10 February 2023 in Computer Networks
1 June 2017 in Journal of Hardware and Systems Security
6 September 2022 in ACM Transactions on Internet of Things
Multiple users have access to multiple devices in a smart home system – typically through a dedicated app installed on a mobile device. Traditional access control mechanisms consider one unique, trusted user that controls access to the devices. However, multi-user multi-device smart home settings pose fundamentally different challenges to traditional single-user systems. For instance, in a multi-user environment, users have conflicting, complex, and dynamically-changing demands on multiple devices that cannot be handled by traditional access control techniques. Moreover, smart devices from different platforms/vendors can share the same home environment, making existing access control obsolete for smart home systems. To address these challenges, in this paper, we introduce Kratos+ , a novel multi-user and multi-device-aware access control mechanism that allows smart home users to flexibly specify their access control demands. Kratos+ has four main components: user interaction module, backend server, policy manager, and policy execution module. Users can easily specify their desired access control settings using the interaction module that are translated into access control policies in the back-end server. The policy manager analyzes these policies, initiates automated negotiation between users to resolve conflicting demands, and generates final policies to enforce in smart home systems. We implemented Kratos+ as a platform-independent solution and evaluated its performance on real smart home deployments featuring multi-user scenarios with a rich set of configurations (337 different policies including 231 demand conflicts and 69 restriction policies). These configurations also included five different threats associated with access control mechanisms. Our extensive evaluations show that Kratos+ is very effective in resolving conflicting access control demands with minimal overhead. We also performed an extensive user study with 72 smart home users to better understand the user’s needs before designing the system and a usability study to evaluate the efficacy of Kratos+ in a real-life smart home environment.
16 November 2019 in ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) play a significant role in our critical infrastructure networks from power-distribution to utility networks. The emerging smart-grid concept is a compelling critical CPS infrastructure that relies on two-way communications between smart devices to increase efficiency, enhance reliability, and reduce costs. However, compromised devices in the smart grid poses several security challenges. Consequences of propagating fake data or stealing sensitive smart grid information via compromised devices are costly. Hence, early behavioral detection of compromised devices is critical for protecting the smart grid’s components and data. To address these concerns, in this article, we introduce a novel and configurable system-level framework to identify compromised smart grid devices. The framework combines system and function call tracing techniques with signal processing and statistical analysis to detect compromised devices based on their behavioral characteristics. We measure the efficacy of our framework with a realistic smart grid substation testbed that includes both resource-limited and resource-rich devices. In total, using our framework, we analyze six different types of compromised device scenarios with different resources and attack payloads. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed framework is the first in detecting compromised CPS smart grid devices with system and function-level call tracing techniques. The experimental results reveal an excellent rate for the detection of compromised devices. Specifically, performance metrics include accuracy values between 95% and 99% for the different attack scenarios. Finally, the performance analysis demonstrates that the use of the proposed framework has minimal overhead on the smart grid devices’ computing resources.
29 January 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) utilize different devices to collect sensitive data, communicate with other systems, and monitor essential processes in critical infrastructure applications. However, in the ecosystem of CPS, unauthorized or spoofed devices may danger or compromise the performance and security of the critical infrastructure. The unauthorized and spoofed devices may include tampered pieces of software or hardware components that can negatively impact CPS operations or collect vital CPS metrics from the network. Such devices can be outsider or insider threats trying to impersonate other real CPS devices via spoofing their legitimate identifications to gain access to systems, steal information, or spread malware. Device fingerprinting techniques are promising approaches to identify unauthorized or illegitimate devices. However, current fingerprinting solutions are not suitable as they disrupt critical real-time operations in CPS due to the nature of their extensive data analysis or too much overhead on the devices' computational resources. To address these concerns, in this work, we propose STOP-AND- FRISK (S&F), a novel fingerprinting framework to identify CPS device classes and complement traditional security mechanisms in CPS. S&F is based on a secure challenge/response mechanism that analyzes the behavior of the CPS devices at both the hardware and OS/kernel levels. Specifically, the proposed novel mechanism combines system and function call tracing techniques, signal processing, and hardware performance analysis to create specific device-class signatures. Then, the signatures are correlated against known behavioral ground-truth to identify the device types. To test the efficacy of S&F extensively, we implemented a realistic testbed that included different classes of CPS devices with a variety of computing resources, architectures, and configurations. Our experimental results reveal an excellent rate on the CPS device-class identification. Finally, extensive performance analysis demonstrates that the use of S&F yields minimal overhead on the CPS devices' computing resources.
10 June 2019 in IEEE Security & Privacy