We show that, if giving is equivalent to not taking, impure altruism could account for List’s (in Journal of Political Economy 115(3):482–493, 2007) finding that the payoff to recipients in a dictator game decreases when the dictator has the option to take. We examine behavior in dictator games with different taking options but equivalent final payoff possibilities. We find that recipients tend to earn more as the amount the dictator must take to achieve a given final payoff increases, a result consistent with the hypothesis that the cold prickle of taking is stronger than the warm glow of giving. We conclude that not taking is not equivalent to giving and agree with List (in Journal of Political Economy 115(3):482–493, 2007) that the current social preference models fail to rationalize the observed data.
This article replicates and “stress tests” a recent finding by Eckel and Grossman (2003) that matching subsidies generate substantially higher Charity Receipts than theoretically comparable rebate subsidies. In a first replication treatment, we show that most choices are consist with a “constant (gross) contribution” rule, suggesting that inattention to the subsidies’ differing net consequences may explain the higher revenues elicited with matching subsidies. Results of additional treatments suggest that (a) the charity dimension of the decision problems has little to do with the result, and (b) extra information regarding the net consequences of decisions reduces but does not eliminate the result.
1 June 2018 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization