Fulya Apaydin

Fulya Apaydin

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Fulya Apaydin

Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals, Barcelona, Spain

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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6 June 2022 in Review of International Political Economy
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Journal Article
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FAFulya Apaydin
Fulya Apaydin
MÇMehmet Kerem Çoban
Mehmet Kerem Çoban
Recent debates on financialization in emerging market economies highlight the terms of unequal exchange that they are embedded in, where international capital flows steered by powerful financial actors and transnationalized banks have a major impact on economic growth performance. As a result, many of the small open economies in the Global South have become increasingly sensitive to international market volatilities, as the post-2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) episode has shown. Yet, we know much less about the political implications of these interactions. How do unequal financial relations influence political trajectories in emerging market economies? Using process tracing and based on original evidence from Turkey, we find that when GDP growth is dependent on financial inflows under a credit-led growth model, the constraints on the domestic policy space following an economic crisis allowed the ruling party to instrumentalize monetary and regulatory institutions as financial agents of political repression.


18 August 2024 in Regulation & Governance
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Journal Article
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MCM. Kerem Coban
M. Kerem Coban
FAFulya Apaydin
Fulya Apaydin
Political decisions over economic growth policies influence the degree of bureaucratic autonomy and regulatory governance dynamics. Yet, our understanding of these processes in the Global South is somewhat limited. The article studies the post‐Global Financial Crisis period and relies on elite interviews and secondary sources from Turkey. It problematizes how an economic growth model dependent on foreign capital inflows, which are contingent on global financial cycles, influences the trajectory of bureaucratic autonomy. Specifically, we argue that dependence on foreign capital flows for economic growth creates an unstable macroeconomic policy environment: while the expansionary episode of the global financial cycle masks conflicts between the incumbent and bureaucracy, the contractionary episode threatens the political survival of the incumbent. In the case of Turkey, this has incentivized the ruling coalition to resort to executive aggrandizement to control monetary policy and banking regulation, which resulted in a dramatic decay of the autonomy of the regulatory agencies since 2013.

16 July 2018 in Regulation & Governance
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Journal Article
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FAFulya Apaydin
Fulya Apaydin
Until recently, most empirical support for theories on regulatory governance has been derived from democratizing and democratic settings. The assumption behind the selection of these cases relies on an understanding that non‐democratic systems will not nurture independent and autonomous regulatory practices. This paper closely examines this claim by problematizing variations in the regulation of the Islamic banking and finance industry based on recent findings from Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates. Combining historical data with field interviews, the findings reveal that historical legacies and regime institutions that frame political competition play a more nuanced role in the contemporary governance of market exchanges in non‐democratic settings. In particular, the type of political competition in authoritarian regimes influences the resulting configuration of regulatory institutions that govern Islamic banking and finance, which accommodate varying degrees of autonomy.

1 March 2012 in The European Journal of Development Research
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Journal Article
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FAFulya Apaydin
Fulya Apaydin

22 February 2024 in Competition & Change
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Journal Article
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FAFulya Apaydin
Fulya Apaydin
This study shows that in peripheral economies that are linked into circuits of global capital on unequal terms, attempts to change the core features of an existing growth regime without broader political support intensify externally induced conflict among the ruling coalition. Under these circumstances, a transition to a new demand regime within a short time frame is more likely to take place via authoritarian intervention when the political cost of repression is lower than the cost of redistribution. In developing these points, the analysis builds on evidence from Turkey: following the 2008 global credit crunch, the Justice and Development Party’s (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) domestic demand-led and credit-fueled growth under dependent financialization has experienced a major crisis. However, the subsequent push to replace this regime with a profit-led model with an emphasis on exports worsened the conflict among the political coalition supporting the party as their preferences over monetary policy began to diverge. A temporary resolution of this deepening rift has been possible by way of an authoritarian intervention under R. T. Erdogan’s presidential bid in 2017–18. By situating the debate on the relationship between growth regimes and political institutions, the study further unpacks the nexus between democratic backsliding, dominant social blocs, and economic growth in the periphery of Europe.