Recent debates on financialization in emerging market economies highlight the terms of unequal exchange that they are embedded in, where international capital flows steered by powerful financial actors and transnationalized banks have a major impact on economic growth performance. As a result, many of the small open economies in the Global South have become increasingly sensitive to international market volatilities, as the post-2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) episode has shown. Yet, we know much less about the political implications of these interactions. How do unequal financial relations influence political trajectories in emerging market economies? Using process tracing and based on original evidence from Turkey, we find that when GDP growth is dependent on financial inflows under a credit-led growth model, the constraints on the domestic policy space following an economic crisis allowed the ruling party to instrumentalize monetary and regulatory institutions as financial agents of political repression.
Political decisions over economic growth policies influence the degree of bureaucratic autonomy and regulatory governance dynamics. Yet, our understanding of these processes in the Global South is somewhat limited. The article studies the post‐Global Financial Crisis period and relies on elite interviews and secondary sources from Turkey. It problematizes how an economic growth model dependent on foreign capital inflows, which are contingent on global financial cycles, influences the trajectory of bureaucratic autonomy. Specifically, we argue that dependence on foreign capital flows for economic growth creates an unstable macroeconomic policy environment: while the expansionary episode of the global financial cycle masks conflicts between the incumbent and bureaucracy, the contractionary episode threatens the political survival of the incumbent. In the case of Turkey, this has incentivized the ruling coalition to resort to executive aggrandizement to control monetary policy and banking regulation, which resulted in a dramatic decay of the autonomy of the regulatory agencies since 2013.
This article contributes to our understanding of how and why developing countries would comply with international banking regulatory standards, Basel standards. The article demonstrates the interplay between opportunity structures constituted by transnationalization of public policymaking and domestic institutional setting, and how forces of compliance resonate in the domestic politics of compliance. The empirical findings are based on Turkey's compliance with Basel standards. It relies on fieldwork that involves semi-structured qualitative interviews with senior regulators and bankers, which are complemented with analysis of secondary data. The article shows that a capable and willing regulator could capitalize on the top-down policymaking style which restricts the regulatee's access to international negotiations, and sets the terms at the domestic level. Direct access to international negotiations, resource asymmetry in favor of the regulator, and superior “negotiation knowledge” helped the regulator pacify a critical, skeptical regulatee, and drive the compliance process. The article also shows that the compliance process takes place at three stages: policy formulation at the international level, an “interpretation stage” in between the international and the domestic levels, and finally the domestic policy process.