1 July 2019 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Problem definition: We investigate multinational firms’ inspection and pricing strategies to address the challenges of combating child labor in global supply chains. We also examine how several factors (such as information disclosure, goodwill loss, inspection cost, external monitoring by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and penalty scheme) affect firms’ incentives to use different strategies to combat child labor. Academic/practical relevance: Nearly 200 million children are engaged in child labor, many in developing countries that are part of the supply base of global manufacturing networks. However, there has been little research on evaluating the impact of firms’ strategies and NGOs’ initiatives on child labor. Methodology: We develop a game-theoretic model based on a two-tier supply chain, in which a multinational firm in a developed country sells the product made by a supplier in a developing country. Results: If internal inspections are economical, a global firm can reduce the incidence of child labor by inspecting the supplier’s use of child labor. Otherwise, the firm can deter the supplier’s child labor employment by offering a sufficiently high wholesale price or simultaneously using internal inspections and a medium wholesale price. The latter strategy should be adopted only when information about the firm’s inspection policy can be informed credibly. This strategy combats child labor more effectively when a higher penalty is levied onto the supplier’s use of child labor. Managerial implications: A multinational firm that adopts a zero-tolerance policy should consider disclosing its effort to combat child labor (e.g., through a social responsibility report), whereas it should take extra caution when using other penalty schemes. NGOs should help raise the firm’s goodwill cost (e.g., through campaigns and consumer education), but they should be careful about helping to reduce the firm’s inspection cost (e.g., by improving a monitoring system). To prevent children from going back to work after initial removal, a sufficient amount of compensation should be provided to those children, especially when firms rely on inspections without paying a high wholesale price to suppliers.
1 July 2015 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Counterfeit goods are becoming more sophisticated, from shoes to infant milk powder to aircraft parts, creating problems for consumers, firms, and governments. By comparing two types of counterfeiters—deceptive, so infiltrating a licit (but complicit) distributor, or nondeceptive in an illicit channel—we provide insights into the impact of anticounterfeiting strategies on a brand-name company, a counterfeiter, and consumers. Our analysis highlights that the effectiveness of these strategies depends critically on whether a brand-name company faces a nondeceptive or deceptive counterfeiter. For example, by improving quality, the brand-name company can improve her expected profit against a nondeceptive counterfeiter when the counterfeiter steals an insignificant amount of brand value. However, the same strategy does not work well against the deceptive counterfeiter unless high quality facilitates the seizure of deceptive counterfeits significantly. Similarly, reducing price works well in combating the nondeceptive counterfeiter, but it could be ineffective against the deceptive counterfeiter. Moreover, the strategies that improve the profit of the brand-name company may benefit the counterfeiter inadvertently and even hurt consumer welfare. Therefore, firms and governments should carefully consider a trade-off among different objectives in implementing an anticounterfeiting strategy.
1 June 2018 in European Journal of Operational Research
14 April 2019 in Production and Operations Management
1 November 2020 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Problem definition: This paper studies two cooperative approaches of firms in managing social responsibility violations of their supplier: auditing a common supplier jointly (joint auditing) and sharing independent audit results with other firms (audit sharing). We study this problem in a market with externalities and a large number of firms. Academic/practical relevance: With numerous firms procuring their materials and parts worldwide, there are many cases in which overseas suppliers violate safety, labor, or environmental standards. Those violations have externalities in the sense that one firm’s violation affects other firms in the same market. It is not clear how such externalities affect competing firms’ incentives to cooperate and the effectiveness of such cooperation. Methodology: We develop a model based on a cooperative game in partition function form, which enables us to analyze the competitive and cooperative interactions of a large number of firms in a market. Results: Although there has been concern about cooperation for fear of compromising a competitive advantage, firms have incentives to cooperate in managing their suppliers when one firm can be hurt by others’ violations, that is, the negative externality is high. However, neither cooperative approach necessarily improves social responsibility, especially when one firm can benefit from others’ violations, that is, the positive externality is high. Finally, even if agreement is not reached for cooperation before conducting individual audits, social responsibility can still be improved by incentivizing firms to share their private audit results with others under a properly designed mechanism. Managerial implications: The careful assessment of the externalities associated with social responsibility violations is a key to the success of joint auditing and audit sharing. Although firms cooperate voluntarily in some cases, a government agency or an industry association should intervene in other cases to motivate cooperation if it is beneficial. In addition, caution must be taken to monitor manufacturers’ audit efforts, especially when cooperative approaches are implemented in the market where competition is fierce and consumers switch brands easily.
1 December 2014 in Operations Research
This paper studies a cooperative game of inventory transshipment among multiple firms. In this game, firms first make their inventory decisions independently and then decide collectively how to transship excess inventories to satisfy unmet demands. In modeling transshipment, we use networks of firms as the primitive, which offer a richer representation of relationships among firms by taking the coalitions used in all previous studies as special cases. For any given cooperative network, we construct a dual price allocation under which the network is stable for any residual demands and supplies in the sense that no firms find it more profitable to form subnetworks. Under the allocation based on the marginal contribution of each firm to its network (called the MJW value), we show that various network structures such as complete, hub-spoke, and chain networks are stable only under certain conditions on residual amounts. Moreover, these conditions differ across network structures, implying that a network structure plays an important role in establishing the stability of a decentralized transshipment system. Finally, we consider the case when firms establish networks endogenously, and show that pairwise Nash stable networks underperform the corresponding networks in centralized systems.