Kelly M. T. Huffer

Kelly M. T. Huffer

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Kelly M. T. Huffer

Oak Ridge National Laboratory USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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20 August 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Visualization and Computer Graphics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JGJohn R. Goodall
John R. Goodall
EREric D. Ragan
Eric D. Ragan
CSChad A. Steed
Chad A. Steed
JRJoel W. Reed
Joel W. Reed
GRG. David Richardson
G. David Richardson
JLJason A. Laska
Jason A. Laska
Despite the best efforts of cyber security analysts, networked computing assets are routinely compromised, resulting in the loss of intellectual property, the disclosure of state secrets, and major financial damages. Anomaly detection methods are beneficial for detecting new types of attacks and abnormal network activity, but such algorithms can be difficult to understand and trust. Network operators and cyber analysts need fast and scalable tools to help identify suspicious behavior that bypasses automated security systems, but operators do not want another automated tool with algorithms they do not trust. Experts need tools to augment their own domain expertise and to provide a contextual understanding of suspicious behavior to help them make decisions. In this paper we present Situ, a visual analytics system for discovering suspicious behavior in streaming network data. Situ provides a scalable solution that combines anomaly detection with information visualization. The system's visualizations enable operators to identify and investigate the most anomalous events and IP addresses, and the tool provides context to help operators understand why they are anomalous. Finally, operators need tools that can be integrated into their workflow and with their existing tools. This paper describes the Situ platform and its deployment in an operational network setting. We discuss how operators are currently using the tool in a large organization's security operations center and present the results of expert reviews with professionals.

30 June 2023 in Digital Threats: Research and Practice
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
RBRobert A. Bridges
Robert A. Bridges
SOSean Oesch
Sean Oesch
MIMichael D. Iannacone
Michael D. Iannacone
KHKelly M. T. Huffer
Kelly M. T. Huffer
BJBrian Jewell
Brian Jewell
JSJared M. Smith
Jared M. Smith
There is a lack of scientific testing of commercially available malware detectors, especially those that boast accurate classification of never-before-seen (i.e., zero-day) files using machine learning (ML). Consequently, efficacy of malware detectors is opaque, inhibiting end users from making informed decisions and researchers from targeting gaps in current detectors. In this article, we present a scientific evaluation of four prominent commercial malware detection tools to assist an organization with two primary questions: To what extent do ML-based tools accurately classify previously and never-before-seen files? Is purchasing a network-level malware detector worth the cost? To investigate, we tested each tool against 3,536 total files (2,554 or 72% malicious and 982 or 28% benign) of a variety of file types, including hundreds of malicious zero-days, polyglots, and APT-style files, delivered on multiple protocols. We present statistical results on detection time and accuracy, consider complementary analysis (using multiple tools together), and provide two novel applications of the recent cost–benefit evaluation procedure of Iannacone and Bridges. Although the ML-based tools are more effective at detecting zero-day files and executables, the signature-based tool might still be an overall better option. Both network-based tools provide substantial (simulated) savings when paired with either host tool, yet both show poor detection rates on protocols other than HTTP or SMTP. Our results show that all four tools have near-perfect precision but alarmingly low recall, especially on file types other than executables and office files: Thirty-seven percent of malware, including all polyglot files, were undetected. Priorities for researchers and takeaways for end users are given. Code for future use of the cost model is provided.

1 July 2022
Verified
Report
Closed access
PDF file
SPStacy Prowell
Stacy Prowell
KSKirk D. Sayre
Kirk D. Sayre
MPMark G. Pleszkoch
Mark G. Pleszkoch
RLRichard Linger
Richard Linger
RWRichard A. Willems
Richard A. Willems
SLStephen L. Lindberg
Stephen L. Lindberg
This project developed and implemented a system for conducting cybersecurity vulnerability detection of smart grid components and systems by performing static analysis of compiled software (“firmware”). The resulting system for automated vulnerability detection (AVUD) was implemented as part of Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s existing test bed for smart meters, the Sustainable Campus Initiative. The work consisted of two phases: the first phase implemented the necessary software and computational models to perform the analysis, and the second phase demonstrated the system on example firmware in partnership with smart meter manufacturer Sensus USA, Inc. The resulting system won an R&D 100 award and has been successfully commercialized, winning a National Laboratory Consortium Commercialization Award.

17 August 2022 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
RBRobert A. Bridges
Robert A. Bridges
SOSean Oesch
Sean Oesch
MVMiki E. Verma
Miki E. Verma
MIMichael D. Iannacone
Michael D. Iannacone
KHKelly M. T. Huffer
Kelly M. T. Huffer
ATAnne Tall
Anne Tall
In this paper, we present a scientific evaluation of four prominent malware detection tools to assist an organization with two primary questions: To what extent do ML-based tools accurately classify previously- and never-before-seen files? Is it worth purchasing a network-level malware detector? To identify weaknesses, we tested each tool against 3,536 total files (2,554 or 72\% malicious, 982 or 28\% benign) of a variety of file types, including hundreds of malicious zero-days, polyglots, and APT-style files, delivered on multiple protocols. We present statistical results on detection time and accuracy, consider complementary analysis (using multiple tools together), and provide two novel applications of the recent cost-benefit evaluation procedure of Iannacone \& Bridges. While the ML-based tools are more effective at detecting zero-day files and executables, the signature-based tool may still be an overall better option. Both network-based tools provide substantial (simulated) savings when paired with either host tool, yet both show poor detection rates on protocols other than HTTP or SMTP. Our results show that all four tools have near-perfect precision but alarmingly low recall, especially on file types other than executables and office files -- 37% of malware tested, including all polyglot files, were undetected. Priorities for researchers and takeaways for end users are given.

1 June 2018
Verified
Report
Closed access
PDF file
KHKelly M. Huffer
Kelly M. Huffer
JGJohn R. Goodall
John R. Goodall
MVMaria S. Vincent
Maria S. Vincent
MIMichael Iannacone
Michael Iannacone
RBRobert A. Bridges
Robert A. Bridges

1 July 2025
Verified
Report
Open access
PDF file
USUsdoe
Usdoe
HNHaoran Niu
Haoran Niu
DHDanica Hahn
Danica Hahn
KHKelly M Huffer
Kelly M Huffer
FOFemi Omitaomu
Femi Omitaomu