Robert J. Reilly

Robert J. Reilly

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Robert J. Reilly

Virginia Commonwealth University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

37Years (1990-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 June 2005 in Experimental Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
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DDDouglas D. Davis
Douglas D. Davis
EMEdward Millner
Edward Millner
RRRobert J. Reilly
Robert J. Reilly
This article replicates and “stress tests” a recent finding by Eckel and Grossman (2003) that matching subsidies generate substantially higher Charity Receipts than theoretically comparable rebate subsidies. In a first replication treatment, we show that most choices are consist with a “constant (gross) contribution” rule, suggesting that inattention to the subsidies’ differing net consequences may explain the higher revenues elicited with matching subsidies. Results of additional treatments suggest that (a) the charity dimension of the decision problems has little to do with the result, and (b) extra information regarding the net consequences of decisions reduces but does not eliminate the result.

14 March 2010 in Experimental Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
DDDouglas Davis
Douglas Davis
OKOleg Korenok
Oleg Korenok
RRRobert Reilly
Robert Reilly
We study the effects of price signaling activity and underlying propensities to cooperate on tacit collusion in posted offer markets. The primary experiment consists of an extensively repeated baseline sequence and a ‘forecast’ sequence that adds to the baseline a forecasting game that allows identification of signaling intentions. Forecast sequence results indicate that signaling intentions differ considerably from those that are counted under a standard signal measure based on previous period prices. Nevertheless, we find essentially no correlation between either measure of signal volumes and collusive efficiency. A second experiment demonstrates that underlying seller propensities to cooperate more clearly affect collusiveness.

1 January 1990 in The RAND Journal of Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
EMEdward Millner
Edward Millner
MPMichael D. Pratt
Michael D. Pratt
RRRobert J. Reilly
Robert J. Reilly

14 March 2009 in Experimental Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
DDDouglas Davis
Douglas Davis
OKOleg Korenok
Oleg Korenok
RRRobert Reilly
Robert Reilly
This paper evaluates the effects of some standard procedural variations on outcomes in posted offer oligopoly experiments. Variations studied include the presence or absence of market information, the use of re-matched or fixed seller pairs and alterations in the order of sequencing. Experimental results indicate that such variations can have first order effects on outcomes. For this reason, we recommend that results in oligopoly experiments be carefully interpreted in light of the procedures selected.