Michael D. Iannacone

Michael D. Iannacone

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Michael D. Iannacone

Cyber & Applied Data Analytics Division Oak Ridge National Laboratory Oak Ridge TN

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

17Years (2010-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
14 November 2019 in ACM Computing Surveys
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
RBRobert A. Bridges
Robert A. Bridges
TGTarrah R. Glass-Vanderlan
Tarrah R. Glass-Vanderlan
MIMichael D. Iannacone
Michael D. Iannacone
MVMaria S. Vincent
Maria S. Vincent
QCQian (Guenevere) Chen
Qian (Guenevere) Chen
This survey focuses on intrusion detection systems (IDS) that leverage host-based data sources for detecting attacks on enterprise network. The host-based IDS (HIDS) literature is organized by the input data source, presenting targeted sub-surveys of HIDS research leveraging system logs, audit data, Windows Registry, file systems, and program analysis. While system calls are generally included in audit data, several publicly available system call datasets have spawned a flurry of IDS research on this topic, which merits a separate section. To accommodate current researchers, a section giving descriptions of publicly available datasets is included, outlining their characteristics and shortcomings when used for IDS evaluation. Related surveys are organized and described. All sections are accompanied by tables concisely organizing the literature and datasets discussed. Finally, challenges, trends, and broader observations are throughout the survey and in the conclusion along with future directions of IDS research. Overall, this survey was designed to allow easy access to the diverse types of data available on a host for sensing intrusion, the progressions of research using each, and the accessible datasets for prototyping in the area.

7 April 2015
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
PDF file
MIMichael Iannacone
Michael Iannacone
SBShawn Bohn
Shawn Bohn
GNGrant Nakamura
Grant Nakamura
JGJohn Gerth
John Gerth
KHKelly Huffer
Kelly Huffer
JGJohn Goodall
John Goodall
In this paper we describe an ontology developed for a cyber security knowledge graph database. This is intended to provide an organized schema that incorporates information from a large variety of structured and unstructured data sources, and includes all relevant concepts within the domain. We compare the resulting ontology with previous efforts, discuss its strengths and limitations, and describe areas for future work.

1 December 2013
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
NMNikki McNeil
Nikki McNeil
RBRobert A. Bridges
Robert A. Bridges
MIMichael D. Iannacone
Michael D. Iannacone
BCBogdan Czejdo
Bogdan Czejdo
NPNicolas Perez
Nicolas Perez
JGJohn R. Goodall
John R. Goodall
Public disclosure of important security information, such as knowledge of vulnerabilities or exploits, often occurs in blogs, tweets, mailing lists, and other online sources significantly before proper classification into structured databases. In order to facilitate timely discovery of such knowledge, we propose a novel semi-supervised learning algorithm, PACE, for identifying and classifying relevant entities in text sources. The main contribution of this paper is an enhancement of the traditional bootstrapping method for entity extraction by employing a time-memory trade-off that simultaneously circumvents a costly corpus search while strengthening pattern nomination, which should increase accuracy. An implementation in the cyber-security domain is discussed as well as challenges to Natural Language Processing imposed by the security domain.

1 December 2017
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
RBRobert A. Bridges
Robert A. Bridges
KHKelly M.T. Huffer
Kelly M.T. Huffer
CJCorinne L. Jones
Corinne L. Jones
MIMichael D. Iannacone
Michael D. Iannacone
JGJohn R. Goodall
John R. Goodall
We address a crucial element of applied information extraction-accurate identification of basic security entities in text--by evaluating previous methods and presenting new labelers. Our survey reveals that the previous efforts have not been tested on documents similar to the targeted sources (news articles, blogs, tweets, etc.) and that no sufficiently large publicly available annotated corpus of these documents exists. By assembling a representative test corpus, we perform a quantitative evaluation of previous methods in a realistic setting, revealing an overall lack of recall, and giving insight to the models' beneficial and inhibiting elements. In particular, our results show that many previous efforts overfit to the non-representative test corpora in this domain. Informed by this evaluation, we present three novel cyber entity extractors, which seek to leverage the available labeled data but remain worthwhile on the more diverse documents encountered in the wild. Each new model increases the state of the art in recall, with maximal or near maximal F1 score. Our results establish that the state of the art in cyber entity tagging is characterized by F1 = 0.61.

1 September 2020 in Computers & Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MIMichael D. Iannacone
Michael D. Iannacone
RBRobert A. Bridges
Robert A. Bridges

30 June 2023 in Digital Threats: Research and Practice
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
RBRobert A. Bridges
Robert A. Bridges
SOSean Oesch
Sean Oesch
MIMichael D. Iannacone
Michael D. Iannacone
KHKelly M. T. Huffer
Kelly M. T. Huffer
BJBrian Jewell
Brian Jewell
JSJared M. Smith
Jared M. Smith
There is a lack of scientific testing of commercially available malware detectors, especially those that boast accurate classification of never-before-seen (i.e., zero-day) files using machine learning (ML). Consequently, efficacy of malware detectors is opaque, inhibiting end users from making informed decisions and researchers from targeting gaps in current detectors. In this article, we present a scientific evaluation of four prominent commercial malware detection tools to assist an organization with two primary questions: To what extent do ML-based tools accurately classify previously and never-before-seen files? Is purchasing a network-level malware detector worth the cost? To investigate, we tested each tool against 3,536 total files (2,554 or 72% malicious and 982 or 28% benign) of a variety of file types, including hundreds of malicious zero-days, polyglots, and APT-style files, delivered on multiple protocols. We present statistical results on detection time and accuracy, consider complementary analysis (using multiple tools together), and provide two novel applications of the recent cost–benefit evaluation procedure of Iannacone and Bridges. Although the ML-based tools are more effective at detecting zero-day files and executables, the signature-based tool might still be an overall better option. Both network-based tools provide substantial (simulated) savings when paired with either host tool, yet both show poor detection rates on protocols other than HTTP or SMTP. Our results show that all four tools have near-perfect precision but alarmingly low recall, especially on file types other than executables and office files: Thirty-seven percent of malware, including all polyglot files, were undetected. Priorities for researchers and takeaways for end users are given. Code for future use of the cost model is provided.