Daphna Buchsbaum

Daphna Buchsbaum

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Daphna Buchsbaum

Department of Cognitive and Psychological Sciences, Brown University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2023 in Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MPManyDogs Project
ManyDogs Project
DADaniela ALBERGHINA
Daniela ALBERGHINA
EBEmily E. Bray
Emily E. Bray
DBDaphna Buchsbaum
Daphna Buchsbaum
SBSarah-Elizabeth Byosiere
Sarah-Elizabeth Byosiere
JSJeffrey R. Stevens
Jeffrey R. Stevens
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1 August 2023 in Animal Behavior and Cognition
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MPManyDogs Project
ManyDogs Project
JEJulia Espinosa
Julia Espinosa
JSJeffrey R. Stevens
Jeffrey R. Stevens
DADaniela ALBERGHINA
Daniela ALBERGHINA
HAHarley E. E. Alway
Harley E. E. Alway
SZSarah G. Zylberfuden
Sarah G. Zylberfuden
To promote collaboration across canine science, address replicability issues, and advance open science practices within animal cognition, we have launched the ManyDogs consortium, modeled on similar ManyX projects in other fields. We aimed to create a collaborative network that (a) uses large, diverse samples to investigate and replicate findings, (b) promotes open science practices of pre-registering hypotheses, methods, and analysis plans, (c) investigates the influence of differences across populations and breeds, and (d) examines how different research methods and testing environments influence the robustness of results. Our first study combines a phenomenon that appears to be highly reliable—dogs’ ability to follow human pointing—with a question that remains controversial: do dogs interpret pointing as a social communicative gesture or as a simple associative cue? We collected data (N = 455) from 20 research sites on two conditions of a 2-alternative object choice task: (1) Ostensive (pointing to a baited cup after making eye-contact and saying the dog’s name); (2) Non-ostensive (pointing without eye-contact, after a throat-clearing auditory control cue). Comparing performance between conditions, while both were significantly above chance, there was no significant difference in dogs’ responses. This result was consistent across sites. Further, we found that dogs followed contralateral, momentary pointing at lower rates than has been reported in prior research, suggesting that there are limits to the robustness of point-following behavior: not all pointing styles are equally likely to elicit a response. Together, these findings underscore the important role of procedural details in study design and the broader need for replication studies in canine science.

31 October 2022 in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AWAdrienne Wente
Adrienne Wente
AGAlison Gopnik
Alison Gopnik
MFMaría Fernández Flecha
María Fernández Flecha
TGTeresa Garcia
Teresa Garcia
DBDaphna Buchsbaum
Daphna Buchsbaum
Pretend play universally emerges during early childhood and may support the development of causal inference and counterfactual reasoning. However, the amount of time spent pretending, the value that adults place on pretence and the scaffolding adults provide vary by both culture and socioeconomic status (SES). In middle class U.S. preschoolers, accuracy on a pretence-based causal reasoning task predicted performance on a similar causal counterfactual task. We explore the relationship between cultural environment, pretence and counterfactual reasoning in low-income Peruvian (N = 62) and low-income U.S. (N = 57) 3- to 4-year olds, and contrast findings against previous findings in an age-matched, mixed-SES U.S. sample (N = 60). Children learned a novel causal relationship, then answered comparable counterfactual and pretence-based questions about the relationship. Children's responses for counterfactual and pretence measures differed across populations, with Peruvian and lower-income U.S. children providing fewer causally consistent responses when compared with middle class U.S. children. Nevertheless, correlations between the two measures emerged in all populations. Across cohorts, children also provided more causally consistent answers during pretence than counterfactually. Our findings strengthen the hypothesis that causal pretend play is related to causal counterfactual reasoning across cultural contexts, while also suggesting a role for systematic environmental differences. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny’.

1 February 2020 in Developmental Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TPTheresa Pham
Theresa Pham
DBDaphna Buchsbaum
Daphna Buchsbaum
Do children always conform to a majority's testimony, or do the pragmatics of that testimony matter? We investigated the influence of pragmatics on conforming to a majority across 2 domains: when learning about object labels and when learning about causal relationships. Four- and 5-year-olds (N = 250) were given a choice between an object endorsed by a 3-person majority, or one endorsed by a single minority informant. Within each domain, there were 4 pragmatic conditions, each with modified testimony so that the majority either explicitly provided an opinion about or pragmatically implied their opinion about the alternative object chosen by the minority. In the unendorsed condition, informants explicitly unendorsed the unchosen object. In the implied condition, informants said nothing about the unchosen object. In the ignorance condition, informants explicitly expressed ignorance about the unchosen object, and in the hidden condition, the chosen object was the only one present at the time of the endorsement. We found that children were most likely to endorse the majority object in the unendorsed condition, in which the majority's opinion was explicitly stated, and least likely in the hidden condition, in which only one object at a time was present, with the other 2 conditions intermediate. Children's preference for majority testimony also depended on the task domain, with a stronger preference for the majority in the language task than causal task. Children might not simply have a majority bias; rather, they use majority information differently depending on the pragmatics and task demands. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

22 January 2024 in Cognition
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
EFElisa Felsche
Elisa Felsche
CVChristoph J. Völter
Christoph J. Völter
EHEsther Herrmann
Esther Herrmann
ASAmanda M. Seed
Amanda M. Seed
DBDaphna Buchsbaum
Daphna Buchsbaum
Concepts are a powerful tool for making wide-ranging predictions in new situations based on little experience. Whereas looking-time studies suggest an early emergence of this ability in human infancy, other paradigms like the relational match to sample task often fail to detect abstract concepts until late preschool years. Similarly, non-human animals show difficulties and often succeed only after long training regimes. Given the considerable influence of slight task modifications, the conclusiveness of these findings for the development and phylogenetic distribution of abstract reasoning is debated. Here, we tested the abilities of 3 to 5-year-old children, chimpanzees, and capuchin monkeys in a unified and more ecologically valid task design based on the concept of "overhypotheses" (Goodman, 1955). Participants sampled high- and low-valued items from containers that either each offered items of uniform value or a mix of high- and low-valued items. In a test situation, participants should switch away earlier from a container offering low-valued items when they learned that, in general, items within a container are of the same type, but should stay longer if they formed the overhypothesis that containers bear a mix of types. We compared each species' performance to the predictions of a probabilistic hierarchical Bayesian model forming overhypotheses at a first and second level of abstraction, adapted to each species' reward preferences. Children and, to a more limited extent, chimpanzees demonstrated their sensitivity to abstract patterns in the evidence. In contrast, capuchin monkeys did not exhibit conclusive evidence for the ability of abstract knowledge formation

1 August 2023 in Developmental Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ETEmma C. Tecwyn
Emma C. Tecwyn
PMPingki Mazumder
Pingki Mazumder
DBDaphna Buchsbaum
Daphna Buchsbaum
Knowing the temporal direction of causal relations is critical for producing desired outcomes and explaining events. Existing evidence suggests that children start to grasp that causes must precede their effects (the temporal priority principle) by age 3; however, whether younger children also understand this has, to our knowledge, not previously been tested. Given the importance of temporal priority in making sense of the world, we explored when knowledge of this principle develops. In the present study, conducted in a lab or museum in a Canadian city, 1- and 2-year-old children observed an adult perform action A on a puzzle box (e.g., spinning a dial), following which an effect E occurred (a sticker was dispensed), following which the adult performed action B (e.g., pushing a button; A-E-B sequence). In line with the temporal priority principle, toddlers were significantly more likely to manipulate A than B (Experiment 1, N = 41, 22 female), even when A was spatially disconnected from the sticker dispenser and further from it than action B (Experiment 2, N = 42, 25 female). In Experiment 3 (N = 50, 25 female), toddlers observed an A-B-E sequence such that both actions A and B were performed prior to effect E. Here, they primarily intervened on B, which ruled out that success in Experiments 1-2 was based on a primacy effect. A lack of any age effects across experiments suggests that within the second year of life, children already grasp that causes must precede their effects, providing key insights into causal reasoning in early childhood. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).