 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SISaya Inagaki
Saya Inagaki
MYMingyu Yang
Mingyu Yang
YLYang Li
Yang Li
KSKazuo Sakiyama
Kazuo Sakiyama
YHYuko Hara-Azumi
Yuko Hara-Azumi
In the era of Internet of Things (IoT), edge devices are considerably diversified and are often designed using high-level synthesis (HLS) to improve design-productivity. A problem here is that HLS tools were originally developed in a security-unaware fashion, inducing vulnerabilities to power side-channel attacks (PSCA), which is a serious threat in IoT. Although PSCA vulnerabilities induced by HLS tools recently started to be discussed, the effects and applicability of existing methods for PSCA-resistant designs using HLS are limited so far. In this paper, we propose a novel HLS-based design method for PSCA-resistant ciphers in hardware. Particularly focusing on lightweight block ciphers composed of Addition-Rotation-XOR (ARX)-based permutations, we studied the effects of applying ''threshold implementation'', one of the provably secure countermeasures against PSCA, to behavioral descriptions of the ciphers. In addition, we tuned the scheduling optimization of HLS tools that might cause power side-channel leakage. In our experiment, using ARX-based ciphers (Chaskey, Simon, and Speck) as benchmarks, we implemented the unprotected and protected circuit on FPGA and evaluated the PSCA vulnerability using Welch's t-test. The results demonstrated that our proposed method can successfully mitigate vulnerabilities to PSCA for all benchmarks. From these results, we provide further discussion on the direction of PSCA countermeasures based on HLS.