Michelle M. Arnold

Michelle M. Arnold

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Michelle M. Arnold

Department of Psychology, Okanagan College, Kelowna, British Columbia, Canada

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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21 August 2019 in Thinking & Reasoning
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TPToby Prike
Toby Prike
MAMichelle M. Arnold
Michelle M. Arnold
PWPaul Williamson
Paul Williamson
A poor understanding of probability may lead people to misinterpret every day coincidences and form anomalistic (e.g., paranormal) beliefs. We investigated the relationship between anomalistic belief (including type of belief) and misperception of chance and the base rate fallacy across both anomalistic and control (i.e., neutral) contexts. Greater anomalistic belief was associated with poorer performance for both types of items; however there were no significant interactions between belief and context. For misperception of chance items, only experiential (vs. theoretical) anomalistic beliefs predicted more errors. In contrast, overall anomalistic belief was positively related to the base rate fallacy but no specific subtype of anomalistic belief was a significant predictor. The results indicate misperception of chance may lead people to interpret coincidental events as having an anomalistic cause, and a poor understanding of base rates may make people more prone to forming anomalistic beliefs.

22 September 2023 in Thinking & Reasoning
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HSHenry W. Strudwicke
Henry W. Strudwicke
GBGlen E. Bodner
Glen E. Bodner
PWPaul Williamson
Paul Williamson
MAMichelle M. Arnold
Michelle M. Arnold

6 July 2022 in Metacognition and Learning
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
OBOlivia R. Burton
Olivia R. Burton
GBGlen E. Bodner
Glen E. Bodner
PWPaul Williamson
Paul Williamson
MAMichelle M. Arnold
Michelle M. Arnold
Meta-reasoning requires monitoring and controlling one’s reasoning processes, and it often begins with an assessment of problem solvability. We explored whether Judgments of Solvability (JOS) for solvable and unsolvable anagrams discriminate and predict later problem-solving outcomes once anagrams solved during the JOS task are excluded. We also examined whether providing training via longer-duration anagrams improves JOS discrimination and predictiveness. In a two-phase paradigm, participants judged each anagram as solvable, not solvable, or already solved (S, NS, AS; JOS phase) then later attempted to solve the anagrams within 45 s (solving phase). Anagrams were presented in 4 blocks. In the training groups, anagram duration started at 16 s and halved across blocks, whereas in the no-training groups anagram duration was always 2 s. Participants’ S JOSs typically were discriminating after excluding anagrams that received AS JOSs, but training did not lead to better discrimination in the final block. Training improved AS JOS predictiveness, but not S JOS predictiveness. Thus, training increased solving during the JOS task rather than increasing JOS predictiveness. In Experiment 3 these findings replicated when both solvable and unsolvable anagrams were presented in the solving phase and no response deadline was set. Here, problem-solving outcomes and effort regulation (i.e., response times) were predicted by AS and NS JOSs, but not by S JOSs. Overall, although S JOSs were discriminating, they were not predictive of later problem solving or effort regulation—and this was true even after training with longer-duration anagrams.