Alexander Budzier

Alexander Budzier

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Alexander Budzier

University of Oxford - Said Business School

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

16Years (2011-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 June 2014 in Energy Policy
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Atif Ansar
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ABAlexander Budzier
Alexander Budzier
DLDaniel Lunn
Daniel Lunn

27 July 2016 in Oxford Review of Economic Policy
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Alexander Budzier
DLDaniel Lunn
Daniel Lunn
China’s three-decade infrastructure investment boom shows few signs of abating. Is China’s economic growth a consequence of its purposeful investment? Is China a prodigy in delivering infrastructure from which rich democracies could learn? The prevalent view in economics literature and policies derived from it is that a high level of infrastructure investment is a precursor to economic growth. China is especially held up as a model to emulate. Politicians in rich democracies display awe and envy of the scale of infrastructure Chinese leaders are able to build. Based on the largest dataset of its kind, this paper punctures the twin myths that (i) infrastructure creates economic value, and that (ii) China has a distinct advantage in its delivery. Far from being an engine of economic growth, the typical infrastructure investment fails to deliver a positive risk-adjusted return. Moreover, China’s track record in delivering infrastructure is no better than that of rich democracies. Investing in unproductive projects results initially in a boom, as long as construction is ongoing, followed by a bust, when forecasted benefits fail to materialize and projects therefore become a drag on the economy. Where investments are debt-financed, overinvesting in unproductive projects results in the build-up of debt, monetary expansion, instability in financial markets, and economic fragility, exactly as we see in China today. We conclude that poorly managed infrastructure investments are a main explanation of surfacing economic and financial problems in China. We predict that, unless China shifts to a lower level of higher-quality infrastructure investments, the country is headed for an infrastructure-led national financial and economic crisis, which is likely also to be a crisis for the international economy. China’s infrastructure investment model is not one to follow for other countries but one to avoid.

1 December 2018 in Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice
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Bent Flyvbjerg
AAAtif Ansar
Atif Ansar
ABAlexander Budzier
Alexander Budzier
SBSøren Buhl
Søren Buhl
CCChantal Cantarelli
Chantal Cantarelli
BWBert van Wee
Bert van Wee

1 January 2011 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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Alexander Budzier
Out-of-control information technology (IT) projects have ended the careers of top managers, such as EADS CEO Noël Forgeard and Levi Strauss’ CIO David Bergen. M

1 July 2016 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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ASAllison Stewart
Allison Stewart
ABAlexander Budzier
Alexander Budzier
Given that Olympic Games held over the past decade each have cost USD 8.9 billion on average, the size and financial risks of the Games warrant study. The objectives of the Oxford Olympics study are to (1) establish the actual out turn costs of previous Olympic Games in a manner where cost can consistently be compared across Games; (2) establish cost overruns for previous Games, i.e., the degree to which final out turn costs reflect projected budgets at the bid stage, again in a way that allows comparison across Games; (3) test whether the Olympic Games Knowledge Management Program has reduced cost risk for the Games, and, finally, (4) benchmark cost and cost overrun for the Rio 2016 Olympics against previous Games. The main contribution of the Oxford study is to establish a phenomenology of cost and cost overrun at the Olympics, which allows consistent and systematic comparison across Games. This has not been done before. Main findings of the study are, first, that average actual out turn cost for Summer Games is USD 5.2 billion (2015 level), and USD 3.1 billion for Winter Games. The most costly Summer Games to date are London 2012 at USD 15 billion; the most costly Winter Games Sochi 2014 at USD 21.9 billion. The numbers cover the period 1960-2016 and include only sports-related costs, i.e., wider capital costs for general infrastructure, which are often larger than sports-related costs, have been excluded. Second, at 156 percent in real terms, the Olympics have the highest average cost overrun of any type of mega-project. Moreover, cost overrun is found in all Games, without exception; for no other type of mega-project is this the case. 47 percent of Games have cost overruns above 100 percent. The largest cost overrun for Summer Games was found for Montreal 1976 at 720 percent, followed by Barcelona 1992 at 266 percent. For Winter Games the largest cost overrun was 324 percent for Lake Placid 1980, followed by Sochi 2014 at 289 percent. Third, the Olympic Games Knowledge Management Program appears to be successful in reducing cost risk for the Games. The difference in cost overrun before (166 percent) and after (51 percent) the program began is statistically significant. Fourth, and finally, the Rio 2016 Games, at a cost of USD 4.6 billion, appear to be on track to reverse the high expenditures of London 2012 and Sochi 2014 and deliver a Summer Games at the median cost for such Games. The cost overrun for Rio – at 51 percent in real terms, or USD 1.6 billion – is the same as the median cost overrun for other Games since 1999. Given the above results, for a city and nation to decide to stage the Olympic Games is to decide to take on one of the most costly and financially most risky type of mega-project that exists, something that many cities and nations have learned to their peril.

6 September 2017
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ABAlexander Budzier
Alexander Budzier
DLDaniel Lunn
Daniel Lunn
This chapter characterizes the propensity of big capital investments to systematically deliver poor outcomes as “fragility”—a notion suggested by Nassim Taleb. A thing or system that is easily harmed by randomness is fragile. It is argued that, contrary to their appearance, big capital investments break easily—they deliver negative net present value—due to various sources of uncertainty that impact them during their long gestation, implementation, and operation periods. The existence of economies of scale and scope is not refuted; instead, it is argued that big capital investments have a disproportionate (non-linear) exposure to uncertainties that deliver poor or negative returns above and beyond their economies of scale and scope. It is further argued that to succeed, leaders of capital projects need to carefully consider where scaling pays off and where it does not. To automatically assume that “bigger is better,” which is common in megaproject management, is a recipe for failure.