Henrique Kawakami

Henrique Kawakami

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Henrique Kawakami

Intel Corp., Seatlle, WA, United States

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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22 June 2015
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
RGRoberto Gallo
Roberto Gallo
PHPatricia Hongo
Patricia Hongo
RDRicardo Dahab
Ricardo Dahab
LNLuiz C. Navarro
Luiz C. Navarro
HKHenrique Kawakami
Henrique Kawakami
LRLuander Ribeiro
Luander Ribeiro

1 July 2013
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
RGRoberto Gallo
Roberto Gallo
HKHenrique Kawakami
Henrique Kawakami
RDRicardo Dahab
Ricardo Dahab
In this work we review the security of the industry standard, software-based, cryptographic services providers Mozilla NSS Softoken and Microsoft CAPI CSPs. We also provide practical measurements of the user experienced security level. We found that this security level is much lower than expected and some service providers should be avoided.

23 June 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
NCNikhil Chawla
Nikhil Chawla
CLChen Liu
Chen Liu
ACAbhishek Chakraborty
Abhishek Chakraborty
ICIgor Chervatyuk
Igor Chervatyuk
THThais Moreira Hamasaki
Thais Moreira Hamasaki
HKHenrique Kawakami
Henrique Kawakami
Traditionally, power side-channel analysis requires physical access to the target device, as well as specialized devices to measure the power consumption with enough precision. Recently research has shown that on x86 platforms, on-chip power meter capabilities exposed to a software interface might be used for power side-channel attacks without physical access. In this paper, we show that such software-based power side-channel attack is also applicable on Apple silicon (e.g., M1/M2 platforms), exploiting the System Management Controller (SMC) and its power-related keys, which provides access to the on-chip power meters through a software interface to user space software. We observed data-dependent power consumption reporting from such SMC keys and analyzed the correlations between the power consumption and the processed data. Our work also demonstrated how an unprivileged user mode application successfully recovers bytes from an AES encryption key from a cryptographic service supported by a kernel mode driver in MacOS. We have also studied the feasibility of performing frequency throttling side-channel attack on Apple silicon. Furthermore, we discuss the impact of software-based power side-channels in the industry, possible countermeasures, and the overall implications of software interfaces for modern on-chip power management systems.